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INTRODUCTION

Over the past year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit issued a reladvely small hody of new precedential
opinions in the field of government contracts. Indeed, during 2011,
the court issued only twenty-two precedendal opinions in this area,
seven of which were in the "non-mainstream" context of Winstar and
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) lidgadon.' While it is not possible to draw
many hroad conclusions from the reladvely small number of
remaining decisions, there were four main developments that likely
will be of interest to practitioners in the field.
First, the number of bid protest decisions published by the Federal
Circuit in 2011 continued to dvwndle as compared to recent years. In
the past year, the Federal Circuit published only two hid protest
decisions. Allied Technology Group, Inc. v. United States and Turner
Construction Co. v. United States {Turner III).^ In comparison, in 2010,

1. See Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit's 2010 Government
Gontracts Decisions, 60 AM. U . L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2011) (characterizing the Winstar
Ccises and spent nuclear fuel cases as "non-mainstream").
2. 649 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
3. 645 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Because this was the third opinion in the
case's history, this Article refers to this opinion as Turner III
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the Federal Circuit published three bid protest decisions," and, in
2009, it published seven bid protest decisions." This trend is
consistent with that of the Comptroller General!, where the surge in
the number of bid protests filed annually betv/een 2007 and 2010
flattened in 2011." The reduction in bid protest decisions by the
Federal Circuit may be a function of the Government's recent record
of successfully defending its procurement decisions before the Court
of Federal Claims (the COFC or Claims Court) and in the Federal
Circuit. Indeed, of the ten bid protest decisions issued by the Federal
Circuit in 2009 and 2010, the Federal Circuit's disposition favored the
Government in all but one of these cases.'
In keeping with this trend, both of the Federal Circuit's 2011 bid
protest decisions favored the Government. Both Allied and Turner III
involved proceedings that commenced at the COFC following an
earlier bid protest before the Government Accountability Office
(GAO).* In Allied, the COFC agreed widi the decision of the GAO,
which denied the earlier bid protest, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed." Conversely, in Turner III, both the COFC and the Federal
Circuit effectively overruled the GAO's earlier decision by ruling that
it was unreasonable for the Government to have followed the GAO's
recommendadons sustaining the original protest.'" Given the
deference the COFC and Federal Circuit usually give to GAO
recommendadons," this outcome is unusual, and it seems unlikely
4. See Schooner, supra note 1, at 1085-89.
5. See Daniel P. Craham et al., 2009 Government Contract Law Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 991, 993 (2010).
6. See U.S. Cov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CAO-12-199SP, COMPTROLLER
CENERAL'S REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2011 ), available at http://www.gao.gov/
special.pubs/bidprolI.pdf (reporting^ that the number of bid protests filed in the
years 2007-2010 increased by 6%, 17%, 20% and 16%, respectively, but that in 2011,
the number of bid protests filed increased by only 2%). Similarly, the number of bid
protests decided on their merits decreased from 441 in 2010 to 417 in 2011. Id.
7. 5«« Schooner, supra note 1, at 1085-89 (discussing.the Federal Circuit's three
bid protest decisions in 2010 and noting that the court affirmed the COFC's denial
of the protest in two cases: Savantage Financial Services, Inc. v. United States, 595
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir.
2010)); Craham et al., supra note 5, at 995 (noting the Federal Circuit's decision in
each of its seven 2009 bid protest decisions "favored the Government and
emphasized the need for judicial restraint and deference co procuring officials"). Of
the bid protest decisions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2009 and 2010, the only one
where the protester enjoyed some degree of success was Resource Conservation Group v.
United States, 597 F.5d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2010), where the Federal Circuit held that the
COFC improperly dismissed a protest for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the
protest to the COFC for further proceedings. Id. at 1247.
8. Turner in, 645 F.3d at 1379; Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 649 F.3d
1320,1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9. AZfoed, 649F.3datl322.
10. Turner IN, 645 F.5d at 1579.
11. M at 1584.
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tbat Turner III will usber in a new era of Federal Circuit reversals of
die GAO."
Second, 2011 saw an unusually large number of cases addressing
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, the COFC, and the Boards of
Contract Appeals (the Boards). In the majority of these cases, the
Federal Circuit took a broad view of tbe respecdve jurisdictions of
tbese tribunals over government contract disputes." For example, in
Slattery v. United States,''^ the Federal Circuit, in an en bane decision,
beld that the Tucker Act" grants the COFC jurisdicdon to entertain
suits against a non-appropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporadon (FDIC), and expressly
disavowed all of the circuit's prior case law to tbe contrary.'** In doing
so, tbe Federal Circuit explained tbat, under the Tucker Act,
jurisdiction is "not [based on] bow tbe government endty is funded
or its obligadons met, but [on] wbetber tbe government endty was
acting on behalf of the government."" In Todd Construction, L.P. v.
United States,'^ the Federal Circuit took a similarly broad view of its
jurisdicdon; tbe Todd Construction court beld tbat tbe COFC bas tbe
authority, pursuant to the Tucker Act and the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA),'" to hear challenges to agency-issued performance evaluadons
that are mandated by tbe Federal Acquisidon Reguladon (FAR).'" In
Holmes v. United States,^' the Federal Circuit setded a longstanding
split among tbe decisions of tbe COFC as well as tbe otber circuit
courts of appeals regarding wbether the COFC has jurisdicdon under
the Tucker Act to hear claims for an alleged breacb of a Tide VIl"
12. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (providing context to suggest a
narrow interpretation of the 7'umer///decision).
13. See, e.g, Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (broadly construing the COFC's jurisdiction on the basis of congressional
intent); Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane)
(recognizing that "Tucker Act jurisdiction does not depend on and is not limited by
whether the government entity receives or draws upon appropriated funds").
14. 635 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (2006).
16. Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1301 (holding that any "[c]onflicting precedent shall no
longer be relied upon").
17. Id. This holding was met with vigorous dissent by four of the judges, who
criticized the majority's holding as "eviscerat[ing]" more than a half century of case
law holding that the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to
contracts entered into by NAFIs. Id. at 1321 (Cajarsa, J., dissenting); see infra Part
ILA (discussing the Slattery dissent in more detail).
18. 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
19. 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101-09 (West 2011) (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 60113 (2006)).
20. 'Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1308. The Federal Acquisition Regulation is found
at Tide 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
21. 657 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
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setdement agreement.
Again, the Federal Circuit resolved this
dispute in favor of finding jurisdiction over these claims.'" Finally, in
Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar!" the court held that, under the CDA,
a contractor is not required to prove that it actually had either an
express or an implied-in-fact contract to estahlish jurisdiction.'"
Rather, the CDA "requires no more than a non-frivolous allegation of
a contract with the government" to estahlish the Boards' jurisdiction
over a dispute."
Other decisions, however, took a narrower view of the court's
jurisdiction. For example, in what appears to be the first puhlished
Federal Circuit case applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation!^ the Federal Circuit, in
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States,^ partially reversed the COFC's

dismissal of a plaintiffs case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500, "which
generally prohihits simultaneous actions against the government in
separate forums" and "was enacted to prevent a claimant from
seeking recovery in district court and the Court of Claims for the
same conduct pleaded under different legal authorities."'" The
Federal Circuit explained that, "[a]fter Tohono, it is clear that [the
court] must: (1) not view § 1500 narrowly; (2) focus only on whether
two claims have the same operative facts and not on the relief
requested; and (3) determine whether two suits share substantially
the same operative facts."" Applying these guidelines, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the Covernment that the COFC properly

23. //o/TOe.s, 657F.3datl306.
24. Id.; see also Tueker Aet Provides Jurisdietion OverBreach of Settlement Agreement, Fed.
Cir. Holds, 53 Gov'T CONTRACTOR 1 305, Sept. 21, 2011, £t 10 [hereinafter Tucker Act
Provides Jurisdiction] (claiming that the Holmes decision is supported by Federal
Circuit precedent); COEC Has Exclusive jurisdiction Over Claim AUeging Breach of
Settlement Agreement, 41 Cov'T CONTRACTOR \ 420, Oct. 6, 1999, at 16 [hereinafter
COEC Has Exclusive Jurisdiction] (discussing Puerto Rico v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl.
618 (1999), and nodng that, in that case, the COFC had exclusive jurisdicdon
because the plaintiff was challenging the breach of a settlement agreement and not
the authority to actually setde). Moreover, the Holmes court favored a broad view of
the COFC's jurisdicdon, hy holding that the "accrual suspension rule" applies to such
claims, thus permitdng the court to hear claims for breaches of Tide VII agreements
that might otherwise be undmely. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1322; see also infra Part II.D
(discussing the court's holding regarding the "accrual suspension rule").
25. 660 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
26. M at 1353.
27. -Id
28. 131S.Ct. 1723 (2011).
29. 659F.3dll59(Fed. Cir. 2011).
30. Id at 1163 (cidng Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1728).
31. /d. at 1164.
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dismissed two out of the plaintiffs three claims as duphcative with
claims brought before the district court.'^
While it may be unwise to draw too strong of a conclusion from
such a small number of jurisdictional cases decided in 2011, they do
seem to suggest, on balance, the Federal Circuit's willingness to
protect its role, as well as the role of the COFC and the Boards, as
designated tribunals for the resolution of government contract
disputes.
Third, among the cases decided in 2011, Todd Construction and
Slattery seem most likely to affect the composition of the docket of the
COFC and the Federal Circuit going forward.
Indeed, for
government contractors, the importance of receiving favorable
performance evaluations cannot be understated, as a contractor's
prior performance is often a critical element in determining whether
the contractor will receive future work from the Government. Given
the importance of the performance evaluation after Todd Construction,
legal challenges to performance evaluations are likely to be more
common, particularly where these challenges are added as secondary
claims to a complaint primarily seeking monetary relief pursuant to
the CDA. Moreover, following the court's en bane holding in Slattery,
an increase in cases before the COFC and the Federal Circuit
involving NAFIs also seems likely.
Finally, the past year saw a substantial increase in Federal Circuit
decisions addressing the calculation of damages in the long-running
saga of SNF cases. Previous decisions of the Federal Circuit
established the Government's liability for failing to begin accepting
SNF from the nation's nuclear utilities,^' and the court's decisions this
year focused primarily on the proper calculation of the quantum of
damages owed by the Government to the utilities for breach of the
Government's contractual obligation to begin accepting SNF by
January 31, 1998."
32.

Id. at 1164-65. Similarly, in Systems Development Carp. v. McHugh, 658 F.3d

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the Federal Circuit afFirmed the decision of the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals that it lacked jurisdiction over a monetary claim
that was untimely. Id. at 1342. While this decision did not break any substantial new
legal ground, it demonstrated the importance of ensuring that claims are timely
submitted and appealed where necessary.
33. See, e.g., S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (characterizing the Federal Circuit's previous decision in Nebraska Public
Power District v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane)); see also
infra note 543 and accompanying text (discussing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982 and the government's contractual duty to begin receiving SNF by January 31,
1998).
34. See, e.g., S. Nuclear Operating, 637 F.3d at 1302 (addressing issues related to the
calculation of damages).
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Many of the issues raised in these decisions, are specific to the
Standard Contract between the Government and the nuclear utilities
for the management of SNF, and most government contracts counsel
will find them of little, if any, utility.^" Other issijes in these decisions,
however, relate to the calculation of damages generally and may be of
broader interest. For example, in Boston Edison Co. v. United States^

the Federal Circuit held that because damages for partial breach may
only be recovered to the extent that they are actually incurred as of
the time of trial, damages for partial breach cannot be recovered
under a diminution of value theory when assets are sold to a third
party.'' In Energy Northwest v. United States^^ the Federal Circuit held
that when the Government breaches a contract, the Government is
immune from damages for interest and financing expenses incurred
by the contractor to mitigate the breach absent a changes clause in
the contract.'^ Moreover, several of the 2011 SNF decisions
reaffirmed the recoverability of indirect overhead expenses "by
whatever means available," so long as the cumulative result is a
reasonable certainty that the awarded costs were actually caused by
the breach.^"
This Article discusses twenty-one of the twenty-two precedential
decisions that were issued in 2011.^' The decisions are grouped into
35. See, e.g., id. at 1303, 1305 (addressing the need for remand where neither the
utility nor the Government had introduced evidence concerning damages using the
SNF acceptance rates that were mandated by the Federal Circuit in Carolina Power &
Light Co. V. United States, 573 F.3d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2009), as well as the
Government's ability to invoke the "Unavoidable Delays" clause of the Standard
Contract following the D.C. Circuit's mandamus order in Northern States Power Co.
V. Department of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also'B.oi,. Edison Co.
V. United States, 658 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (addressing whether fees paid
by the utilities to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were recoverable as damages) ;
Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1363, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(addressing the proper calculation of damages based on a hypothetical "exchange
market" for SNF removal allocations if the Government had not breached the
Standard Contract). The Federal Circuit's resolution of these issues will likely have
little impact for government contracts counsel outside of the area of SNF.
36. 658 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
37. Id. at 1366.
58. 641 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
39. Id. at 1311-15; see also Bos. Edison, 658 F.3d at 1570-72 (denying the plaintiffs
costs of securing capital because it was unable to demonstrate that the Standard
Contract had any provisions waiving the no-interest rule).
40. Dairyland Power, 645 F.3d at 1373-74; Energy Ntu., 641 F.3d at 1309; see also S.
Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 655 F.3d 1319, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the
COFC's award of indirect overhead costs).
41. This Article does not discuss the Federal Circuit's decisions in Stockton East
Water District v. United Slates, 638 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Stockton, the Federal
Circuit granted in part and denied in part the Government's petition for a panel
rehearing of its earlier decision in Stockton East Water Distnct v. United States, 583 F.3d
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Stockton, 638 F.3d at 785. See genercdly Graham et al., supra note
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four categories: (1) bid protests and contract formadon issues; (2)
contract performance disputes; (3) Winstar cases; and (4) spent
nuclear fuel cases.
I.

BID PROTESTS AND CONTRACT FORMATION

The number of bid protest decisions published by the Federal
Circuit in 2011 condnued to dwindle as compared with those
published over the previous couple of years. In keeping with this
trend, the Federal Circuit published only two bid protest decisions in
2011, Allied and Turner III. In comparison, in 2010, the court
published three bid protest decisions,"' and in 2009, it published
seven bid protest decisions."' This trend is consistent with the one
experienced at the Comptroller General where the surge that was
experienced in the number of bid protests filed annually between
2007 and 2010 flattened in 2011."" In 2011, the Federal Circuit
published only one decision reladng to contract formadon. Chattier v.
United States.''"

In all three cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In each of the two bid protest cases,
the proceeding commenced at the COFC following an earlier bid
protest filed with the GAO."'^ In Allied, the COFC agreed with the
decision of the GAO, which denied the earlier bid protest, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed."' Conversely, in Turner III, the COFC and
the Federal Circuit both disagreed with the GAO's decision that
sustained an earlier bid protest, both ruling that it was unreasonable
for the Government to follow the GAO's recommendations in its
decision on the earlier bid protest."'
In Turner III, the Government lost the two rounds of the prior legal
proceedings. First, the GAO sustained the bid protest filed by
Turner's compedtors and recommended termination of the contract
awarded to Turner."" Then, after the Government accepted those
5, at 1042-43 (discussing the 2009 decision).
42. See Schooner, supra note 1, at 1085-89 (discussing the resolution of the 2010
bid protest cases and the potential impact on government interests).
43. See Graham et al., supra note 5, at 993 (noting that all seven 2009 bid protests
favored the government's position).
44. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
45. 632 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
46. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States {Turner III), 645 F.5d 1577, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Allied Tech. Crp., Inc. v. United States, 649 F.5d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
47. Allied, 649 F.3d at 1322.
48. TuTOer///, 645F.5datl579.
49. Id. at 1383.
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recommendations and terminated Turner's contract, the COFC
entered a judgment in favor of Turner in its bid protest against the
Government's decision to terminate its contract, finding that the
Government's decision to accept the GAO's recommendations was
arbitrary and capricious/" Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the COFC's judgment."' Notwithstanding the
Government's consecutive losses, ultimately, the status of Turner's
Government contract has come full circle and the original intention
of the Government to award the contract to Turner has been
vindicated." In the final analysis, therefore, in all of its decisions
regarding bid protests and contract formation matters, the Federal
Circuit approved the Government's actions, at least as originally
conceived.
A. Turner Construction Co. v. United States (Turner III)
In Turner III, a case addressing a FAR Organizational Conflict of
Interest (OCIs) issue, the Federal Circuit affirmed a COFC decision"
that overturned the GAO ruling in two earlier bid protests.^'' The
COFC's decision held that the GAO's recommendations, and the
Government's subsequent decision to adopt them, were
unreasonable, thus departing from a longstanding policy of
deference to GAO recommendations.^" Because of the many twists
and turns in this saga, the multitude of parties involved and the factspecific nature of the OCI analysis,^'^ some background is necessary.
50. Id.
51. M. at 1388.
52. Id. (reinstating Turner's military contract, which the Army had overturned
but upon further examination found advantageous to its interests).
53. Turner Cpnstr. Co. v. United States (rumerl), 94 Fed. Cl. 561 (2010), appeal
dismissed in part by 407 F. App'x 478 (Fed. Cir. 2011), affd, 645 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
54. Id. at 581 (disagreeing with the CAO rulings in B.L. Harbert-Brasfield &
Corrie, JV, B-402229, 2010 CPD \ 69 (Comp. Gen., Feb. 16, 2010) and
McCarthy/Hunt, JV, B-402229.2, 2010 CPD \ 68 (Comp. Gen., Feb. 16, 2010)).
55. Id. at 586. As explained by outside counsel for the successful plaintiffappellee, however, the Federal Circuit's decision in this case should not be
considered a precedent allowing federal agencies more latitude in declining to
follow GAO decisions; rather, the Federal Circuit's decision should be understood as
limited to its own specific facts consistent with the fact-sp»eciñc nature of the CAO's
review of OCI issues. See Winning Attorney Discusses Federal Circuit's OCI Ruling in
Turner Construction Case, 96 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) NO. 414 (Oct. 25, 2011)
(intervievjring one of the attorneys who successfully represented Turner Construction
regarding the implication of the Federal Circuit's decision).
56. FAR 9.505, which lays down the general OCI rules, states: "Each individual
contracting situation should be examined on the basis of its particular facts and the
nature of the proposed contract." FAR 9.505 (2011); see OÍJO Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc.
V. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing FAR 9.505 and noung
that it "recognizes that the identification of OCIs and the evjiluation of mitigation
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In June 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (die Army) issued
a two-phased solicitation to design and huild a Covernment hospital
at Fort Benning, Ceorgia.*' At the conclusion of Phase I, the Army
selected three offerors for submitting Phase II proposals: (1) B.L.
Harbert-Brasfield
& Corrie, JV
(Harhert/Corrie);
(2)
McCartiiy/Hunt, JV (McCarty/Hunt); and (3) Turner Construction
Company (Turner) .**
Turner proposed that an architectural and engineering firm called
Ellerbe Becket (EB) serve as a suhcontractor for the design portion of
the contract.*' In June 2007, prior to issuing the solicitation, the
Army entered into a contract for design-related technical assistance
in connection with the solicitation vñth a joint venture consisting of
two companies: (1) Hayes, Seay, Mattern & Mattern (HSMM); and
(2) Hellmutii, Obata & Kasshaüm, Inc. (HOK) (collectively
HSMM/HOK)."" This contract called for hoth the preparation of the
hospital design concept and a technical review of the proposals to be
suhmitted to the Covernment."'
On Septemher 28, 2009, tiie Army made an award to Turner."'
Following this award, both McCarthy/Hunt and Harhert/Gorrie filed
hid protests with the CAO making various OCI-related allegations;
these allegations were prompted hy the fact that, during the
solicitation process, EB (Turner's subcontractor) engaged in
discussions with HSMM's parent company, AECOM, regarding a
proposals are fact-specific inquiries"). See generally, Graham et al., supra note 5, at 998
(discussing the contribudon of the Axiom decision to the field of government
contract law).
57. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States {Turner III), 645 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed
Cir. 2011); see 10 U.S.C. § 2305a (2006) (describing the two-phased solicitadon
procedure); see also 41 U.S.C. § 253m (2006) (including similar provisions for nonmihtaiy agencies); FAR Subpart 36.3 (2011) (implemendng 10 U.S.C. § 2305a and 41
U.S.C. § 253m). The two-phase design-build procedures may be accomplished
through two consecudve solicitadons or one solicitadon covering both phases. FAR
36.303. Phase I describes the scope of work and includes various technical (but not
cost or price-based) evaluadon factors and a statement regarding the maximum
number of offerors that will be selected to submit Phase II proposals. Id. at 36.303-1.
Phase II includes a second round of proposals limited to the ofiferors selected in
Phase I; it involves a new set of evaluadon factors that cover both cost or price-related
factors, as well as technical factors. Id. at 36.303-2. At die conclusion of Phase II, one
offeror is selected for award based on FAR Part 15 procedures. Id. See generally Kurt
A. Didier, Construction Contracting and the New Two-Phase Design-Build Selection

Procedures: Balancing Eßciency with Full and Open Competition, 27 PuB. CON. L.J. 589

(1998) (analyzing the effect of two-phase contracdng procedures on the field of
military construcdon law).
58.

TMTO«-///, 645F.3datl380.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id
Id. at 1379-80.
Id
Id at 1380.

2012]

2011 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1023

possible merger.'^' HSMM was a member of the HSMM/HOK joint
venture, which the Army had retained to assist with the technical
evaluation of the competing proposals in the project.**"" The
discussions between AECOM and EB were successful and, in October
2009, the companies completed a merger.'^''
On February 16, 2010, the GAO decided to sustain the two
protests,'^^ finding that Turner/EB had an "unequal access to
information" and that there had also been a "biased ground rules"
OCI;" consequently, it recommended that the Army proceed with the
procurement after eliminating the Turner/EB team from the
competition.*^ On March 19, 2010, the Army announced that it had
accepted the GAO recommendations and eliminated the Turner/EB
team from the procurement.^' Turner then fiLed a bid protest with

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1379-80.
65. /á. at 1381.
66. See Turner Constr. Co. v. United States {Turner I), 94 Fed. Cl. 561, 563
(2010), appeal dümissed in part by 407 F. App'x 478 (Fed. Cir. 2011), affd, 645 F.3d
1377(Fed. Cir. 2011).
67. According to FAR Subpart 9.5, there are three groups of OCI situations. See
generally FAR 2.101 (explaining that an organizational corîflict of interest arises when
a person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to
the Government, or the person's objectivity in performing the contract work is or
might be otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage").
The first group consists of situations in which a contractor obtains access to
nonpublic information as a result of its performance of a Government contract and
the information may provide that contractor a competitive advantage in a later
competition for another Government contract. FAR 9.505-4(a); see also Keith R.
Szeliga, Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: A Guide to Identifying and

Mitigating Organizational Conflicts of Interests, 35 PuB. CONT. L.J. 639, 648-49 (2006)

(classifying this group of cases as unequal access to information" cases and stating
that the main OCI concern in this line of situations is the risk of the contractor
gaining a competitive advantage). The second group consists of situations in which a
contractor, as part of the performance of one Government contract, has set the
ground rules for another Government contract, such as through the development of
the statement of work or specifications for that other contract. FAR at 9.505-2 (a)(b); see also Szeliga, supra, at 651-52 (labeling these situations as the "biased ground
rules" group of cases, and suggesting that the main OCI concern in these cases is that
the contractor may skew the competition, whether deliberately or not, in its own
favor). The third group of OCI situations consists of cases where a contractor's work
under one Government contract could entail its evaluating itself or a competitor,
either through an assessment of performance under another contract or an
evaluation of offers. FAR at 9.505-3; see also Szeliga, supra, at 660 (characterizing this
final group as "impaired objectivity" cases, and noting that the OCI concern in these
cases is that the contractor's ability to provide inripartial advice to the Government
will be impaired). See generally Daniel I. Gordon, Organiiational Conflicts of Interest: A
Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25 (2005) (suggesting reasons for the
increased frequency of OCIs in recent times and surveying relevant case law in the
U.S. federal procurement system).
68. B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010 CPD f 69, at 11 (Comp.
Gen. Feb. 16,2010).
69. Turner I, 94 Fed. Cl. at 563.
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the COFC on March 31, 2010.'° On July 16, 2010, the COFC held
that the Army acted arbitrarily and capriciously in implementing the
GAO's decision because the trial court found that the GAO's decision
itself was irrational. Accordingly, the trial court granted Turner
injunctive relief, which included reinstatement of Turner's contract."
On August 5, 2010, consistent with the COFC's decision, the Army
reinstated Turner's contract;'^ Harbert/Gorrie appealed to the
Federal Circuit, which affirmed the COFC's decision."
The GAO's ruling regarding whether an "unequal access" OGI
situation existed focused primarily on the potential for access to
nonpublic information that was created as a result of the merger
discussions between AECOM and EB personnel, rather than on
whether access to such nonpublic information wais actually obtained
by AECOM or EB." The GAO stated:
[W]ith respect to the AECOM employees who worked on the
design contract, without credible evidence that AECOM had
systems in place to prevent the receipt of competitively useful
information by EB, there is no reasonable basis to assume that the
information was not made available to EB employees.'*
With regard to the "biased ground rules" OCI category, the GAO
concluded that, through AECOM's work on supporting the Army in
developing the hospital design concept, AECOM obtained special
knowledge of the Army's requirements that would have enabled
AECOM to provide Turner/EB with an unfair advantage in the
competition over the other competitors."^
70. Id.
71. /¿.at586.
72. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States {Turner III), 645 F.5d 1377, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
^
73. Id. at 1379. Earlier, Harbert/Gorrie filed with the COFC a Motion for Stay of
Injunction Pending Appeal, which the COFC denied. Turner Constr. Co. v. United
States {TurnerII), 94 Fed. Cl. 586, 597 (2010).
74. B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010 CPD \ 69, at 6-9 (Comp.
Gen. Feb. 16, 2010); see also Turner III, 645 F.3d at 1587 (supporting the GOFC's
determination that the GAO erred in its assessment of whether there was unequal
access).
75. B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, 2010 CPD \ 69, at 9. The GAO also found
that the access restrictions imposed on AECOM's employees were not sufficient and
that the record did not include any indication that AECOM disclosed to the
contracting officer its insufficient mitigation effort; therefore, the contracting officer
could not have been involved in developing or monitoring these mitigation efforts.
Id. In this respect, the FAR imposes on the contracting officer the responsibility to
"[a]void, neutralize or mitigate significant potential confiicts before contract award "
FAR9.504(a)(2) (2011).
76. See B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Garrie, JV, 2010 CPD f 69, at 9-11 (concluding
that the record did not contain any information suggesting that the Army supervised
AECOM to mitigate this OCI concern, and further, that it would be unreasonable to
assume that such supervision, even if it existed, would have prevented AECOM from
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With regard to both of the GAO's determinations, the COFC found
that the GAO relied on mere suspicions or innuendos, rather than on
"hard facts," thus contrasting the GAO's questionable determinations
with the thorough investigation and analysis conducted by the
contracting officer (CO), albeit after the fact."
The COFC
additionally criticized the GAO for discounting the CO's post-award
investigation and findings, determining that this discounting was
irrational.'' The Federal Circuit affirmed and adopted all of the bases
on which the COFC relied to justify its conclusion that the GAO's
decision was irrational. Among other things, the Federal Circuit
stated that the COFC correctly reviewed the GAO decision,™ which
was not a de novo review, as the appellant asserted, but rather an
inquiry as to "whether the GAO's decision was a rational one."'" With
regard to application of this standard, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the COFC did not err in finding that the GAO's decision "lacked
a rational basis."" In this regard, the Federal Circuit also did not find
error with the COFC's conclusion that, even though its review of
GAO decisions should be a deferential one, the GAO's decision did
not have a rational basis because the GAO's analysis failed to give any
deference to the CO's analysis.'^ Thus, in the particular factual
circumstances of this case, the tension between two required
deferences was resolved with the required deference to the CO's
using this special knowledge it had gained to unfairly benefit the Turner/EB team).
77. 5e«Turner Constr. Co. v. United States (TurnerI), 94 Fed. Cl. 561, 581 (2010)
(noting the CO's determination that the Army's steps to control access to certain
materials were effective in preventing a potential unequal access OCI), appeal
dümüsed in part by 407 F. App'x 478 (Fed. Cir. 2011), affd, 645 F.Sd 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
78. See id. at 574-76 (asserting that the GAO's dismissive approach to the GO's
post-award investigation represented a sharp departure from established precedent).
In this regard, tJie Federal Gircuit noted that "[c]ourts reviewing bid protests
routinely consider post-award OCI analyses and consider evidence developed in
response to a bid protest." Turner Constr. Co. v. United States (TurnerIII), 645 F.3d
1377, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Masai Techs. Corp. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl.
433, 449-50 (2007)) (recognizing that "[i]f the first time an allegation or evidence of
a potential OCI appears is after award, then the earliest time to evaluate that
potential OCI as countenanced by § 9.504(a) (1) might be at tbat time").
79. Turner III, 645 F.3d at 1384; see also Turner I, 94 Fed. Cl. at 571, 574, 579
(providing an overview of and applying the appropriate standard of review of GAO
decisions).
80. Turner III, 645 F.3d at 1384 (quoting HoneyweE, Inc. v. United States, 870
F.2d 644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
81. Id.; see also Army Decision to Follow GAO Recommendation Lacked a Rational Basis,
Fed. Cir. Holds, 53 Gov'T. GONTRACTOR f 245, July 27, 2011, at 10 (explaining that
since the GAO recommendation lacked a rational basis, the Army's decision to follow
the recommendation was also irrational).
82. See Turner III, 645 F.3d at 1384 (recognizing the deference generally given to
a CO with respect to OCIs, and contrasting the depth of review conducted by this
particular CO with that performed by the GAO).
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analysis prevailing over the required deference to the GAO's
1

.

83

analysis.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the COFC's determination that
the GAO's conclusion that the interests of HSMM and EB were
aligned was conclusory and thus lacked a rational basis.'^ The Federal
Circuit similarly adopted the COFC's conclusion that the GAO's
cursory rejection of the well-developed CO's analysis of the "biased
ground rules" OCI determination lacked a rational basis, because it
was based on "mere suspicion and innuendo."'" Likewise, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the COFC's conclusion that the GAO's decision
lacked a rational basis for rejecting the carefully assessed CO's
"unequal access" determination, noting "that the GAO 'failed to cite
any hard facts'" and, instead, pointed only to "vague allegations that
someone 'may have had access' to unidentified information or that
someone 'was familiar with the details.'""^ Finally, with regard to
whether the CO properly addressed the responsibility to mitigate the
potential OCIs, the Federal Circuit distinguished between two
separate CO responsibilities under FAR 9.504(a): (1) the duty to
identify and evaluate potential OCIs, which applies to all types of
OCIs; and (2) the duty to mitigate such conflicts, which applies only
to significant OCIs, noting that there is no requirement for the CO to
document the preliminary analysis." With respect to the duty to
mitigate significant OCIs, the Federal Circuit added that the CO has
83. See id. (noting that the GAO's actions represented a substitution of its own
judgment for the judgment of the CO).
84. See id. at 1384-85 (explaining the COFC's criticism of the GAO's divergence
from precedent with regard to the need for "hard facts" supporting the existence of
an alignment of interests as opposed to suspicion or mere potential for such an
alignment).
85. Id. at 1385. The COFC and the Federal Circuit were both clearly impressed
with the CO's meticulous analysis of the precise state of merger negotiations between
AECOM and EB. Id. at 1385, 1387; see also Turner Constr. Co. v. United States
(Turner I), 94 Fed. Cl. 561, 574, 579 (2010) (contrasting the detailed investigation
conducted by the CO with the more cursory analysis of the GAO), appeal dismissed in
part by 407 F. App'x 478 (Fed. Cir. 2011), affd, 645 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Of
particular importance to this conclusion were the CO's factual findings that: (1) of
the 25-30 AECOM employees that were involved in the merger negotiations with EB,
none was part of the HSMM/HOKjoint venture team that assisted the Army with the
hospital procurement; (2) that AECOM was only one of three firms that showed
interest in acquiring EB, but not the highest bidder; and (3) that the AECOM-EB
negotiations initially failed and were terminated before HSMM/HOK provided any
advice or materials to the Army for the Phase II solicitation. Turner III, 645 F.3d at
1380-81 (noting that after breaking down, the AECOM-EB merger negotiations
subsequendy restarted, but that was a month after the Phase II solicitation materials
proposed by AECOM was complete).
86. Turner III, 645 F.3d at 1385 (quoting Turner I, 94 Fed. Cl. at 581-82).
87. Id. at 1386 (defining a significant OCI as "one which provides the bidding
party a substantial and unfair competitive advantage during the procurement process
on information or data not necessarily available to other bidders").
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considerable discretion to determine whether an OGI is significant.^^
The Federal Gircuit affirmed the GOFG's conclusion that the GO
discharged both of these duties properly.*'
As the Federal Gircuit noted, GAO decisions generally deserve
deference;^'' it was only in the very unusual circumstances of this case
that the Federal Gircuit decided to overturn the GAO decision.^'
Thus, while the Federal Gircuit's decision overturning the GAO's
decision is noteworthy, it seems unlikely that this decision will usher
in a new era of Federal Gircuit decisions challenging the GAO's
recommendations in bid protest cases.
B. Allied Technology Group, Inc. v. United States
Allied Technology Group, Inc. v. United States^ addresses a dilemma

that almost every Government contractor must resolve prior to
submitting an offer or a proposal in response to a Government
solicitation: whether to take exceptions to the solicitation. The
Federal Gircuit's decision in Allied underscores the inherent risk
associated with taking exceptions.
Allied Technology Group (Allied) protested the award of a
Department of Justice (DOJ) commercial item contract for a webbased application for recruiting and staffing employees to Monster
Government Solutions, LLG (Monster), which intervened in the
protest.''^ Allied's protest was based primarily on two'"* allegations:
(1) that the DOJ Gontracting Officer (the GO) should have engaged
in discussions with Allied over the exceptions in its proposal before
disqualifying Allied; and (2) that the CO should have disqualified
Monster's proposal because of the exceptions it took to the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1584 (stating that the COFC recognized that its review of the GAO
decision should be deferential).
91. See Turner I, 94 Fed. Cl. at 581 (finding that the GAO failed to meet the
highly deferential rational basis standard because it lacked specificity and neglected
to properly analyze the CO's determinations).
92. 649 F.5d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
93. Id. at 1322. The "contract" to which the Federal Circuit's decision referred
was actually a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) to be awarded pursuant to the
offeror's General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS)
contract. See Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 16, 25 (2010)
(noting that Allied had been involved in providing similar services since 2001), affd,
649 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See generally FAR 13.503-l(;a) (2011) (characterizing
a BPA as "a simplified method of filling anticipated ref>etidve needs for supplies or
services by establishing 'charge accounts' with qualified sources of supply").
94. See Allied, 649 F.3d at 1326 (declining to address a third allegation brought by
Allied—that the Government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making its best
value determination—based on its affirmation of the COFC's decision on Allied's
first two allegations).
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solicitation's requirement to comply with Section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act (Section 508).'^ Following the contract award.
Allied filed a post-award bid protest with the GAO, which denied the
protest.^^ Allied then filed a second protest with the COFC, which
granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the
Government and Monster."' On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the opinion of the COFC, with the panel majority holding that the
CO's decisions to disqualify Allied's proposal and to accept Monster's
proposal were both reasonable.""
Judge Bryson dissented,
determining he could not uphold the award to Monster because the
CO's decision to accept Monster's proposal was unreasonable.""
Under the DOJ's Request for Quotation (RFQ) evaluation criteria,
the various technical factors, including Past Performance, when
combined, were "significandy more important than price;" however,
the RFQ went on to state that the final award would be made on the
basis of a best value determination, wherein "the total evaluated price
will be the determining factor for award where two or more quotes
are considered substantially technically equal."""'
Ultimately, Allied's bid received a higher technical score than
95. Id. Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 guarantees "individuals with
disabilities who are Federal employees to have access to and use of information and
data that is comparable to [that enjoyed] by those who are not individuals with
disabilities." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 Ü.S.C. § 794d (2006); see Federal
Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 36 C.F.R. § 1194
(2011) (setting forth standards for such access and use); see also FAR 39.201 (a)
(2011) (implementing Section 508).
96. Allied Tech. Grp., Inc., B-402135 et ai, 2010 CPD \ 152, at 2 (Comp. Gen.
Jan. 21,2010).
97. Allied, 94 Fed. Cl. at 24. Monster intervened in both the GAO and the COFC
protests. Id. at 23. Prior to the COFC's ruling on the merits of this case, both Allied
and Monster filed motions with the COFC seeking to supplement the administrative
record with various declarations and other materials, inchiding materials that formed
part of the record before the GAO when addressing the original Allied protest. See
Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 226, 228, 231 (2010) (denying,
with a few limited exceptions, the motions to supplement the record), affd, 649 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Relying on the Federal Circuit's decision in Axiom Resource
Marmgement, Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the COFC
ruled that the Court's review of bid protests should proceed on the basis of the
administrative record before the agency at the time of the procurement decision.
Allied, 92 Fed. Cl. at 229. Accordingly, the only materials with which the COFC
agreed to supplement the administrative record were those that the DOJ actually had
reviewed or those that "were available to and probably should have been reviewed by
the agency" before making the award decision. Id. at 231. See generally Graham et.
al., supra note 5, at 998 (discussing the Federal Circuit's decision in Axiom).
98. Affieá, 649F.3datl333.
99. See id. at 1335-36 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (relying on Monster's lack of
compliance writh Section 508—in comparison to Allied's full compliance—as the
basis for determining that the CO's decision was unreasonable).
100. Id. at 1323 (majority opinion) (adding that disparities in technical
capabilities between offerors may justify selection of a more expensive bid).
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Monster's bid."" Notwithstanding the technical superiority of Allied's
bid, the CO decided to award the contract to Monster because,
among other reasons, Allied's bid proposed a total evaluated price
(TEP) of $7 million, whereas Monster's TEP v/as $3.2 million.'"' As
the CO explained, the best value analysis resulted in a conclusion
that Allied's 5.04% high technical score did not justify a 100% price
103

premium.
The primary reason, however, why the CO selected Monster's bid
over Alhed's, was the CO's determination that the exceptions Allied
took to the RFQ were tantamount to a refusal to accept material RFQ
requirements.'"" The RFQ stated that, to be eligible, an offeror must
"accept. . . each of the requirements, provisions, terms and
conditions, and clauses stated in all sections of this RFQ."'°^
Moreover, the RFQ contained a section titled "Part 4—^Additional
Documents," which stated:
The Offeror shall highlight any provisions that conflict with the
Terms and Conditions outlined in Document B. These documents
vnW be reviewed by the Government. Any Terms and Conditions
that are considered unacceptable by the Government and cannot
be resolved may result in the Offeror being removed from
consideration.
Conflicting provisions will be considered as
exceptions to the Terms and Conditions of the RFQ.
Finally, the RFQ warned offerors "that any exception taken to the
terms and conditions of the RFQ may adversely impact its evaluation
rating."'"'
Based on these provisions, Allied's bid was disqualified. Monster's
bid—^which the CO determined did not take any exceptions—^was the
only bid remaining and was selected for award.'"' In fact, however,
both Allied and Monster took exceptions to différent portions of the
RFQ. Allied's bid listed six exceptions, all relating to the relations
101. See id. at 1325 (referring to Allied's superior technical score as a "small
technical advantage").
102. Id. at 1324-25.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. M at 1323.
106. Id. The potential confiict addressed in this provision could have been
created as a result of a contradiction between provisions in the RFQ, on one hand,
and a contradiction between provisions included in each offeror's standard
commercial Master Subscription Agreement (MSA) or Service Level Agreement
(SLA) that was supposed to become part of the BPA, on the other hand. See id. at
1327-29 (noting that in the instant case, such a conflict indeed occurred between
the RFQ and Allied's MSA).
107. /á. at 1325.
108. M a t 1325.
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between its Master Subscription Agreement (MSA) and the Blanket
Purchase Agreement's (BPA) Terms and Conditions.'"' Monster's
bid, while stating that the proposed system was compliant with
Section 508 and attaching the required Section 508 Compliance
Certification,"" also stated, in its "Part 5. Exceptions," that the
proposed system was only "generally compliant with exceptions to the
relevant Section 508 requirements" and that it had "minor compliance
exceptions" to the Section 508 requirements.'"
Allied first argued its disqualification was inconsistent with the
terms of the sohcitation. The RFQ stated that "[a]ny Terms and
Conditions that are considered unacceptable by the Government and
cannot be resolved may result in the offeror being removed from
consideration.""^ Based on this language. Allied asserted that the
RFQ required that the CO engage in discussions with an offeror that
had taken exceptions—before disqualifying its proposal—to
determine whether the confiict created can be resolved, which the
CO failed to do.'" The court rejected this argument for a number of
reasons. First, it noted that the RFQ states clearly that "[t]he
Government intends to make an award on the basis of initial
quotations without the use of discussions. . . . However, the Government

reserves the right to use discussions after receipt of quotations if it is
considered in the Government's best interests to do 50."""

The court

accepted the Government's argument that this language gave the CO
full discretion to conduct discussions."' Second, the Federal Circuit
explained that Allied's interpretation, if accepted, would create a
patent ambiguity in the contract because one provision would require
discussion and another provision would leave this issue exclusively to
the CO's discretion."" In light of this patent ambiguity, the court
109. Id. at 1324,1329.
110. Id. at 1324. The RFQ included a requirement that the proposal offered by an
offeror must comply with Section 508 and that a Section 508 Compliance
Certification must be signed by the contractor. Id. at 1323.
111. See id. at 1324-25 (emphasis added) (noting that the CO, in his award
decision, found that "Monster took no exceptions,' thus apparently ignoring
Monster's statement regarding its "minor compliance exceptions" and relying
instead on Monster's Compliance Certification and other statements to the
contrary); see abo infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text (explaining the
fiexibility of Section 508 as a consideration in the CO's determination regarding
Monster's compliance).
112. Allied, 649 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis added)
113. Id.
^ i/
114. /¿. (emphasis added).
115. See id. at 1328 (arguing that adopting Allied's reading of the RFQ would
amount to an elimination of the CO's discretion over the use of discussions).
116. See id. at 1327-28 (concluding that Allied's interpretation of the RFQ was
erroneous).
.
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concluded that such an argument, if not made the subject of a preaward protest, was waived.'"
The court also was not impressed with Allied's argument that, if the
Government's interpretation were to be accepted, it would render
meaningless the RFQ's "cannot be resolved' phrase."' In fact, the court
stated it was Allied's interpretation that would render meaningless
another RFQ provision—the one granting the CO discretion to
engage in discussions."' Under Allied's interpretation, the court
elaborated, a CO who does not desire to engage in discussions may
be forced to do so by a contractor who takes an exception or simply
submits a proposal that fails to conform to the RFQ.'^" A correct
interpretation, the court concluded, would be one that gives
reasonable meaning to both the RFQ provision highlighted by the
appellees (the CO's discretion regarding v/hether to engage in
discussions) and the one emphasized by Allied ("and cannot be
resolved").'^'
Without definitively opining on the meaning of the phrase "cannot
be resolved," the court offered one possible interpretation that may
reconcile the two seemingly conflicting RFQ provisions: the CO may
be required to hold discussions only when a contractor proposes
additional terms that do not conflict with other RFQ terms, but the
CO's discretion to not engage in such discussions (and, therefore, to
disqualify the contractor) will be maintained when the proposed
additional terms conflict with the RFQ's terms.'"
Having concluded that the RFQ did not require discussions prior
to disqualifying a contractor on the basis of unacceptable exceptions,
the court proceeded to examine whether the CO acted in a rational

117. See id. at 1327 (discussing Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d
1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007), for the proposition that the failure to raise an argument
on the basis of a patent ambiguity prior to bidding results in waiver of the
argument).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1328 (arguing that Allied's interpretation would limit the CO's
discretion to situations wherein an offer was in complete conformance with the
RFQ).
120. See id. (rejecting Allied's position that the RFQ permits CO discretion only in
the face of precise conformance with the RFQ's terms).
121. Id.\ see also Bumside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 854, 860
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) ("A contract must be interpreted as a whole in a manner that gives reasonable
meaning to all its parts and avoids conflicts in, or surplusage of, its provisions.").
122. Allied, 649 F.3d at 1328 (noting that regardless of the exact interpretation of
the phrase "cannot be resolved," it is clear that the phrase does not unequivocally
force a CO to engage in discussions prior to disqualifying an offer).
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manner in disqualifying Allied on this basis.'" The court concluded
that the GO acted reasonably.'"
Allied's second protest ground raised a more interesting question.
Allied asserted that the award to Monster lacked a rational basis
because Monster, like Allied, had taken exceptions to the RFQ.'^^
The panel majority, however, rejected this argument. It explained
that Monster had certified that it met all of the RFQ's technical
requirements and that the GO was entided to rely on this certification
in determining whether to accept the bid.'^** Giting Centech Group, Inc.
V. United States,'" the majority noted that the only time a GO may not
rely on a certification is "where a proposal, on its face, should lead an
agency to the conclusion that an offeror could not comply with the
applicable requirement."'^* Based on this principle, the court found
that the exceptions taken by Monster did not constitute "significant
countervailing evidence" of non-compliance.'^'
The majority
explained that "[c]ompliance with Section 508 is not an all-ornothing attribute of a product, requiring perfect compliance or
disqualification" and that Section 508 and its implementing
123. /d at 1329.
124. See id. at 1329-30 (explaining Allied's argument that the CO disqualified its
proposal on the cumulative basis of all six exceptions, but that because two of the six
were not "true" exceptions, the CO's determination required remand to examine
whether disqualification on the basis of only four of the six exceptions was
appropriate). In support of its argument. Allied cited SEC v. Chmery Corp., 532 U.S.
194 (1947), which required an appeals court to make its judgment exclusively based
on the grounds invoked by the agency in making its decision and "if those grounds
are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administradve
action by subsdtuting what it considers to be more adequate or proper basis." Id. at
196. The Federal Circuit in Allied rejected this argument primarily by not accepdng
the assertion that the CO's disqualification relied only on the aggregate of Allied's
six exceptions. 649 F.3d at 1329.
125. Allied, 649 F.3d at 1530; see supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing
Monster's "excepdon" with regard to compliance with Secdon 508).
126. See Allied, 649 F.3d at 1330 (stadng that failure on the part of an offeror to
abide by a proposal's requirements implicates issues of contract administradon
rather than the appropriateness of the bid decision).
127. 554 F.5d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See generally Graham et al., supra note 5, at
1015-17 (providing an overview of Centech).
128. Allied, 649 F.5d at 1330 (cidng Centech, 554 F.3d at 1039); see also In re
Spectrum Sys., Inc., B-401130, 2009 CPD % 110, at 5 (Comp. Gen. May 15, 2009)
(proposing that "an agency may accept a quotadon's representadon that indicates
compliance with the solicitadon requirements, where there is no significant
countervailing evidence reasonably known to the agency evaluators that should
create doubt whether the oËFeror will or can comply with the requirement")
129. Allied, 649 F.3d at 1331-32 (quodng Spectrum, 2009 CPD \ 110, at 2)
(concluding that the correct benchmark for determining whether the DOJ acted in a
radonal manner is whether the "'generally compliant with excepdons' language in
Monster's proposal consdtute[d] 'significant countervailing evidence reasonably
known to the agency evaluators that should create doubt whether the offeror will or
can comply with the requirement'").
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regulations permit flexible compliance.''°
The majority also
emphasized the fact that Monster's exceptions were only minor,'"
and that they .were supported by a Compliance Certification
providing that, contrary to the exceptions taken. Monster would
comply with Section 508."^
Judge Bryson dissented, rejecting the majority's analysis. He
explained that regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 508
required "specific modes of compliance," and that Monster simply
did not meet these requirements.'^' Moreover, Judge Bryson rejected
the Government's argument—which was accepted by the majority—
that Monster's exceptions to the RFQ were "minor", because the
Section 508 regulations require that products "comply with all
applicable provisions.""^ The dissent also rejected the majority's
assertion üiat Section 508 permits a flexible approach to
compliance.''° According to Judge Biyson, Section 508 allows
contractors to provide an alternative means of access to information
only when strict compliance with the requirements would impose an
"undue burden."'"^ Thus, before taking advantage of the "undue
burden" exception, the CO must explain why and to what extent
"compliance would create an undue burden."'" Because the CO
failed to conduct the requisite analysis and provide the requisite
explanation. Judge Bryson would have remanded the case to give the
DOJ an opportunity to do so.''*
The Federal Circuit's decision in Allied may be interpreted
narrowly as permitting flexible compliance only with regard to
Section 508 requirements. It may also be interpreted more broadly
130. Id. at 1331. As elaborated above, the dissent disagreed with this conclusion,
stating that, for the flexible compliance to be permitted, the CO should have
analyzed whether there was "undue burden" and pro>/ided explanation regarding
such burden, which the CO failed to do in this case. See id. at 1334 (Bryson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the CO initially failed to recognize that Monster had taken
exceptions to the RFQ's Section 508 requirements) ; see also supra text accompanying
note 99 (discussing the dissent's determination that the CO's decision was
unreasonable).
131. See Allied, 649 F.3d at 1332 (citing Centech, 554 F.3d at 1039) (comparing
Monster's exceptions to those in Centech, in which the court determined that tJie Air
Force reasonably followed the GAO's recommendation not to accept Centech's offer
when Centech proposed to perform only 43.2% of the work itself despite a statute
requiring that small business prime contractors perform at least 50% of the work
themselves).
132. W. at 1324.
133. Id. at 1334 (Bryson,J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1335 (emphasis added) (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 1194.2(a) (2011)).
135. Id. at 1334.
136. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794d (a) ( 1 ) (B) (2006) ).
137. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 1194.2(a) (2)).
138. Id. at 1336.
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as recognizing that strict compliance with all the myriad
requirements of each solicitation is often difficult to accomplish;
therefore, some fiexibility in how compliance is assured may
occasionally be permitted, especially if the exceptions taken are
minor or when they are counterbalanced by some contradicting
promises, such as a Compliance Certification.
C. Chattier v. United States
In Ghattler v. United States,'^^ the Federal Circuit was faced with a
unique contract formation question: Can an implied contract, which
obligates the government to perform a service required by regulation,
be formed based on statements by the agency explaining how its
regulations work? The Federal Circuit panel majority responded
negatively, with Judge Newman dissenting.
The regulatory scheme at issue in Chattier was created as a result of
the September 11 attacks when Congress passed the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.'"" This legislation
required anyone entering the United States to present a passport,
including upon entry from countries such as Canada and Mexico,
which was not previously required.'"'
This new requirement
burdened the State Department vñth a significant increase in
demand for passports and thus prolonged the time it took the State
Department to process passport applications.'"^ To accommodate
persons with urgent needs, the State Department issued regulations
that allowed for the processing of passport requests within three days
of the request for an additional $60.00 "expedite fee."'"' These
regulations also stated that "[t]he passport expedite fee will be
refunded if the Passport Agency does not provide the requested
expedited processing.
Chattier applied for a passport, requested expedited processing,
and paid the expedite fee, but her request was not fulfilled within the
three-day expedited processing window.'"' Instead of requesting a
refund, Chatder initiated legal action against the Government in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
under the "Little" Tucker Act.'"^ Even though the Government
159.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

652 F.5d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Pub. L. No. 108-458,118 Stat. 3658 (2004).
C/iaZifer, 652 F.5d at 1526.
Id.
Id. at 1527 (citing 22 C.F.R. § 51.66(b) (2007)).
Id. (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 51.63(c)).
M at 1526.
Id. at 1326-27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (2006) (allowing district courts

2012]

2011 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1035

offered to refund Chattier the expedite fee if she filed a request.
Chattier rejected the offer and insisted on litigating the case in which
she sought $60 in damages.'"' The district court ruled in favor of the
Government, finding that no implied contract was formed between
Chattier and the Government.'"'
Chattier subsequendy appealed to the Federal Circuit.'"" On
appeal, Chattler's main argument centered on provision 5(b) of the
expedited request application form, which provided that
"[e]xpedited requests will be processed in three workdays from
receipt at a passport agency [for a $60 fee]."'"" Chattier asserted that
the 5 (b) language on the form constituted an offer, that she accepted
the offer by paying the $60 fee, and that the breach of contract
occurred when the Government did not process her application
within three days.''' The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court that no contract was formed between the Government and
Chattier as a result of provision 5(b).'°^ For this provision to be
considered an offer, the court noted, it must be "a manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain," but provision 5(b) did not meet
this standard for several reasons.'"'
First, provision 5(b) characterized the applicant's initiation of the
expedited procedure as a "request" submitted to the Government,

to have concurrent jurisdiction with the COFC over claims against the Government
that do not exceed $10,000). The "Big" Tucker Act provides that the GOFG has
exclusive jurisdiction of contract claims against the United States Government. 28
U.S.C. §1491 (a)(1) (2006).
147. Chattier, 632 F.3d at 1326-27 n.2 (clarif)ang that Chattier originally called her
complaint a class action, but she never filed a motion to certify the class and,
accordingly, the court declined to treat the case as a class action).
148. Chattier v. United States, No. C-07-4040 MMC, 2009 WL 2450518, *4 (N.D.
Cal.July 10, 2009), affd, 652 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
149. Chattier, 632 F.3d at 1326-27 (recognizing that, the Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(2) to hear an appeal of a district court
decision in a case brought under the "Little" Tucker Ací).
150. Id. at 1326.
151. Id. at 1327 (explaining that Chatder also argued, based on the then-exisüng
text of 22 C.F.R. § 51.63(c), that she was entided to receive the refund automatically,
without first submitting a refund request). The Federal Circuit, however, rejected
the automatic refund argument, deferring to the State Department's interpretation
of this regulation that refund requires a request. Id. at 1528-29 (citing Pauley v.
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991), and Bowles v. Seminóle Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), for the broad proposition that the court defers
to an agency's interpretation of its own minimally reasonable regulation).
152. Id. at 1332.
155. Id. at 1530 (quoting Cuder-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1179,
1185(Ct. Cl. 1971)).
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rather than as a promise by the Government to do anything.'"*
Second, to hold the government liable, its contractual promise "'must
be stated in the form of an undertaking, not as a mere prediction or
statement of opinion or intention,'"'^" especially when the language
in dispute is merely a reiteration of the requirements of the
regulation, as was the case in the text of provision 5(b).'*'' Third,
because the regulatory scheme established that the Department of
State may either approve the request or disapprove it, the applicant's
"acceptance" of the Government's alleged "offer" included in the
application form would not complete the offer-acceptance
requirement.'"' Finally, "the form of provision 5(b) informs the
substance."'"' When, as here, the assertion that a contract existed
relied on a single sentence, no contract was formed, in part because
no negotiations preceded the document alleged to be a contract, this
document did not include standard FAR provisions that are typically
included in Government contracts, and no one at the Government
"has assented to anything."'^'
The Federal Circuit also explained that the cases cited by Chattier
to support the argument that either an express contract or an
implied-in-fact contract was formed were all "inapposite,""*" and that
Chatder failed to find even "a single case where the Government was
held to have contracted to perform a service in furtherance of a
regulation scheme by virtue of a statement in a form application.""*'
The court added that in the small group of cases where courts have
found the Government liable under a service contract, the contracts
contained an "express obligation observing the formalities of typical
government contracts, including a signature by an authorized
agent."'^^
154. Id. (citing Cutler-Hammer, 441 F.2d at 1182 ("[N]owhere is there a promise on
the part of the Government to sell even one ounce of silver at the price mentioned.
Purchasers are simply invited to make application to buy certain quantities of silver . .
155. Id. (quoting Cutler-Hammer, 441 F.2d at 1182).
156. Id. at 1331 (citing Floyd v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 889, 891 (1992)); see also
Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1991) ("[W]here rights and obligations
are prescribed by statute and regulations rather than determined through the
mechanics of a bilateral exchange, there is no contract in the usual sense of the
word.").
157. C/iaiifer, 632 F.3d at 1331.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1331-32 (quoting Girling Healtii Sys., Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
66, 70 (1990) (describing a case against the 1RS in which no contract was formed
based on language on a form)).
160. Id. at 1332.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1332-33 (citing Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225
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Judge Newman dissented.'"' She explained-that she would have
found that a binding contract was formed when Ghatder accepted
the Department of State's offer in provision 5(b) of the passport
application form and that the Department of State then breached
this contract by not refunding the $60 without waiting for any formal
request to be submitted by Ghattler.'" It appears that Judge Newman
was swayed by the Kafkaesque situation faced by the appellant and
others like her.'°^ In 2007, 5,910,135 people requested expedited
passport application processing."^'^ Of this group, the majority—
3,358,725—had their request denied, but only 8546 received a
refund; in other words, in 99.75% of the cases, the State Department
kept the expedite fees paid by persons who never received expedited
services simply because they failed to formally request a refund.'"
Judge Newman likely wanted to send a message to the State
Department that it must adopt a better way of handling expedited
fees collected from individuals who did not receive the services they
paid for.
II. JURISDICTION

As mentioned above, 2011 saw a marked increase in the volume of
Federal Gircuit decisions addressing the jurisdiction of the Gourt of
Federal Glaims and the Boards over specific types of government
contracts disputes. Indeed, in the past year, ¿le Federal Gircuit
issued six such decisions, which accounted for over 40% of the
court's non-Winstar and non-SNF opinions. The majority of these
decisions endorsed a reading of either the Tucker Act or the GDA
that found the tribunals had jurisdiction. While it is difficult to draw
any definitive conclusions based on this handful of decisions, on
balance, they suggest a propensity by the Federal Gircuit to protect
F.5d 1556, 1537-38 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N. States Power Co. v. United States, 224 F.3d
1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. United States, 88 F.5d 1012,
1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953,
954-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (rejecdng for the same reasons the argument that the
statements posted on the Department of State's website were an offer to contract).
163. /d at 1335 (Newman,J., dissenting).
164. M at 1335.
165. See id. at 1554 (looking to the discovery record, which shows that, even
though this case was not certified as a class acdon, a large number of people applied
for an expedited processing of their passport applicadon, paid the expedite fee, and
have not received the refund); see also id. at 1526-27 n.2 (majority opinion) (nodng
that "Chatder styled her complaint EIS a class acdon" but that "it did not appear that
there was a modon to cerdfy th[e] case as a class acdon").
166. Id. at 1334 (Newman,J., dissendng).
167. Id. (highlighdng that the percentages of cases in which the State Department
did not refund expedite fees for the services not provided in the years 2004-2006
were 98.82%, 99.15%, and 98.49%, respecdvely).
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the central role of the COFC and the Boards over contract disputes.
For example, in Slattery v. United States,^^^ the Federal Circuit, sitting
en bane—and over a strong dissent by Judge Gajarsa joined by three
other judges—held that the Tucker Act grants the COFC jurisdiction
to entertain suits against a NAFI, in this case, the FDIC, and expressly
disavowed all of its prior case law to the contrary.'"" In Todd
Construction, L.P. v. United States,™ the Federal Circuit held that the
COFC has the authority, pursuant to the Tucker Act and the CDA, to
hear challenges to agency-issued performance evaluations that are
mandated by the FAR.'" In Holmes v. United States,""^ the Federal
Circuit held that the Tucker Act gives the COFC jurisdiction to hear
claims for an alleged breach of a Title VII settlement agreement.'"
Finally, in Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar,™ the court held that the
CDA grants the COFC jurisdiction over any case that raises a "nonfrivolous allegation of a contract with the Government," whether or
not such a contract actually existed."^
The only one of the jurisdictionally-focused 2011 decisions that did
not favor a broad reading of the COFC's and Boards'jurisdiction was
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States.™ In what appears to be the
first Federal Circuit decision applying the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation,'^^ the Federal
Circuit held that the COFC had no jurisdiction over a plaintiffs
claims that were duplicative of claims the plaintiff previously raised in
federal district court."* Meanwhile, in Systems Development Corp. v.
McHugh,™ the Federal Circuit afflrmed the decision of the Armed
168. 635 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane).
169. Id. at 1301 (holding that any "[c]onflicting precedent shall no longer be
relied upon").
170. 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
171. /d. at 1308.
172. 657 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
173. Id. at 1306 (favoring a broad view of the COFC's jurisdiction, by holding that
the "accrual suspension rule" applies to such claims, thus permitting the court to
hear otherwise untimely claims for breaches of Titie VII agreements); see infra Part
II.D (discussing the court's holding regarding the "accrual suspension rule"); iee also
Tucker Act Provides Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 9 (analyzing the Holmes opinion's
impact on the "accrual suspension rule"); COFC Has Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note
24, at 15-16 (discussing Puerto Rico v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 618 (1999), and
recognizing that the COFC had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim in that case).
174. 660 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
175. Id. at 1353.
176. 659 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
177. See 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1727 (2011) (clarifying that COFC jurisdiction does not
extend to a claim by a plaintiff who has a pending claim against the United States).
178. Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1164 (applying Tohono and concluding that two
of the claims "arose from the same operative facts upon which the claims in the
district court were predicated and are, thus, barred by § 1500").
179. 658 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Services Board of Contract Appeals that it lacked jurisdiction over an
1

1

.

180

untimely monetary claim.
These decisions are discussed in turn.
A. Slattery v. United States
In Slattery v. United States,^^^ the Federal Circuit, sitting en bane,
definitively settled whether the COFC possesses jurisdiction to
entertain suits against a NAFI—in this case, the FDIC."' The FDIC is
"supported by fees from member banks, not by congressional
appropriations, and there is no specific appropriation with respect to
payment of [the FDIC's] judgment.""' The Government's position
was that the FDIC's status as a NAFI deprived the Court of Federal
Claims ofjurisdiction to entertain suits against the FDIC.""
The Federal Circuit—based upon its review of the history and
application of the Tucker Act—"conclude [d] that the source of a
government agency's funds, including funds to pay judgments
incurred by agency actions, does not control whether there is
jurisdiction of a claim within the subject matter assigned to the court
by the Tucker Act."'^" In particular, according to the court, "[t]he
jurisdictional criterion is not how the government entity is funded or
its obligations met, but whether the government entity was acting on
behalf of the government."'*" In sum, "Tucker Act jurisdiction does
not depend on and is not limited by whether the government entity
receives or draws upon appropriated funds."'" In so holding, the
Federal Circuit explicidy instructed that "[c]onfiicting precedent
shall no longer be relied upon."'^
The Government, for its part, pointed to the 1970 amendment to
the Tucker Act which added the following sentence: "[A]n express
180. Id. at 1347.
181. 635 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane).
182. Id. at 1301. For further scholarly discussion of the NAFI doctrine, see
generally Evan C. Zoldan, All Roar and No Bite: Lion Raisins and The Federal Circuit's
First Swipe At The NAFI Doctrine, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1£5 (2007) (questioning the
Federal Circuit's treatment of the NAFI doctrine in Lion Raisins v. United States, 416
F.5d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); Evan C. Zoldan, The King is Dead, Long Live The King!:
Sovereign Immunity and the Curious Case of Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, 38

455 (2006) (asserting that the NAFI doctrine lacks legal support).
185. Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1300.
184. See id. (outlining the Government's position that the Tucker Act would not
apply to the FDIC).
185. M. at 1501.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. /</.; see also id. at 1303 (explaining that "some later decisions viewed as
'jurisdictional' the source of funds to pay judgments arising from activities of federal
entities").
CONN. L. REV.
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or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service,
Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges,
or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration shall be considered an express or implied contract
with the United States."'*" According to the Government, this
amendment, "because of its explicit terms, means that all other
federal entities that do not receive appropriated funds are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Tucker Act."'"" The Government derived
that meaning by negative implication: "[B]ecause Congress listed
only the military and NASA exchanges in the amendment as enacted,
although an earlier draft included all non-appropriated fund
activities, this means that every other non-appropriated fund activity
was intended to be excluded from Tucker Act jurisdiction."'''
Following an extensive review of that amendment's legislative
history, the court rejected the Government's view, concluding that
the "legislative record belies the [G]overnment's argument that the
specificity of this amendment means that Congress intended to
exclude from the jurisdiction of the Tucker Act every government
entity that does not receive support from appropriated funds except
for the military and NASA Exchanges."'"^ Indeed, according to the
Federal Circuit, the clear "purpose of the amendment was to restore
access to the courts where such access had been removed, not to
extend the removal [ofjurisdiction] into new, unknown areas."'"'
The Government also attempted to rely upon the FDIC's "sue and
be sued" clause for the proposition "that suit for breach of contract
must be pursued against the FDIC in district court."'"" The Federal
Circuit likewise rejected that argument, explaining that "it is well
established that the potential availability of a remedy in district court
does not of itself withdraw jurisdiction under the Tucker Act."'""
189. Id. at 1511 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-350, § l(b), 84 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1 ) (2006) ) ).
. 190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1311-13 (discussing McDonald's Corp. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1126,
1127 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which involved a contract with the Navy Resale and Service
Support Office).
193. Id. at 1313; see also id. at 1313-14 ("Legislative action to close a muchcriticized loophole cannot reasonably be understood as an endorsement of the
loophole itself.... [Congress's] decision not to legislate in areas whose boundaries
could not be defined did not consdtute an endorsement of all judicial rulings
relating to instrumentalities for which no agency was able to provide a precise
definition.").
194. M. at 1314.
195. Id. at 1514-15; see also id. at 1515 (asserting that "[w]ith respect to the
corporate status of the FDIC, it is established beyond dispute that the jurisdictional
criterion is not whether the government entity is incorporated, but whether it is
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Finally, with respect to how a government entity satisfies its
obligations or judgments, the Federal Circuit held that "Tucker Act
jurisdiction is not affected by how the agency meets its obligations or
how anyjudgment establishing those obhgations is satisfied."'"*
The Federal Circuit's decision was not without dissent. Judge
Gajarsa, joined by Judges Dyk, Prost, and O'Maliey, criticized the en
bane decision as "overturn [ing] and eviscerat[iiiig] the vast body of
NAFI law in one fell swoop."'" According to the dissent, the "settled
law for more than half a century [is] that the Tucker Act's waiver of
sovereign immunity does not apply to contracts entered into by
[NAFIs].""' The dissent would have concluded that, "[u]nder
Supreme Court precedent and [Federal Circuit] precedent, the FDIC
is clearly a NAFI because it receives no appropriated funds and is . . .
a separate entity with independent authority to sue and be sued" and,
therefore, it "is not subject to suit in the Court of Federal Claims in
actions alleging breach of contract."'^' The dissent also explained
that the consequences of the majority's ruling extend beyond simply
expanding Tucker Act jurisdiction. In that regard, the dissent
pointed out that the majority's ruling means that "the United States is
now directly liable for the FDIC's contractual commitments . . . and
future plaintiffs . . . can now sue the United States in the Court of
Federal Claims and will receive money damages directly from the
Judgment Fund."'"" The problem is that "[t]he FDIC, however, has
no statutory obligation to reimburse the [G]overnment for any
damages paid out of the Judgment Fund."^°' Thus, as a result of
Slattery, "taxpayers, not the EDIC, shall bear the burden of the FDIC's
,

.

„202

contractual commitments.
B. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States
In what appears to be the first published Federal Circuit case
acting on authority of the United States").
196. Id. at 1318.
197. Id. at 1321 (Gajarsa,J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1328 (concluding that the FDIC is a NAFI, which is unnecessary under
the majority's opinion since it dispenses with the NAFI doctrine entirely). In that
regard, the majority in Slattery makes the question of whether the FDIC is a NAFI
irrelevant by holding that Tucker Act jurisdiction does not depend on how an agency
is funded. 7d. at 1301 (majority opinion).
200. Id. at 1334-35 (Gajarsa,J., dissenting).
201. M. at 1335.
202. See id. (criticizing the majority for an "alarming result" that "affords the FDIC
complete insulation from liability . . . in stark contrast to Congress's requirement that
those NAFIs specifically indentified in the 1970 Act reimburse the government for
any liability incurred by their breach of contract").
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applying the Supreme Gourt's recent decision in Tohono O'Odham
Nation, the Federal Gircuit, in Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States,^°^

partially reversed the GOFG's dismissal of a plaintiffs case pursuant
to 28 U.S.G. § 1500.""* That statute "generally prohibits simultaneous
actions against the government in separate forums" and "was enacted
to prevent a claimant from seeking recovery in district court and the
Gourt of Glaims for the same conduct pleaded under different legal
theories."^»^
Pursuant to § 1500, the GOFG "does not have jurisdiction over a
claim if the plaintiff has 'another suit for or in respect to that claim
pending against the United States or its agents.'"^°^ "'[T]wo suits are
for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the
[GOFG], if they are based on substantially the same operative facts,
regardless of the relief sought in each suit.'"^"'
In Trusted Integration, the plaintiff filed a complaint in district court
for $15 million in damages, including claims based on the Lanham
Act, unfair competition, and breach of fiduciary duty.^°' Several
months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal
Claims, likewise seeking $15 million in relief, but this time for breach
of an oral or implied-in-fact contract, breach of a license agreement,
and breach of the duty of good faidi and fair dealing.^"' The COFC
granted the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that "it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction [as] both suits sought the same relief and
were 'based upon the same dispute between the same parties:
defendant's allegedly wrongful development of an alternative to the
[plaintiffs] product in contravention of its agreement to cooperate
with plaintiff.'"""
On appeal before the Federal Circuit, the court first explained
that, "[a]fter Tohono, it is clear that [the court] must: (1) not view
§ 1500 narrowly; (2) focus only on whether two claims have the same
operative facts and not on the relief requested; and (3) determine
whether two suits share substantially the same operative facts.""'
203. 659 F.5d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
204. Id. at 1164-65 (cidng United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nadon, 151 S. Ct
1725, 1728 (2011)) (accepdng diat after Tohono, § 1500 should not be viewed
narrowly).
205. / ¿ a t 1163.
206. Id. (quodng Tohono, 151 S. Ct. at 1727).
207. Id. at 1164 (quodng Tohono, 151 S. Ct. at 1731).
208. M at 1162.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1165 (quodng Trusted Integradon, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed Cl 94
101 (2010)).
t.
6
,
,
211. /d. at 1164.
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Applying those rules from Tohono, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
Government that the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed two
out of the plaintiffs three claims.^'^
In particular, the court agreed that the plaintiffs claim for breach
of fiduciary duty before the district court, premised as the claim was
upon "the parties' roles as joint venturers," arose from the same
operative facts as the plaintiffs claim for breach of "an implied
agreement between the parties to engage in a joint venture."^" In so
holding, the Federal Circuit sided with the Government's position
"that the only difference between Count I [of the Court of Federal
Claims complaint] and the claims in the district court complaint are
the legal theories supporting the claims, which . . . are insufficient to
place Count I outside of § 1500's prohibition."^"
Similarly, the Federal Circuit concurred that the plaintiffs COFC
count for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing "is
premised on the same operative facts as the district court complaint
pleaded under different legal theories."^'" The only difference
between that COFC count and the district court complaint for breach
of fiduciary duty was that, in the latter, "the fiduciary duty arose from
[the parties'] relationship in a joint venture, while in the [COFC]
complaint, the fiduciary duty allegedly arose from an oral or impliedin-fact contract.""^
The Federal Circuit held that "[t]his
characterization . . . is not relevant to whether the claims arose from
the same operative facts."^"
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the COFC as to the
plaintiffs count for breach of its licensing agreement.^"' On that
212. See id. at 1164-65 (dismissing counts I and III but accepting that the breach
of license agreement claim did not arise from the same operative facts as the district
court claims).
213. M a t 1165.
214. Id. Indeed, even the district court characterized plaintiffs breach of
fiduciary duty claim as "essentially a contract claim." Id. (discussing Trusted
Integration, Inc. v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 2d 70, 84 (D.D.C. 2010), on this
point). The Federal Circuit held "the fact that the district court dismissed some of
the counts of Trusted Integration's district court complaint has no effect on [the
Federal Circuit's] analysis of each of the counts of the [Court of Federal Claims]
complaint," because the Federal Circuit applies "§ 1500's jurisdictional bar 'by
looking to the facts existing when' [the plaintiff] filed each of its complaints." Id. at
1166 n.2 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993), and
explaining that, "[a]t the time the [Court of Federal Claims] complaint was filed, all
of Trusted Integration's claims were still pending before ±e district court").
215. M at 1166.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1166-67 (citing Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 212).
218. See id. at 1170 (concluding that the CFC erred in concluding "that Count II
in the CFC complaint arose from the same operative facts as Trusted Integration's
district court claims").
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point, the Federal Circuit explained that "[t]he basis of Trusted
Integration's district court complaint was [the Government's]
creation of an alte;rnative to Trusted Integration's product and
promotion of that alternative in contravention of its promise."'" In
contrast, the basis of the Court of Federal Claims count related to the
alleged breach of the license agreement, "a distinct contract" from
that alleged in the district court complaint."" Because "[t]he district
court complaint and Count II [of the Court of Federal Claims
complaint] are . . . premised on independent contracts," the Federal
Circuit concluded that "the facts that would give rise to breach of
either of these agreemerits are not legally operative for establishing
breach of the other."'"
Accordingly, the court held that Count II of the COFC complaint
alleging breach of the licensing agreement "and the counts of the
district court complaint are not based upon substantially the same
operative facts.""' In sum, "Trusted Integration . . . asserted two
distinct claims, that involve [d] distinct agreements, whose breaches
g[a]ve rise to distinct damages, and which require[d] distinct proofs,"
and for that reason, the COFC "erred when it concluded that Count
II in the [COFC] complaint arose from the same operative facts" as
the district court claims.'"
C. Todd Construction, L.P. v. United States
In Todd Construction, L.P. v. United States^'^ the Federal Circuit

finally had the opportunity to resolve whether the Court of Federal
Claims possesses jurisdiction, pursuant to the Tucker Act and CDA, to
entertain challenges to agency-issued performance evaluations
mandated by the FAR."^ Although the COFC determined that it
219. /d at 1167-68.
220. /d. at 1168.
221. Id.
222. Id. In so holding, the Federal Circuit addressed a variety of nineteenthcentury tests for res judicata, but did "not adopt these . . . tests as the standard by
which to measure whether two claims arise from substantially the same set of
operative facts." Id. at 1170 n.5. Instead the court merely "test[ed] [its] conclusion
that the claim in Count II is not barred by § 1500 by reference to these tests simply to
confirm that [its] conclusion remains true to the principles encompassed in that
statutory provision." See id. (concluding that, while "the fact that two suits arise from
different claims under the 19th century tests does not compel the conclusion that
the suits do not arise from substantially the same operative facts[,] . . . [i]f two suits
are determined to arise from the same claim under [such] res judicata tests, . . .
application of the bar of § 1500 is likely compelled").
225. « . a t 1170.
224. 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
225. 5ee id. at 1310-11 n.3 (recognizing that if "[plaintifFs] requested relief . . .
'relates to the contract[,] ' . . . it is a 'claim' under the CDA, and the Claims Court has
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generally possessed such jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the
complaint of the plaintiff, Todd Construction, L.P. (Todd), "for lack
of standing and failure to state a claim."^^° Todd appealed the trial
court's dismissal; the Government defended the COFC's decision
based in part on the grounds that the trial court entirely lacked
jurisdiction over performance evaluation challenges.^" The Federal
Circuit sided with Todd and the trial court regarding the COFC's
jurisdiction to hear performance evaluation claims, but upheld the
trial court's dismissal of Todd's case for lack of standing and for
failure to state a claim.^^'
At the time of Todd's performance of its construction contracts for
the Army Corps of Engineers, the FAR required that for each such
construction contract of $550,000 or rriore, a "'[performance] report
shall be prepared . . . in accordance with agency procedures'" and
that "'[e]ach performance report shall be reviewed to ensure that it is
accurate and fair.'"^^" The Government also issued Army Corps of
Engineers Regulation 415-1-17 "to implement FAR § 36.201 and
establish procedures for contractor performance evaluations."^'"
Todd received negative interim performance evaluations and a
final "overall performance rating of unsatisfactory."^" After the
contracting officer issued a final decision denying Todd's request for
a review of its performance evaluations, the company filed a
complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, "alleging that the
[G]overnment failed to follow the proper procedures and that the
unsatisfactory performance evaluations were arbitrary and
capricious."^'^ As the Government pointed out, however, "Todd did
not challenge any particular performance ratings," but "[i]nstead . . .
merely pled that the government issued overall unsatisfactory
performance evaluations and that these ratings were arbitrary and

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act).
226. Id. at 1308 (citing Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 100 (2010);
Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235 (S009); Todd Constr., L.P. v.
United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 34 (2008), affd, 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). A
number of other COFC decisions also had held that the CDA confers jurisdiction
over performance evaluation challenges. See generally Kara M. Sacilotto, Challenging
Contractor Performance Evaluations: FAR Processes and Claims Before The Court of Federal
Claims and The Boards of Contract Appeals, BRIEHNG PAPERS, Sept. 2011 (discussing
leading cases).
227. Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1510-11.
228. /d. at 1508.
229. Id. (quoting FAR 36.201 (2006)).
250. Id.
251. /d at 1309.
232. Id. (outlining that Todd sought a declaratory judgment).
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capricious."„233 Although the trial court concluded that it possessed
jurisdiction, the court granted the Government's motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal
Claims, because Todd had failed to state a claim for relief.'^* The trial
court then permitted Todd to file an amended complaint.^'"
Todd's amended complaint, however, fared no better. Once again,
Todd "did not specifically identify which unsatisfactory ratings were
arbitrary and capricious" but rather "appeared to challenge primarily
the unsatisfactory ratings related to Todd's timeliness of
performance."'"* Todd also alleged "that the [G]overnment failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of [Army Corps of
Engineers Regulation] 415-1-17.""' The Government moved to
dismiss Todd's amended complaint, which the Court of Federal
Claims granted.'^' Although the trial court "reaffirmed that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over Todd's complaint," the Court of
Federal Claims "also held that Todd lacked standing to sue for the
alleged procedural violations because 'there [was] no discernible
injury to the plaintiff from the error.'"™ Moreover, the trial court
agreed that "Todd failed to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6)
because Todd was responsible for the acts of its subcontractors as a
matter of law" and the amended complaint only contained '"Todd's
bare assertion of non-responsibility to support'" its conclusory
allegation that the assigned unsatisfactory ratings were an abuse of
discretion.^*"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the "[G]overnment's
contention that the Claims Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the CDA."^*' The Federal Circuit began by noting that the
Tucker Act provides the COFC vwth jurisdiction to decide CDA claims
"including . . . nonmonetary disputes on which a decision of the
contracting officer has been issued.""' The CDA does not define
"claim," but the Federal Circuit noted that it has "held . . . that the
233. Id. at 1309-10.
234. M. at 1310.
235. Id. (discussing Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235, 249-50
(2009)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 100, 103, 116 (2010), affd,
656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
239. 7odd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Todd Constr, 94 Fed. Cl. at 107-13).
240. Id. (quoting Todd Constr, 94 Fed. Cl. at 116).
241. Id. at 1310-11; see id. at 1310-15 (evaluating the Government's arguments in
light of prior case law and legislative history).
242. Id. at 1311 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quotiner 28 U.S.C. S
1491(a)(2) (2006)).

2012]

2011 GOVERNMENT GONTRACT LAW DECISIONS

1047

»243

definition of the term 'claim' in the FAR governs." The FAR, in
turn, defines "claim" as "a written demand or written assertion by one
of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right," not only "the
payment of money in a sum certain"—or "the adjustment or
interpretation of contract terms"—but also "other relief arising under
or relating to the contract."^'" Thus, the Federal Gircuit viewed the
jurisdictional issue as "whether Todd's requested relief—in essence a
declaratory judgment that the [G]overnment's performance
evaluations were unfair and inaccurate—'relat[es] to the contract.'"'*"
In answering that question, the Federal Gircuit relied upon its
precedent and the legislative history of both the GDA and Tucker Act
to "support[] a broad reading of the term 'claim.'"^*'^ Moreover, the
appeals court held that "[n]ot only is the term 'claim' broad in scope,
[but also] the 'relating to' language of the FAR regulation itself is a
term of substantial breadth."^*' In that regard, the Federal Gircuit
"previously held that to be a claim 'relating to the contract' under the
GDA, the claim 'must have some relationship to the terms or
performance of a government contract.'"^** Applying that standard to
Todd's case, the court held that "[t]he performance evaluations at
issue ha[d] a direct connection and association with Todd's
government contracts.""' The court explained that "[w]hile the
unsatisfactory performance evaluations may not relate to the terms of the
contract itself, they relate to Todd's performance under the
»250

contract.
Accordingly, the Federal Gircuit held that Todd's performance
evaluation claims were covered by the GDA and Tucker Act, and
correspondingly rejected the Government's contention that Todd's
claims could not relate to the contract unless the claims were based
on a valid contractual theory, such as breach of contract or mistake.'^'
In other words, "[a] contractor's [GDA] claim need not be based on
the contract itself (or a regulation that can be read into the contract)
245. Id. (cidng H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.5d 1565, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
244. M. (quodng FAR 2.101 (2010)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1511-12 (discussing Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d
1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1999); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 1 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-1118,
at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235).
247. See id. at 1312 (discussing dicdonary definidon and cataloging court cases).
248. Id. at 1512 (emphasis added) (quodng Applied Cos. v. United States, 144
F.5d 1470, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
249. M at 1312-15.
250. Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).
251. Id. (discussing Paragon Energy Corp. v. United Slates, 645 F.2d 966, 975 (Ct.
Cl. 1981), and holding that "Paragon imposes no such limitadon").
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as long as it relates to its performance under the
Finally, the court acknowledged that a plaintiff may not "sue under
a statute or regulation if the law was not intended to benefit that class
of plaintiffs.""' In this case, the court held, however, that "it is
possible for a regulation or law to benefit both the government and a
class of private parties" and "[t]hat is the case with performance
evaluations."^^""
Todd's victory with respect to subject matter jurisdiction was a
pyrrhic one, as the Federal Circuit ultimately agreed Todd's
complaint was properly dismissed "for lack of standing (with respect
to its procedural allegations) and failure to state a claim (with respect
to its substantive allegations)."^'"' With respect to the former, the
Federal Circuit held that "Todd . . . alleged nothing to indicate that
the outcome of the performance evaluations would have been any
different if the purported procedural errors had not occurred.""'^
With respect to the latter category—the alleged substantive errors in
Todd's performance evaluations—Todd was required to, but did not,
"plead facts which g[a]ve rise to a plausible inference that the
government abused its discretion in awarding the negative
performance ratings."^"' Put differendy, "[a] 11 of the facts alleged by
Todd could be true and yet it [did] not follow that any of the
unsatisfactory ratings were an abuse of discretion or should be
1_

1 1)258

changed.
The Federal Circuit's decision upholding the trial court's Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of Todd's complaint—and in applying the
252. Id. at 1314 n.6. In reaching that conclusion the court also rejected the
Government's argument "that this approach improperly reads the performance
evaluation regulation into the contract under G.L. Christian & Associates v. United
States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), and its progeny." Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1314
n.6. The court explained that it was not "suggest[ing] that the performance
evaluation regulation . . . be read into the contracts. Rather, the regulation applies
of its own force and directiy governs the parties' performance under the contracts."
Id. (distinguishing Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), and Agredano v. United States, 595 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert,
denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011), as cases in which "the regulations were not designed to
benefit the contractor and there was no claim that the regulations themselves
created rights enforceable by the contractors apart from the contracts").
253. Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at 1314 (citing United States v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S.
Co., 239 U.S. 88, 90-93 (1915); Freightiiner Corp. v. Caldera, 225 F.3d 1361, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Dalton, 126 F.3d 1442, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Rough Diamond Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 636, 642 (Ct. Cl. 1965)).
254^. See id. at 1314-15 ("Performance evaluation regulations were intended to
directiy and significantiy benefit contractors.").
255. Id. at 1315.
256. Id. at 1316 ("Therefore, Todd lacks standing to sue vvrith respect to the
procedural violations.").
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Supreme Court's interpretation of that rule in Ashcrofl v. Iqbat^—is
particularly notable for ignoring, as "a legal conclusion," the
plaintiffs "bare assertion that it [was] not responsible for the actions
of its subcontractors" because the court was "not required to assume
that legal conclusions [were] true.""*" Although Todd "specifically
assert [ed] that its problems with subcontractors did not refiect poorly
on its management or supervisory capabilities," Todd's "conclusory
statement that the performance of its subcontractors could not
refiect negatively on its own performance [did] not support a claim
that its performance ratings for effectiveness of management and
control of subcontractors should be changed."'"'
The Federal Circuit's application of the arguably heightened
pleading requirements resulting from the Supreme Court's decisions
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly^^ and Iqbcd, as exhibited in Todd,

should serve as a warning to would-be plaintiffs to err on the side of
filing detailed complaints, and to support, with specific facts,
allegations that otherwise may be deemed mere legal conclusions.
D. Holmes v. United States
In Holmes v. United States^^^ the Federal Circuit finally settled a long
standing split among the decisions of the COFC regarding its Tucker
Act jurisdiction to entertain claims for an alleged breach of a Title
VII settlement agreement."^
Before the trial court, Timothy Holmes alleged that the
Department of the Navy breached two settlement agreements relating
to Tide VII employment discrimination actions that he had previously
brought against the Navy."^^ The trial court dismissed his amended
complaint, which alleged two separate breach of contract claims
under the Tucker Act, for lack of jurisdiction."^" In particular, the
259. 129S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
260. Todd Constr., 656 F.5d at 1516-17 (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949-50 (2009), and concluding that, "[t]o raise a plausible inference that the
ratings were arbitrary and capricious, the contractor would, at the very least, need to
allege facts indicating that all of the substantial delays were excusable").
261. M atl517n.9.
262. 550 U.S. 544(2007).
263. 657 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
264. Id. at 1306; see also Tucker Act Provides Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 9
(accepting that "Tucker Act jurisdiction can apply to a dispute over a breach of a
settlement agreement relating to a Title VII action"); COFC Has Exclusive Jurisdiction,
supra note 24, at 420 (discussing Puerto Rico v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 618 (1999),
and explaining that, in that case, "[tjhe COFC concluded that DLHR's claim for
breach of the setdement agreement was v^ithin the Court's exclusive'yaúsáicúon").
265. Holmes, 657 F.5d at 1508.
266. Holmes v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 511, 521 (2010), reu'd, 657 F.5d 1505
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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trial court held that neither agreement could fairly be interpreted as
mandating the payment of money damages for breach by the
Government.^''' In the alternative, the court held that Mr. Holmes's
suit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2501 because Mr. Holmes, who conceded that his suit was
filed outside the limitations period, was not entitled to the benefit of
the "accrual suspension rule."^"*
The Tucker Act, from which the COFC derives its jurisdiction,
provides, in relevant part, that the court shall have "jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with, the United States."^**" The Tucker Act, however,
does not create substantive rights; rather, it is a jurisdictional
provision "that operate [s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims
premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."""
Although "[t]he other source of law need not explicitly provide that
the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for
damages, . . . it triggers liability only if it 'can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government.'""' Although
these basic premises are far from controversial, their application to
Mr. Holmes's breach claims is a different story.
In granting the Government's motion to dismiss, the COFC held
that Mr. Holmes "failed to identify any terms of either the 1996
Agreement or the 2001 Agreement which are reasonably amenable to
a reading that supports [his] claim that he is entitled to money
damages for defendant's breach.""^ The trial court also held that Mr.
Holmes had not "demonstrated that there is a basis for a 'fair
inference' that he is entitled to money damages based on the
government's breach.""' The COFC thus concluded that neither
agreement upon which Mr. Holmes's claims were based could "be
fairly interpreted as mandating compensation."""
On appeal, both the Government and Mr. Holmes agreed "that the
Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction for breach of contract claims can
encompass such claims arising from Title VII settlement
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (2006).
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009).
Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
Holmes, 92 Fed. Cl. at 316.
M at 318.
/¿.at 521.
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agreements." " Mr. Holmes argued, however, that because the 1996
and 2001 Title VII setdement agreements at issue "are express
contracts, the [trial] court erroneously imposed upon him the
burden of demonstrating a 'fair inference' that the terms of the
agreements entitle him to money damages."'"* Mr. Holmes reasoned
that such a burden does not exist when a Tucker Act claim is based
upon a contract "because money is the presrumptive remedy for
breach of contract."'" Put differently, "[i]n the absence of contract
terms specifically precluding the recovery of money damages, . . . a
non-breaching party is entitled to such damages when the
government breaches a contract.""'
In contrast, the Government argued that "the Court of Federal
Claims properly examined whether the 1996 and 2001 Agreements
were money-mandating, and that it correctly determined that Mr.
Holmes had not carried his burden of establishing that the
agreements supported a 'fair inference' that money damages were
payable in event of breach."'™ In the Government's view, the trial
court correctly relied upon "'the absence of any provision mandating
the payment of money for a breach by the government.'""" Indeed,
the Government pointed out "that both the 1996 Agreement and the
2001 Agreement provided for non-monetary remedies."'" With
respect to the 2001 Agreement in particular, the Government argued
that the agreement "is actually a consent decree because it was
approved and 'so ordered' by the district court in the Northern
District of California."'" The Government posited that "as a consent

275. Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The
Government conceded that "the Court of Federal Claims possesses jurisdiction over a
claim where plaintiff can establish a substantive right enforceable against the United
States for money damages" and that "this includes a Title VII settlement agreement
providing for damages as a result of a breach." Id. at 1310 n.3. In other words, even
the Government agreed that "simply because a settiement agreement pertains to a
Titie VII case does not automatically mean that the Court of Federal Claims lacks
jurisdiction." Id.
276. Id. at 1309-10.
277. M. at 1310.
278. See id. ("In short, Mr. Holmes argues that the money-mandating requirement
of Tucker Act jurisdiction was satisfied by the very nature of his suit—an action for
breach of two Title VII settlement agreements—and that the Court of Federal Claims
erred when it required him to identify 'separate' money-mandating provisions in the
agreements.").
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting Holmes v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 311, 317
(2010)).
281. M. at 1311.
282. Id.
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decree, the Gourt of Federal Glaims lacked jurisdiction to enforce its
terms."'^'
Before addressing the arguments raised by the parties, the Federal
Gircuit, sua sponte, first "resolve [d] the initial jurisdictional question
of whether the Gourt of Federal Glaims may exercise its Tucker Act
jurisdiction over a claim alleging breach of a Tide VII setdement
agreement" notwithstanding that "Mr. Holmes and the
[G]overnment [did] not dispute the point."'** The problem for the
Federal Gircuit was that it previously had "not addressed this
question, and there [was] a split of authority on it in the Gourt of
Federal Glaims."'''
For example, a number of GOFG decisions "have held that the
court lacks Tucker Act jurisdiction over claims alleging breach of a
Tide VII setdement agreement due to the comprehensive statutory
scheme established under Tide VTI, which assigns jurisdicdon over
discriminadon suits to the district courts."'*'' In contrast, other GOFG
decisions, relying on Kokhonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Go. of

ArrwdcaT^ "have found such setdement agreements to fall outside the
comprehensive scheme of Tide VII and to be within the jurisdiction
of the court."'** The Federal Gircuit also noted a split on this issue
among the circuit courts of appeal.'*'
Siding with the United States Gourt of Appeals for the District of
Golumbia Gircuit, the Federal Gircuit concurred with those "Gourt of
Federal Glaims cases which have reached a similar conclusion, that
Tucker Act jurisdicdon may be exercised in a suit alleging breach of a
Tide VII setdement agreement.""" In the Federal Gircuit's view.

283. Id.
284. Id. (cidng John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2006), which explained that, "[a]s an appellate court, we must be sadsfied
that the court whose opinion is the subject of our review properly exercised
jurisdicdon, regardless of whether the pardes challenge the lower court's
jurisdicdon").
285. Id.
286. Id. (cidng Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458, 464-65 (2004); Taylor v.
United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 425, 425-26 (2002); Mitchell v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl.
457, 438-39 (1999); Lee v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 374, 378-80 (1995); Fausto v.
United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 750, 752-54 (1989)).
287. 511U.S. 375 (1994).
288. Holmes, 657 F.5d at 1511 (cidng Taylor v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 552, 54145 (2006); Westover v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 635, 638-39 (2006)).
289. Id. at 1311-12 (cidng Frahm v. United States, 492 F.3d 258, 262-65 (4th Cir.
2007); Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.5d 569, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hansson v. Norton,
411 F.5d 251, 252, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
290. M at 1312.
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"Title VlFs comprehensive scheme" was not "a bar to the exercise of
such jurisdiction."^"'
In addressing the next issue of whether an invocation of
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act required Mr. Holmes to "show that
the 1996 and 2001 Agreements could support a fair inference that he
was entided to the payment of money damages for breach, or was
required to demonstrate that the two agreements could fairly be
interpreted that way," the Federal Circuit rejected the Government's
position, agreed with Mr. Holmes, and reversed the trial court
below.^"^ In particular, the Federal Circuit explained that "when
referencing the money-mandating inquiry for Tucker Act
jurisdiction, the cases logically put to one side contract-based claims"
because "'normally contracts do not contain provisions specifying the
basis for the award of damages in case of breach.'"^"' This is because,
with respect to "government contracts, as with private agreements,
there is a presumption in the civil context that a damages remedy will
be available upon the breach of an agreement."^"'' In sum, the
Federal Circuit clarified that "when a breach of contract claim is
brought in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, the
plaintiff comes armed with the presumption that money damages are
available, so that normally no further inquiry is required."^"^
The Federal Circuit, however, did not completely disappoint the
Government. The court made clear that the existence of a contract,
per se, does not "always mean[] that Tucker Act jurisdiction exists."^"''
For example, "[a] contract expressly disavowing money damages
would not give rise to Tucker Act jurisdiction"—indeed, the Federal
Circuit has "found Tucker Act jurisdiction lacking in the case of an
agreement 'entirely concerned with the conduct of the parties in a
criminal case.'"^"' Put differently, "the [G]ovemment's consent to
291 Id (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994);
Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Del-Rio Drilhng
Programs Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1314 (quoting San Juan City Coll. v. United States, 391 F.3d 1357, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
294. Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1S29, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001));
see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 885 (1996) (plurality opinion)
("damages are always the default remedy for breach of contract").
295. Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1314 ("We view this presumption as forming the likely
basis for the disparate discussion of claims arising under the Constitution, a statute,
or a regulation and those stemming from a contract. Put another way, in a contract
case, the money-mandating requirement for Tucker Act jurisdiction normally is
satisfied by the presumption that money damages are available for breach of
contract, with no further inquiry being necessary.").
296. Id.
297. Id. (citing Sanders, 252 F.3d at 1334; Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264,
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suit under the Tucker Act does not extend to every contract.""*
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit did "not agree with Mr. Holmes
that the Court of Federal Claims erred in requiring him to
demonstrate that the 1996 and 2001 Agreements could fairly be
interpreted as contemplating money damages for breach.""' The
court instead recognized that "settlement of a Title VII action
involving the government could involve purely nonmonetary relief—
for example, a transfer from one agency office to another."'"" On the
other hand, the Federal Circuit "agree [d] with Mr. Holmes's
alternative argument: that the agreements can fairly be interpreted
as contemplating such damages" and that "[t]he Court of Federal
Claims therefore ha[d] jurisdiction over Mr. Holmes's breach of
contract claims."'"' The Federal Circuit based that conclusion on
specific provisions in the setdement agreement, the purpose of which
was to document and expunge Mr. Holmes's record and thereby "to
prevent Mr. Holmes from being denied future employment based on
his record as the Navy maintained it prior to the agreements."'"'
Thus, thé contractual provisions that the court held were moneymandating did not do so directly, but rather were "inherendy
relate [d] to monetary compensation through [the] relationship to
Mr. Holmes's future employment."'"' Moreover, the Federal Circuit
highlighted the fact that "there is no language in the agreements

268-69 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
298. Id. (alteration omitted) (citing Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States
521 F.5d 1558, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). In Rick's Mushroom, the plaintifiF brought suit
in the Court of Federal Claims based upon a cost-share agreement with the Natural
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS). Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 76 Fed. Cl. 250, 255-54 (2007). The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the
suit, holding that, because the contract between Rick's and the NRCS was a
cooperative agreement and not a procurement contract, the court did not have
subject matter jurisdicdon. Id. at 258, 262. The Federal Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. Rick's Mushroom, 521 F.3d at 1548. In reaching that conclusion, the court
''noted that Rick's breach of contract claim fell outside of the Tucker Act's
jurisdiction because the unique cost-share agreement at issue 'd[id] not provide a
substantive right to recover money-damages and Rick's d[id] not point to a moneymandating source of law to establish jurisdicdon under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1)
Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1515 (quodng Rick's Mushroom, 521 F.3d at 1543)
299. Ho/m«i, 657 F.3d at 1515.
300. Id. at 1315 n.8 (citing Harris v. Brownlee, 477 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.
2007), for the proposition "that money damages appear not to be the routine
remedy for the breach of a setdement agreement involving an employment dispute,"
and explaining that, "[t]ypically, the employee's remedy is enforcement of the
setdement terms or rescission of the setdement agreement and reinstatement of the
underlying action").
301. /a. at 1315.
302. /¿.at 1316.
503. Id.
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indicating that the parties did not intend for money damages to be
available in the event of breach."'""
With respect to the Government's argument that the Court of
Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over the breach of a consent
decree, the Federal Circuit declined to reach the issue because the
court did not agree that the 2001 settlement agreement constituted a
J

S05

consent decree.
In the COFC, "[c]ompliance with the statute of limitations is a
jurisdictional requirement."'"'* The applicable statute of limitations,
28 U.S.C. § 2501, provides that all claims that otherwise fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims '"shall be barred unless
the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first
accrues.'"'"' The Holmes court further explained that "[a] cause of
action first accrues when all the events have occurred that fix the
alleged liability of the Government and entide the claimant to
institute an action."'"' On the other hand, under the "accrual
suspension rule," the "accrual of a claim against the United States is
suspended, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, until the claimant knew
or should have knovm that the claim existed."'"" For that rule to
apply, a plaintiff "must either show that the defendant has concealed
its acts with the result that [the] plaintiff was unaware of their
504. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected the Government's argument that 29 G.F.R.
§ 1614.504(a) bars the exercise of Tucker Act jurisdiction. Id. That section
establishes that a plaintiff alleging breach of an EEOG agreement:
shall notify the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Director, in writing, of the
alleged noncompliance within 50 days of when the complainant knew or
should have known of the alleged noncompliance . . . [and] may request that
the terms of setdement agreement be specifically implemented or,
alternadvely, that the complaint be reinstated for further processing . . . .
Id. (quoting 29 G.F.R. § 1614.505(a) (2011)). The court did not seek to "diminish[]
the force of this reguladon" but saw "no reason for § 1614.504(a) to preclude a suit
for money damages in the event of breach that is separate from, or in addition to,
the relief the regulation provides." Id. at 1516 n.9 (acknowledging "that at least one
other circuit has reached the contrary conclusion" (citing Frahm v. United States,
492 F.3d 258, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2007))).
305. Id. at 1316 (discussing the three related factors provided in Aronov v.
Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 90 (1st Cir. 2009) (en bane), used to determine whether a
court-ordered consent decree exists, and explaining that "the 2001 Agreement is not
a consent decree" because the district court's jurisdiction under that agreement
"lasted only for a year, while obligations under tbe agreement extended well beyond
that periocl").
306. Id. at 1317 (cidngjohn R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133-34 (2008)).
507. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006)).
308. Id. (citing Ingrum v. United States, 560 F.3d 1511, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
509. Id. (quodng Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see
also id. at 1517 n.ll (citing Holmes v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 511, 519 n.9 (2010))
("[T]he accrual suspension rule is distinct from equitable tolling, which the Supreme
Court has stated is precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2501.").
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existence or it must show that its injury was 'inherently unknowable'
at the accrual date."^'"
Before the COEC, Mr. Holmes conceded that, "in the case of both
the 1996 and the 2001 Agreements, his original complaint was filed
more than six years after the Government's breach."'" To avoid the
jurisdictional bar of the statute of limitations, Mr. Holmes contended
"that he was entitled to the benefit of the accrual suspension rule."'"
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding "that he reasonably should have
known of the alleged breach of the 1996 and 2001 Agreements [only]
when the [prospective employers] began conducting background
checks in 2005 and he was no longer being offered contract jobs."'"
The court thus concluded that "Mr. Holmes's suit [was] not timebarred.""*
Mr. Holmes's victory may well be short-lived, given that the Federal
Circuit explicitly provided the caveat that its "holding [was] based
solely on the allegations set forth in the amended complaint" but
that, "[a]fter discovery, . . . the [G]overnment may be warranted in
renewing its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the
statute of limitations, should evidence suggest that Mr. Holmes, in
fact, knew or reasonably should have known of the Navy's alleged
breach at an earlier date."""
E. Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar
In Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar,'^^ Engage Learning (Engage)

brought a CDA claim for unpaid services it rendered to schools run
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BLA) during the periods of October
1-November 22, 2002, and March 1-4 and April 5-7, 2004."' With
respect to the 2002 period, BL\ awarded Engage a $66,480 contract
in August 2002 for teacher training and site visits."' Engage,
however, contended that it was owed an additional $80,485 for
services rendered as a result of amendments made to the original
contract."' The Government responded that those additional claims
310. Id. at 1317 (quoting Young, 529 F.3d at 1384)
311. M. at 1317-18.
312. Id. at 1318.
313. M. at 1322.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1322-23 n.l5 (citing Oral Argument at 44:39-46:03, Holmes, 657 F.3d
1303 (No. 2010-5119), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings/all/holmes.html).
316. 660 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
317. Id. at 1348-49.
318. Id. at 1349.
319. M. at 1350.
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were the product of an unauthorized commionent; while officials
from the Office of Indian Affairs requested and approved the
amendments, they were not officially signed by the contracting
officer."" For the 2004 period. Engage claimed that it was due
$11,500 for providing education training and support services.'"
Specifically, Engage based its claim on the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), under which "the supervisor of a Bl^.-operated school can
secure services without competitive bidding" if five factors are met.'"
Engage argued that it had an implied-in-fact contract with the
principal of the beneficiary school.'"
In 2007, Engage filed a CDA claim for die $91,895 in unpaid
services from both the 2002 and 2004 periods."* The Government
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdicdon, which
the Board granted, "holding that it did not have jurisdiction under
the GDA because Engage had failed to show that it had either an
express or an implied-in-fact contract with the Government.""^
On appeal, the Federal Gircuit held that the Board improperly
dismissed both the 2002 and 2004 claims for lack of jurisdiction, but
also found that Engage had not stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted for the 2004 period.'"' The court noted that the
GDA grants the Board jurisdiction over appeals taken "from a
decision of a contracdng officer of any executive agency . . . reladve
to a contract made by that agency."'" The Board had "ignore[d]"
this jurisdictional statement, and instead improperly required that
Engage "prove that it had either an express or an implied-in-fact
contract with the BIA.""* The Federal Gircuit rejected this position,
holding that "a plaintiff need only allege the existence of a contract
to establish the Board's jurisdiction under the GDA 'relative to' an
express or implied contract with an execudve agency."' Applied to
520. Id. at 1349-50; see also CDA Requires Only Allegation of a Contract, Fed. Cir. Holds,
53 Gov'T CONTRACTOR Î 346, Oct. 19, 2011, at 15 [hereinafter CDA Requires Only
Allegation of a Contract] (noting that "no CO s^ned contracts for these
amendments").
521. Engage Learning, 660 F.3d at 1551.
322. /d. at 1351 (cidng 25 U.S.C. § 2010(a)(3)(A) (2006)).
323. Id. at 1549.
324. / ¿ a t 1351.
325. Id.
526. M at 1353,1556.
327. Id. at 1352 (quodng 41 U.S.C.A. § 7105(e)(ri(B) (West 2011) (formerly
codified as 41 U.S.C. § 607 (2006))).
528. Id. at 1553 (cidng Engage Learning, Inc. v. Dep': of the Interior, CBCA 1165,
2010 WL 2484235 (June 15, 2010)).
329. Id. at 1355; see CDA Requires Only Allegation of a Contract, supra note 320, at 15
(nodng that the Board's "jurisdicdon under the CDA does not depend on the
undisputed existence of a contract between a provider and an agency").
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the facts of Engage Learning, the court held that the claim for $80,485
in unpaid services in 2002 "undoubtedly met the jurisdictional
requirements" in that it related to the original undisputed August
2002 contract with the BIA.™ Similarly, the court held that the Board
erred in dismissing the 2004 claim.'" It then noted, however, that
once the Board exercises jurisdiction, it can "assess . . . whether the
claim is one upon which it can grant relief"''^ The NCLB requires
that five conditions be satisfied for non-competitive contracts such as
the one claimed by Engage; because Engage did not contest on
appeal the absence of at least two of those conditions, the court
affirmed the Board's dismissal of Engage's 2004 period claim."'
E. Systems Development Corp. v. McHugh
In Systems Development Corp. v. McHugh,'^ the Federal Circuit

affirmed the decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA or the Board) that it lacked jurisdiction over
Systems Development Corporation's (SDC) monetary claims, which
stemmed from the Army's termination of SDC's contract for
convenience.""
The salient facts are straightforward, but
demonstrate, like the decision itself, the importance of keeping, and
paying attention to, an accurate calendar.
On February 17, 2004, die CO terminated SDC's contract for
convenience, prompting SDC to submit a new termination setdement
proposal in the amount of $789,058."' On March 25, 2005, "[t]he
termination contracting officer (TCO) issued a final decision
awarding SDC $403,563 to setde the contract termination," although
the TCO denied certain "proposed costs and expenses to avoid
double payment.""' At that point, pursuant to the Contract Disputes
Act, "SDC had the option of appealing the TCO's final decision to
either the [ASBCA] or die Court of Federal Claims.""' Specifically,
SDC had undl June 23, 2005 to appeal to the ASBCA or, alternatively.
330. Engage Learning, 660 F.3d at 1354.
331. Id. at 1356 (noting that "because the[] allegations are non-frivolous
assertions of the existence of a contract under the Act, the Board may not decline to
consider them on jurisdictional grounds").
332. Id. (citing Adair V. United States, 497 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
333. Id.
334. 658 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
335. Id. at 1342.
536. Id.
337. /d. at 1342-43.
338. Id. at 1343; iee 41 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2011) (formerly codified at 41
U.S.C. § 606 (2006) (providing that a contractor is allowed to appeal a decision to an
agency board of contract appeals within ninety days of the contractor's receipt of the
decision).
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to file suit in the court vwthin twelve months of SDC's receipt of the
contracting officer's decision."'
SDC, however, did not act within the ninety-day timeframe, but
instead initiated an action in the COFC on March 24, 2006, just prior
to the one year period of limitations on CDA actions in that court.'""
The COFC action, however, "went beyond appealing issues resolved
in the TCO's final decision."'"' For example, SDC, for the first time,
also requested equitable adjustments totaling almost $1.7 million,
which consisted of claims for alleged defective specifications; in
addition, it appended claims of breaches of the covenants of good
faith and fair dealing.'"'
The Government filed a motion to dismiss the case, "arguing that
the Court of Federal Claims did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
equitable adjustment claims because they had never been submitted
to a CO, a prerequisite to suit in the Court of Federal Claims or
review by the [ASBCA]."'"' While the Government's motion to
dismiss was pending before the court, SDG and the Government
submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal,'"" but "SDC took no further
appeal from the TCO's March 25, 2005 final decision."'"^ Instead, on
Feîjruary 14, 2008, SDC submitted yet another set of new claims to
the CO, again seeking termination costs and expenses that previously
had been disallowed by the TCO.'"" In addition, SDC sought more
than $7 million in equitable adjustments.'"' In response, "the CO
issued a final decision denying termination setdement costs on the
grounds that the claim had already been addressed in the TCO's
March 25, 2005 final decision and was not reversed on appeal."'"*
After the CO's second decision, SDC filed a timely appeal to the
ASBCA, which held that the Board "lacked jvirisdiction to entertain
either" the claims for the termination settlement costs or for the
equitable adjustment.'"'' With respect to the termination settlement
claim, the ASBCA concluded that SDC was time-barred from
pursuing the claim due to its failure to appeal the TCO's March 25,
339. Sys. Dev. Corp., 658 F.3d at 1545 (citing § 7104(a) i.
340. Id.
341. Id.
542. Id.
545. Id. (citing Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 585 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
344. Id. (citingCr.FED. C L . R . 41(a)(l)(ii)).
545. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. M a t 1343.
549. Id.
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2005 final decision to the Board within the CDA's ninety-day
limitation.'*" Regarding SDC's claims for equitable adjustment, "the
Board noted that the CDA requires a contractor to submit its claims
against the Government within six years of accrual of the claim."'"'
SDC, however, was aware "of the basis for its equitable adjustment
claims no later than November 13, 2001."'" Accordingly, the ASBCA
"dismissed the equitable adjustment claims because SDC did not
assert them before the six-year CDA limitations period [expired]."'*'
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and affirmed its
decision.'*" First, the court concluded that, "[i]n order to timely
appeal the TCO's decision regarding termination setdement costs to
the Board, SDC needed to file its appeal no later than June 23,
2005."'*" The fatal problem for SDC, however, was that it "elected . . .
to wait nearly a year later to appeal to the Court of Federal Claims,"
and "then voluntarily dismissed that appeal."'"* Consequendy, "the
ninety-day period for appealing the March 25, 2005 decision to the
Board had long-elapsed."'" Because "SDC took no further action to
contest the TCO's resolution of its claim for termination setdement
costs until it filed the claims underlying the present appeal in
2008[,] . . . the TCO's determination with respect to these costs
J

„ 358

Stands.
Second, the Federal Circuit rejected SDC's "contention that the
TCO lacked the authority to issue the March 25, 2005 final decision
in the first place because SDC's proposed setdement amount
($759,058) was greater than the amount of SDC's contract
($430,000)."'*" Indeed, "under SDC's reasoning, a CO never has the
authority to consider any setdement proposal that is greater than the
amount of the awarded contract.""^" In that regard, the court
recognized that "FAR 49.207 limit[ed] setdement amounts for fixedprice contracts terminated for convenience.""^' The court elaborated
that the regulation specifically highlights that "[t]he total amount
payable to the contractor for a setdement, before deducting disposal
550. Id.
551. Id. at 1544 (cidng 41 U.S.C.A § 7103 (West 2011) (formerly codified at 41
U.S.C. §605(a) (2006)).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1547.
355. Id. at 1344.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1544-45.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1345.
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or other credits and exclusive of settlement costs, must not exceed
the contract price less payments otherwise made or to be made under
the contract.""*' On the other hand, "the EAR does not limit the size
of the settlement proposal that may be submitted to a CO.""*' In this
case, although SDC's setdement offer exceeded SDC's contract price
by eighty-three percent, the "TCO clearly had the authority to issue
the March 25, 2005 final decision because the awarded settlement
amount was below the contract price.""**
Accordingly, and "[b]ecause its appeal to the Court of Federal
Claims was voluntarily dismissed, SDC has never successfully appealed
the costs addressed in the TCO's final decision.""*^ In sum, the
Federal Circuit concluded that "SDC canrrot revive the lapsed
setdement cost claim by simply resubmitting a previously resolved
claim to a CO years later.""*'*
Third, the Federal Circuit held that the ASBCA did not have
jurisdiction over SDC's claims for over $7 million in equitable
adjustments because those claims were not "submitted [to the CO]
within 6 years after the accrual of the claim."'" In that regard,
"[c]ontractor compliance vñth this statutory time limit on the
presentment of a claim to a CO is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any
subsequent appeal of the CO's decision on that claim.""*'
The court further added that, "[u]nder the FAR, a claim accrues
on 'the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the
Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim,
were knovm or should have been known.'""*' In this case, "[a]ll three
of SDC's equitable adjustment claims seek damages arising out of
allegedly defective specifications contained in the May 9, 2000
contract" and SDC's first claim expliciüy "alleges that the
specifications were defective 'at the time of award."'

362. Id. (quoting FAR, 48 C.F.R. 49.207 (2011)).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. (concluding that "[t]he February 14, 2008 termination settiement costs
claim is the same claim that SDC submitted on April 23, 2004 and that the TCO
resolved on March 25, 2005").
367. Id. (citing 41 U.S.C.A § 7103(a)(4)(A) (West 2011) (formerly codified at 41
U.S.C. § 605)) ('The Board found that SDC's equitable adjustment claims based on
the alleged liability of the Government for defective specifications, failure to
cooperate, and bad faith accrued no later than November 13, 2001.").
368. Id. (citing Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius^ 583 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir.
2009)).
369. Id. (quoting FAR, 48 C.F.R. 33.201 (2011)).
370. Id. at 1345-46 (emphasis added) (quoting SDC's complaint and discussing
the additional two counts that were tied to the alleged defective specifications).
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Although SDG argued that its equitable adjustment claims did not
ripen until setdement negotiations between the TGO and SDG had
reached an impasse—that is, "undl March 25, 2005, when the TGO
entered die final decision rejecting SDG's setdement proposal"—the
Government correcdy "counter [ed] that such an impasse is not
required for the equitable adjustment claims to accrue."'" SDG's
impasse argument relied upon Rex Systems, Inc. v. Gohen.^''' In Rex

Systems, the Federal Gircuit considered the question of "when a
submission by a contractor to a GO meets the definition of a "claim"
for the purposes of die GDA."'"
In that case, the court
"acknowledged that not all contractor submissions to a GO are
claims" and "clarified that termination setdement proposals
submitted under die termination for convenience clause of the FAR
generally are not GDA claims.""* On die other hand, "a termination
setdement proposal may ripen into a claim."'" Moreover, "the FAR
'anticipate [s] the submission of claims independendy of the
termination setdement proposal.'""^ In sum, the Federal Gircuit has
"never indicated that such independendy submitted claims require
an impasse."'"
Ultimately, the fatal defect in SDG's argument was diat "SDG's
equitable adjustment claims were wholly separate from its
termination setdement proposal" and "[n]othing precluded SDG
from presenting üiem to a GO as soon as SDG knew of their basis as
provided in die FAR.""*
^ ^ ^

As discussed above, during the past year, the Federal Gircuit issued
a noteworthy number of decisions addressing the jurisdiction of the
GOFG and the Boards to hear government contract disputes. Indeed,
571. Id. at 1345-47. Notably, before the Board, "SDC argued diat the equitable
adjustment claims did not accrue undl June 2, 2003 when the CO refused to issue a
decision on [die] April 29, 2003 setdement proposal." Id. at 1345 n.2. There
however, "SDC did not argue . . . diat 'impasse' was required for die claims to
accrue. Id.
372. 224 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
375. Sys. Deu. Corp., 658 F.5d at 1546 (cidng Rex Sys., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1571-75James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir 1996))
374. Id. at 1346-47 (discussing Rex Sys., 224 F.3d. at 1372) ("[A]ny non-roudne
submission by a contractor meets die definidon of a claim if it is: (1) a written
demand; (2) seeking as a matter of right; (3) the payment of money in a sum
certain.").
'
375. Id. at 1347 (cidng Ellett, 93 F.3d at 1543-44, for die proposidon that "a
terminadon setdement proposal may ripen into a CDA claim when die pardes'
negotiations reach an impasse").
576. Id. (alteradons in original) (quodngEllett, 95 F.5d at 1548).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1347 (cidngFAR, 48 C.F.R. 33.201-11 (2011)).
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the court issued six such decisions—significandy more than have
been issued in recent years. While it is difficult to draw any defmidve
conclusions based on this series of decisions, on balance, they seem
to illustrate the Federal Circuit's inclinadon to protect its role, as well
as the role of the COFC and the Boards, as specifically designated
tribunals for the resoludon of government contract disputes.
III. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE DISPUTES

Besides the jurisdicdonally-focused cases discussed above, the
Federal Circuit issued only a handful of non-W¿nsíar/non-SNF
decisions addressing contract disputes in the past year. These cases
cover a hodgepodge of unrelated subjects including sovereign
immunity, equitable estoppel, suretyship obligadons, and privity of
contract.
A. Covemment Immunity

1. Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States
Congress frequently acts—or fails to act—in a manner that
produces contract breaches and, concomitandy, this results in suits
before the COFC."" In Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States,^^" the Federal

Circuit once again was called upon to decide a breach of contract
direcdy caused by an act of Congress.'^'
In 2008, with the passage of die Medicare Improvements for
Padents and Providers Act of 2008 (2008 Amendment), Congress
unilaterally terminated certain medical equipment and supplies
contracts previously executed by the United States under a prior
version of the Medicare statutes.'*^ Cardiosom, whose contracts were
terminated by the 2008 Amendment, prompdy filed suit for breach of
contract in the COFC."' The trial court dismissed Cardiosom's suit,
however, on the basis that Corigress withdrew the court's jurisdicdon
to entertain Cardiosom's complaint.'*' In particular, die 2008
379. The Winstar and SNF cases being but two examples of such cases. See infra
Parts IV-V; see also Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)) (arguing that
Congress was attempting to avoid a contract breach as in Winstar).
380. 656 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
381. See id. at 1324 ("The 2008 Amendment terminated all existing contracts,
including Cardiosom's, which were in effect prior to the date of the enactment."
(citation omitted)).
382. /d. at 1524-25.
583. Id. at 1325 (citing Cardiosom, L.L.C. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 659, 661-62
(2010)).
384. Id. (citing Cardiosom, L.L.C, 91 Fed. Cl. at 661-62).
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Amendment provided that contractors whose contracts are
terminated shall not have "'an independent cause of action or right
to administrative or judicial review with regard to the
termination[s].'"'*'
The COFC, relying upon that provision,
concluded "that the plain words of the statute 'prohibit[ed]
contractors from bringing any suit arising from the contract
termination, such as claims for damages resulting from the
termination.'"''"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began with the following basic
proposition: "[w]ith regard to Congress's withholding subject matter
jurisdiction from a court that already has had it established, our law is
clear—such a re-invocation of sovereign immunity by Congress must
be done unambiguously.""' The issue, therefore, was whether the
COFC correcdy read the statute in question "to bar judicial review."'^'
In the 2008 Amendment, the contract termination provision
provided that, "'to the extent that any damages may be applicable as
a result of the termination of such contracts, such damages shall be
payable from the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Fund.'"''^
In interpreting that provision, the Federal Circuit
explained that "Congress recognized that its action terminating the
existing contracts might well have adverse consequences in terms of
damages for breach.""" Ultimately, the court held that "[t]he
existence of reasonable interpretations that are consistent with the
Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity compel a finding that the
2008 Amendment did not manifest the necessary 'unambiguous
intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy.'""'
In short,
"[w]hatever may be the rule regarding nonreviewability of the act of
termination, or the absence of challenge to the administrative
585. /á. at 1324 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(l)(D)(i) (2006)).
386. Id. at 1325 (quoting Cardiosom, L.L.C., 91 Fed. Cl. at 662).
387. Id. (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990); Slattery v. United States
635 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane)); see also supra Part ILA (providing a
discussion of Slattery).
388. Cardiosom, L.L.C., 656 F.3d at 1324.
589. Id. at 1326 (quoting42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3(a)(l)(D)(i)(I)).
390. Id. at 1327 ("Perhaps remembering its experience with the Savings and Loan
imbroglio, . . . the termination provision was accompanied by an express recognition
that payment of damages might be needed."); see also id. at 1327-28 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1595w-5(a)(l)(D)(i)(I)) (explaining that Congress "recognize[d] that damages
may need to be paid as a result of the contract breaches caused by die unilateral
terminations, and authorize [d] payment from a specific insurance trust fund—the
Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, a part of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—from which money judgments resulting from
the contract terminations may be paid").
391. Id. at 1550 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019
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remedy authorized, the legal consequences of the terminations can
still be determined under existing federal law governing contract
disputes with the Government."'"^
2. Klamath Irrigation District v. United States
In Klamath Irrigation District v. United States^^^ a collection of

irrigation districts and agricultural landowners sued the United
States, alleging that the Department of Interior's Bureau of
Reclamation breached water supply contracts via temporary
reductions of irrigation water provided from the Klamath River Basin
reclamation project.'"" The Bureau of Reclamation had to reduce the
delivery of such water due to obligadons imposed by the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).'"* The plaintiffs' complaint alleged counts for
taking of their water rights without just compensation in violation of
the Fifdn Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Klamaüi Basin
Compact."" The plaintiffs also alleged that, "when the Bureau halted
the delivery of water, its action breached water service contracts with
the plaintiff districts."'"
The COFC issued two summary judgment decisions—one resolving
the plaintiffs' takings claims, the other adjudicating their breach of
contract claims—both in favor of the Government.'"' With respect to
the contract claims, the trial court "emphasized that many (though
not all) of the contracts had provisions absolving or limiting the
United States' liability for Klamath Project water shortages."'""
592. Id. "The statute in effect clears away the prior administradve acdons in
awarding contracts under the old law and leaves the Secretary free to undertake
further administradve contract actions without the hinderance of the prior
arrangements, but leaves unaffected the rights and remedies created by die
Government's prior contractual obhgadons." Id.\ see also id. at 1351 ("Absent the
clear and unequivocal language necessary to establish Congressional intention to
withdraw jurisdiction from the Court of Federal Claims, we cannot find that the
statute is effecdve to withdrawjurisdicdon over the contract dispute alleged here.").
393. 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
394. Id. at 508-10 (citadons omitted).
395. Id. at 508-09 (cidng Klamath Irrigadon Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504,
513 (2005)) (discussing Üie ESA and explaining that "[i]n a 1999 Ninth Circuit
decision, the interests of Project water users were declared subservient to the ESA,
the result being that, as necessary, the Bureau [of Redamadon] has a duty to control
the operadon of the Link River Dam in order to sadsfy -he requirements of the ESA"
(citing Klamath Water Users Protecdve Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.5d 1206, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1999))).
596. /d. at 510.
397. Id.
398' Id. at 507 (cidng Klamath Irrigadon Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677
(2007) (the "Contract Decision"); Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 504 (the
"Takings Decision")).
399. Id. at 515 (citing Klamath Irrigation Dist., 75 Fed. Cl. at 681-82). This arocle
only discusses the contract-related issues.
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However, the trial court concluded that it had no need to "resolve the
bounds of the government's exemption from liability on that basis,
because the 'controlling issue' in the case was whether the sovereign
acts doctrine foreclosed government liability as to [the] plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims."*"" In that regard, "[t]he court first noted
that the sovereign acts doctrine immunizes the federal government
for any and all acts taken in its sovereign capacity, rather than its
capacity as a contractor."*"'
Applying the sovereign acts doctrine, the COFC "reasoned that
because the ESA was a general statute enacted for public benefit, the
United States could not be held liable for an obstruction to its
performance as a contractor that resulted from its public and general
acts of compliance as a sovereign."*"' According to the COFC:
[CJompliance with the ESA was mandatory upon the government
and ... the Bureau modified the Klamath Project operating plan in
2001 in order to protect the endangered species of flsh, not to
provide an excuse for decreasing the amount of water provided to
[the] plaintiffs in its role as [a] government contractor.*
In so holding, the trial court "rejected [the] plaintiffs' argument
that, even if the sovereign acts doctrine did apply, it did not excuse
the [G]overnment's breach of the water supply contracts because the
[G]overnment had failed to show the contract was impossible to
perform."*"* Although the opinions of four justices in United States v.
Winstar Corp.""" were supportive of the plaintiffs' view of the
requirement to demonstrate impossibility of performance as part of
the sovereign acts defense, the trial court viewed "the Court's nonmajority opinion as not binding."*"^
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concurred with the black letter
proposition of law that "[t]he government is not liable for breach of
contract whenever it takes any generally applicable action in its
sovereign capacity that incidentally frustrates performance of a
contract to which it is a party."*"' The Federal Circuit also agreed with
400. Id. at 513-14 (citing Klamath Irrigation Dist., 75 Fed. Cl. at 682)
401. M. at 514.
402. Id. (citing Klamath Irrigation Dist., 75 Fed. Cl. at 683-84).
403. Id. (citing Klamath Irrigation Dist., 75 Fed. Cl. at 684-85)
404. Id.
405. 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion).
406. Klamath Irrigation Dist., 635 F.3d at 514 (citing Winstar Corp., 518 U.S at 839Klamath Irrigation Dist., 75 Fed. Cl. at 691).
407. Id. at 520 (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925)); see also
id. (stating that under the sovereign acts doctrine, "'the United States when sued as a
contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the
particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign'"
(quoting Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1574 (Fed Cir
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the GOFG "that, in this case, the Bureau's haldng of water
deliveries . . . constituted a genuine public and general act that only
incidentally fell upon the contracts at issue."*"*
The Federal Gircuit nevertheless vacated the trial court's ruling,
holding that "the Gourt of Federal Glaims faiJed to undertake the
second part of the sovereign acts doctrine analysis, which addresses
whether the sovereign act would otherwise release the Government
from liability under ordinary principles of contract law."*"' That
inquiry, according to the Federal Gircuit, "implicates the impossibility
of performance component of the sovereign acts defense, which the
[G]overnment must establish."*'" Thus, the Federal Gircuit appeared
to concur with the plaintiffs that it had already "relied upon the
Wïnstor plurality holding" in Garabetta Enterprises, Inc. v. United States.^"

Indeed, the court noted that it "reaffirmed this requirement" of
proving impossibility of performance in Gasitas Municipal Water
District V. United States,''^ in which the court explained diat
"'performance by the [G]overnment is excused under the sovereign
acts defense on/)) when the sovereign act renders the [G]overnment's
performance impossible.'"*
In sum, the Federal Gircuit vacated the GOFG's decision and
remanded the case "so that the [G]overnment may have the
opportunity to carry [its] burden" of demonstrating "that
performance of the various contracts at issue was impossible."*'* In
that regard, the Federal Gircuit instructed the trial court to
"determine whether additional evidence should be received in order
to give the [G]overnment the opportunity to show that the Bureau
lacked alternatives to halting water deliveries in 2001" and to

1997))).
408. M at 521.
409. Id. at 522 (cidng Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 585 F.5d 1344,1366
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
410 Id at 522 (cidng Stockton E. Water Dist, 583 F.3d at 1567; Seaboard Lumber
Co. V. United States, 308 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 200S)).
411. 482 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also id. at 1565 ("'[I]t does not follow that
discharge will always be available, for the common-liaw doctrine of impossibility
imposes addidonal requirements before a party may avoid liability for breach'"
(quodng Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 904)).
412. 545 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
413. Klamath Irrigation Dist., 655 F.3d at 521 (emphasis added) (quodng Casitas
Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1287).
414. Id. at 522 (footnote omitted) ("The Bureau's reducdon of water deliveries . . .
was a public and general act. However, in order to escape liability from breach of
contract in this case . . . the government has the burden of establishing that
performance of the various contracts at issue was impossible.").
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determine whether the plaintiffs should have "the opportunity to
respond to any such showing by the [G]overnment.""^
B.

I.

Equitable Estoppel

Mabus V. General Dynamics C4 Systems
Mabus V. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc."^'^ stems from General

Dynamics C4 Systems' (General Dynamics) assumption of a contract
between the United States Navy and Motorola.'" The contract at
issue was for Digital Modular Radios, to be developed and delivered
by Motorola on an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ)
basis; after the Navy purchased a contractual minimum, it "could
order additional radios at the contract price.""* Further, the
Ordering Clause provided that "'a delivery order or task order is
considered 'issued' when the Government deposits the order in the
mail,'" and that "'[o]rders may be issued orally, by facsimile, or by
electronic commerce methods only if authorized in the schedule.'""^

General Dynamics assumed the contract on September 28, 2001, and
negodated opdon pricing in 2002 and early 2003.'^° General
Dynamics and the Navy also entered into a bilateral modification on
September 27, 2002, which exercised Option IV.'" Then, on
September 10, 2003, the Navy exercised Option V and issued delivery
orders (DOs) 18-20 and 22-29 via email.'"
General Dynamics, however, did not want to accept DOs 18-20 and
22-29 at Opdon V prices,'" and concluded that they were in confiict
with the Ordering Clause in the contract.'^' Specifically, General
Dynamics claimed that the Ordering Clause "prohibited emailing
[DOs] unless authorized by the schedule," and the schedule did not
415. Id. at 522 n.l4.
Notably, although Judge Gajarsa filed a separate
concurrence, he did not appear to take any issue with the panel majority's analysis of
the sovereign acts issue. See generally id. at 522-25 (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
416. 633F.3dl556(Fed. Cir. 2011).
417. Id. at 1558 (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988
09-2 BCA154150).
418. Id.
419. /á. (emphasis added).
420. Id. (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988, 09-2
BCA1154150).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1559 (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988,
09-2 BCA 154150).
423. Estoppel Barred Contractor's Rejection of E-Mailed DOs, Fed. Cir. Says, 53 Gov'T
CONTRACTOR H 56 (2011 ).

424. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d at 1359 (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics
C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988, 09-2 BCA H 34150).
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authorize email delivery."" On October 6, 2003, General Dynamics
informed the Navy that it rejected DOs 18-20 and 22-29, but the
Navy responded that the DOs were valid and demanded delivery."'^
General Dynamics construed this demand as "direction to proceed
under the Changes Clause of the contract,' which required "a
contractor to go forward with work even if it dispute [d] the propriety
of the Navy's request.""" After the Navy demanded performance,
"General Dynamics filed a claim with the contracting officer," who
denied the claim."'' General Dynamics then appealed to the Armed
Services Board of Gontract Appeals, which ruled that the DOs were
invalid because the Navy failed to send them in compliance with the
Ordering Clause."'^
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Navy challenged the Board's
finding on the ground that the Board had incorrectly analyzed the
Navy's proffered defense of equitable estoppel."" As outlined in A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. RL. Chaides Construction Co.,^^ the Federal Circuit

utilizes a three-factor test for equitable estoppel: (1) misleading
conduct; (2) rehance upon that conduct; and (3) material prejudice
as a result of such reliance."" However, the Board applied a different
test, requiring that: "(1) [General Dynamics] knew the facts; (2) it
intended that its conduct be acted upon or acted such that the Navy
had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the Navy was ignorant of
the true facts; and (4) the Navy relied [on General Dynamics']
conduct.""" General Dynamics acknowledged that the Board utilized
an incorrect standard and that the Aukerman standard applied, but
claimed that the Board's error was harmless in that the analysis was
"essentially identical.""'" General Dynamics also argued, in the
alternative, that equitable estoppel should not apply to the type of
contract at issue in the case."'^
The Federal Circuit rejected General Dynamics' second argument
425. Id. (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988, 09-2
BCA 134150).
426. Id. (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988, 09-2
BCA 1134150).
427. Id. (citing Appeal of Gen. Dynamics G4 Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 54988, 09-2
BCA 134150).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 1360.
431. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
452. M. at 1028.
453. Gera. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 655 F.3d at 1359-60 (citing Rel-Reeves, Inc. v.
United States, 534 F.2d 274, 296-97 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per œriam)).
434. /á. at 1360.
435. M. at 1363.
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that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply to ID/IQ
contracts,"'" and apphed Aukerman to reverse the Board and hold that
the Navy satisfied the three-factor test for equitable estoppel."" With
respect to the first factor, the court found that General Dynamics'
conduct was misleading in that, prior to challenging the DOs at issue
in the case, it had accepted and performed on thirteen emailed DOs
without objection."'' Regarding the second factor, the court held that
"the Navy clearly relied on General Dynamics' conduct," pointing out
that General Dynamics "never rejected emailed [DOs] or even
mentioned the Ordering Clause maihng requirement.""'" Lastly, the
court found it "clear that the Navy suffered material prejudice,"
namely its "inability to obtain radios under its contractually
negotiated pricing.""""
C

Suretyship Obligations

1. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. United States
Lumbermens Mutual Gasualty Go. v. United States""^ presented three

issues for the Federal Circuit's resolution: (1) "whether the surety's
claim against the United States seeking to recover allegedly improper
progress payments made to the contractor is an equitable
subrogation claim and is therefore within Tucker Act jurisdiction"
pursuant to Insurance Go. of the West v. United States;""^ (2) "whether the

Claims Court ha[d] Tucker Act jurisdiction over impairment of
suretyship claims against the [G]overnment apart from the theory of
equitable subrogation;" and (3) "whether the administrative
requirements of the Contract Disputes Act. . . appl[ied] to a surety's
claim against the United States arising from a takeover agreement
which the government and surety have entered into for the
completion of a bonded contract following the [contractor's]
default."""'

456.

Id.; see Estoppel Barred Contractor's Rejection of E-Mailed DOs, Fed. Cir. Says, supra

note 425, 1 56 (nodng that, although DOs are like opdons, the court held that this
does not preclude the applicadon of equitable estoppel).
437. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d at 1361.
438. Id. (nodng that "[t]his acceptance of email orders was misleading in light of
General Dynamics' later change in course when it refused to accept the final
disputed DOs").
439. « . a t 1362.
440. Id. at 1362-65.
441. 654 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Gir. 2011).
442. 245 F.5d 1367 (Fed. Gir. 2001).
443. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 654 F.3d at 1307. There is no shortage of
background informadon and commentary regarding suredes in the context of
government contracts. See, e.g., Donavan Bezer, The Inadequacy of Surety Bid Bonds in
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Although suretyship claims are not necessarily straightforward, the
salient facts of this case are few. A construction company. Landmark
Construction (Landmark), contracted with the United States Navy to
repair and renovate military family housing units.*** The contract
provided for liquidated damages if Landmark failed to complete its
work by the specified completion date.**" Landmark, in accordance
with the Miller Act, was required to furnish performance and
payment bonds.**** To satisfy those bond requirements, "Landmark
entered into two suretyship agreements with Lumbermens."**' "The
United States was not a party to either suretyship agreement, but
both contracts expressly identified the United States as the intended
third-party beneficiary of the bond in the event Landmark breached
its obligations."**'
Although Landmark completed only a relatively small percentage
of the work, the Navy had paid Landmark approximately forty
percent of the contract price when Landmark abandoned the
construction site.**" The Navy consequently terminated Landmark for
default and thereafter "exercised its rights as an intended third-party
beneficiary of the performance bond and demanded that
Lumbermens complete the construction contract."*"" Lumbermens,
in turn, accepted its obligation and hired a replacement contractor to
complete what was originally Landmark's contractual obligation.*"'
To effectuate the new arrangement, Lumbermens, the replacement
contractor, and the United States entered into a "'takeover
agreement."'*^' The replacement contractor was late in completing
the construction contract and the Navy assessed liquidated damages
Public Construction Contracting, 40 PuB. CoNT. LJ. 87 (2010) (addressing the
unavailability of surety bid bonds in protecting against bid defaults); Edward G.
Gallagher & Mark H. McCallum, The Importance of Surety Bond Verification, 39 PUB.
CONT. LJ. 269 (2010) (arguing that contractors should verify the validity and
jurisdiction of surety bonds); Postscript: The Rights of Performance Bond Sureties, 19
NASH & CIBINIC REP. f 34 (July 2005) (summarizing rase law regarding current
jurisdiction over cases involving sureties' rights); Rights of Sureties: They're Growing, 2
NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 42 (July 1988) (acknowledging the expansion of sureties'
rights in the Claims Court to match those of the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals); The Rights of Performance Bond Sureties: It Depends on the Circumstances, 6
NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 57 (Oct. 1992) (discussing the rights of sureties in cases
against the government).
444. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 654 F.3d at 1308.
445. Id.
446. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. §3131 (b) (2006)).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. M. at 1308-09.
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against the replacement contractor, for which Lumbermens was
required to reimburse the contractor pursuant to a separate
completion contract.*^'
Lumbermens sued the Government to recover damages under
three theories.*^* First, Lumbermens "sought to recover damages
under the theory of "'equitable subrogation,'" contending that "the
government improperly increased Lumbermens' suretyship costs by
making overpayments to Landmark in violation of FAR payment
provisions in the bonded contract that were aimed at ensuring
progress payments corresponded to work actually completed."*^^
Second, "Lumbermens asserted identical counts to that of its
'equitable subrogation' claim on an alternadve theory of impairment
of suretyship . . . , pointing out that state contract law recognizes such
claims."*^'^ Third, Lumbermens alleged that the Government
breached the takeover agreement by withholding an improper
amount of liquidated damages from the replacement contractor.*"
The Federal Gircuit rejected each of Lumbermens' positions. With
respect to the equitable subrogation claim, the court agreed with the
GOFG diat
[t]he theory of equitable subrogation is based on the view that the
triggering of a surety's bond obligation gives rise to an implied
assignment of rights by operation of law whereby the surety. . .
'step[s] into the shoes' of the principal obligor and is entitled to all
of its rights relating to the construction contact.*'^*
In this case, the Federal Gircuit held that "equitable subrogation is
not implicated" because the doctrine "can be used to recover
improper payments" only if they are made by the Government after it
has received notice of the contractor's default—that is, "nodce that
the bond obligation has been triggered and an implied assignment of
the contract rights to the surety has occurred."*^' "Because the
Government did not make progress payments to Landmark after
notice of its default," Lumbermens could not recover the alleged
overpayments based on a claim of equitable subrogation.*'^"
455. /¿.at 1509.
454. Id. (cidng 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006)).
455. Id.
456. M. at 1310.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1312 (quodng Ins. Co. of the W. v. United States, 245 F.5d 1567, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
459. Id. (citadons omitted); see also id. at 1512 n.3 (referencing Insurance Co. of the
West, among other cases).
460. Id. at 1313. The court disdnguished this case from National Surety Corp. v.
United States. Id.) see Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. United States, 118 F.3d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
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The Federal Circuit further held that the "surety's affirmative cause
of acdon for impairment of suretyship stems not from an equitable
assignment of rights (like equitable subrogadon}, but rather is based
on an implied-in-law contract theory—i.e., a recovery in the nature of
quantum meruit or quantum valebant."'"' Lumbermens' theory
essendally boiled down to the fact that it "ha[d] paid more than it
owed and the [G]overnment was unjusdy enriched.""*^ While
Lumbermens' claim "may be a sound legal theory for recovery against
an obligee as a matter of state law," the court "conclude [d] that the
United States has not waived sovereign immunity as to such claims."'"
Notably, although the Surety & Fidelity Association of America
argued in an amicus brief that the Government's posidon would
"leave suredes without a remedy when the government impairs the
surety's collateral," the Federal Circuit flady rejected that argument
as "incorrect.""^
Instead, the court somewhat formalistically
explained that "the surety has the right to withhold payment on the
bond, to the extent the surety has been prejudiced," but that "once a
surety makes overpayments on its bond obligation, it has no right to
affirmatively recover against the United States."'
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Lumbermens' claim based
upon the takeover agreement, because Lumbermens failed to submit
a claim to a contracting officer as required by the CDA.'"" The
Federal Circuit thus reversed the trial court's decision below, which
had held the CDA inapplicable to the surety.'"' In the view of the
1997) (finding that the notice requirement for equitable subrogation was met
because the Government was aware of the default). The court proceeded to explain
that "a panel of this court would lack the authority to eliminate this rule in view of
our prior precedents explicitiy holding that equitable subrogation only applies to
payments made after the obligee receives notice of the default." Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 654 F.3d at 1313 (ciutions omitted).
461. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 654 F.3d at 1314-15.
462. Id. at 1316. The Federal Circuit has held "in other contexts that the mere
provision of goods or services to the government in excess of a party's legal
obligation does 'not create an implied-in-fact contract'" over which the COFC would
have jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321,
1327(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
463. Id. at 1315. "Generally speaking, implied-in-law contracts 'impose duties that
are deemed to arise by operation of law' in order to prevent an injustice, whereas
implied-in-fact contracts are 'founded upon a meeting of :he minds, which, although
not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, froni conduct of the
parties showing, in light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit
understanding.'" Id. at 1316 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. United States, 153 F.3d
1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
464. Id. at 1317.
465. Id.
466. M a t 1321.
467. Id. at 1518, 1321-22 (citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas. v. United States, 90 Fed.
Cl. 558, 560-61 (2009)).
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COFC, the CDA did not apply to Lumbermens' claim because the
takeover agreement was not a contract for the procurement of goods
or services and because Lumbermens signed the takeover agreement
in order to fulfill its performance bond obligations.""' The Federal
Circuit, on the other hand, held that the takeover agreement "is
clearly a contract for 'the procurement of construction, alteration,
repair or maintenance of real property.'"""' Moreover, the Federal
Circuit rejected Lumbermens' contention that it was not a contractor
within the meaning of the CDA, noting that the statute defines
"'contractor'" simply as "'a party to a Government contract other
than the Government.'""'"
Lumbermens, for its part, creatively argued that because the
agreement expressly designated Lumbermens as a '"surety"'—rather
than as a "'contractor,'" it was "exempt[] . . . from the jurisdictional
requirements of the CDA" and thus did not have to submit a claim.""
The problem with that argument, according to the Federal Circuit,
was that "the agreement ma [de] clear that Lumbermens became
bound to complete the defaulted construction contract by assuming
the role of a prime contractor and hiring" a replacement
472
contractor.
D.

Privity of Contract

1. CCA Associates v. United States
Although the issue in CCA Associates v. United States"'^ is primarily
one concerning the privity of contract, this case is perhaps more
noteworthy for illustrating the court's willingness to follow its prior
decisions even where they appear to have been wrongly decided. In
this case, the owner of an apartment complex claimed that the
Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987"'"
(ELIHPA) and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990"'^ (LIHPRHA) created a temporary
468. Id. at 1318. (citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas., 90 Fed. Cl. at 560-61)
469. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (3) (2006)).
470. 7d. at 1319 (quoting 41 U.S.G. § 601(4)).
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1520 (explaining that the court "previously recognized that where, as
here, a surety enters a takeover agreement with the government under which the
surety agrees to complete the performance of a defaulted contract, the surety
assumes the role of a prime contractor").
475. 667 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
474. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 201, 101 Stat. 1815, 1877 (1988) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §17151(2006)).
475. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 201, 104 Stat. 4079, 4249 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §4101 (2006)).
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regulatory taking and a breach of contract by depriving the
apartment owner of its contractual right to prepay a governmentbacked mortgage and thereby end its participation in a low-income
housing program."'*
The dispute here traced its origin to a 1961 amendment to the
National Housing Act"" (NHA), which created incentives for private
developers to build housing that would meet the needs of moderateincome families."'^ Under the 1961 amendments, the Government
agreed to subsidize and insure mortgages that participating
developers took with private lenders for up to 90% of the cost of new
housing developments."'" The term of these mortgages was set at
forty years; however, the relevant contracts gave developers the right
to prepay their mortgages after twenty years."'" In return for these
mortgages and other incendves, the developers were required to sign
a "regulatory agreement" with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), under which HUD approval was
required for, among other things, any increases in rent." ' The
restrictions in the regulatory agreement were to remain in effect as
long as HUD insured the mortgage, which, for practical purposes,
meant that developers were subject to HUD regulation until the
mortgage was paid off."^^ Therefore, the twenty-year prepayment
opdon in the mortgage gave developers the opportunity to convert
their properties to market rate housing at an earlier date."*'
To enter the program, developers signed three documents: a
regulatory agreement with HUD, a secured note, and a mortgage."*"
Each of these documents were drafted by HUD and written on HUD
or Federal Housing Administration forms."*" "The secured note,
which was endorsed by HUD, included a term allowing prepayment
476. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1242-43.
477. Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
478. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101 (a) (6), 75 Stat. 149, 150-51
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (2006)); see also S. REP. NO. 87-281, at 4
(1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1923, 1926 (nodng that the 1961 amendments
to the Nadonal Housing Act were made to "enable private enterprise to pardcipate
to the maximum extent in meeting the housing needs of moderate-income
families").
479. Ciénega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citadon omitted); see id. at 1270-71 (discussing the history and purpose of the 1961
amendments to the NHA).
480. Id. at 1270.
481. M at 1271 (citadon omitted).
482. Id.
483. See id. (acknowledging that the regulatory agreement would be terminated
once the prepayment right was exercised).
484. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
485. Id. (cidng CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580, 586 (2010)).
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after [twenty] years, and also incorporated the mortgage by
reference."*"* The mortgage incorporated the secured note and the
regulatory agreement and was signed by the developer and the
lender, but not HUD.*" The regulatory agreement, which was signed
by the developer and HUD, incorporated the legislation and
regulations related to the program, but "did not expressly include the
[twenty] year prepayment provision."*" In sum, the only document
that HUD signed was the regulatory agreement, which did not
explicitly include the prepayment provision.*'^
By the 1980s, Congress grew worried that program participants
were preparing to prepay their mortgages and exit the program en
masse.*'" In order to avoid a resulting shortage in low-income
housing. Congress enacted ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, which, among
other things, effectively prohibited prepayment of mortgages for
many participants in the program.*"' This restriction continued until
April 1996, when Congress enacted legislation restoring prepayment
rights.*"' CCA Associates, a program participant, filed suit, alleging
that ELIHPA and LIHPRHA prevented it from making prepayments,
and that this constituted both a temporary regulatory taking and a
breach of its contractual right to prepayment.*"' The COFC agreed
that the restriction on prepaying the mortgage was a regulatory
taking, but held that there was no breach of contract because CCA
did not have privity of contract with HUD with respect to its
prepayment rights.*" The parties filed cross-appeals.*""
With respect to CCA's breach of contract claim,*""* the Federal
Circuit explained that it was compelled by its prior decision in Ciénega
486. Id. (citing CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 586).
487. Id. (citing CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 586).
488. Id. (citing CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 586).
489. Id.
490. See Ciénega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that Congress responded to concerns about withdrawal from the lowincome housing market with "carrot-and-stick" legislation).
491. Id. at 1272-73 (citation omitted); see also CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1243
(discussing ELIHPA and LIHPRHA).
492. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120,
§ 2(b), 110 Stat. 834, 834-35; Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; see also Ciénega Gardens, 503 F.3d at
1274 (explaining that the 1996 legislation freed participants from prepayment
restrictions provided that they had not entered into use agreements with HUD)
493. CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 584.
494. M. at 620.
495. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1242.
496. Most of the Federal Circuit's opinion was devoted to addressing the
regulatory taking issue and is, therefore, outside the scope of this article on
government contracts law. See id. at 1244-46 (analyzing CCA Associates' takings
claim).
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497

Gardens v. United States, to find that there was no privity of contract
between the apartment owner and HUD regarding prepayment
rights; therefore, the Government's restrictions on prepayment did
not breach the contract.*'* In Gienega Gardens, a case involving the
same housing program, the Federal Gircuit held that there was no
privity of contract between HUD and a program participant
regarding prepayment rights.*" The court reasoned that because the
United States was a party to only one of the three documents—the
regulatory agreement—and the regulatory agreement did not
contain any prepayment provision, there was no privity of contract
between HUD and the participant regarding this right.""" The only
document that mendoned prepayment rights was the secured note—
a document to which the Government was never a signatory.''
In GGA Associates, the Federal Gircuit explained that because the
facts before it were not distinguishable from Gienega Gardens, it was
compelled to find that GGA also lacked privity with HUD regarding
its prepayment rights and, therefore, there was no breach of
^ 502
contract.
It is interesting to note, however, the panel's""' implicit
acknowledgement that Gienega Gardens may have been wrongly
decided.'"* Indeed, die Federal Gircuit noted diat both the GOFG
and the United States Gourt of Appeals for the Tenth Gircuit were
sharply critical of the Gienega Gardens decision.^"" The GOFG asserted
that the three documents (i.e., the regulatory agreement, the secured
note, and the mortgage) should be treated as an "'integrated
497. 194 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
498. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1250 (cidng Ciénega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1246).
499. Ciénega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1235-36, 1246 (citadon omitted).
500. W. at 1241-43.
501. M at 1242.
502. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1250.
503. The majority opinion was written by Judge Moore and joined by Judge
O'Malley in its endrety. Judge Dyk wrote a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment and dissendng-in-part. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissendng-in-part). However, Judge Dyk's separate opinion focused only on his
disagreement with the majority's treatment of the taking? issue, and he appeared to
be in agreement with the majority's opinion on the breach of contract issue. Id. ("I
agree with . . . the majority's affirmance of the Claims Court's dismissal of the
contract claim. I write separately because I disagree with the majority's . . . incorrect
and wholly unnecessary dictum approving aspects of 'he Claims Court's takings
analysis.").
504. See id. at 1248-50 (majority opinion) (conceding that the trial court was
correct to find Ciénega Gardens controlling but also recognizing the court's
"exceedingly thoughtful and thorough analysis" suggesdng that HUD was a party to
the "overall transacdon" involving all three relevant documents (cidng CCA Assocs.
V. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580, 592, 598 (2010))).
505. Id. at 1249-50 (cidng Aspenwood Inv. Co. v. Mardnez, 555 F.5d 1256, 1260
(10th Cir. 2004)).

1078

AMERICAN

UNfVERSiTY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1013

„506

transacdon.'"
It explained that reading these three documents
together "'gives effect to the fact that the [twenty-year] limit on
prepayment contained in the secured note was a provision drafted by
HUD that replicated HUD's reguladons on prepayment and was used
by HUD to induce participation in the program. "'°'" Thus, if not for
the fact that it was bound by Ciénega Gardens, the COFC would have
held that HUD and CCA Associates were in privity as to the twentyyear prepayment provision.""'
The Tenth Circuit refused to follow Ciénega Gardens for essentially
the same reasons as noted by the COFC. In Aspenwood Investment Co.
V. Martinez,^^ the Tenth Circuit concluded that these related
documents consdtuted "'a single, overarching agreement.'"^'" The
court explained that the property owner's "'promises were primarily
for the benefit of HUD (and the participants in the low income
housing program), not for the lender'" and that "'it was the
demonstrated intent of HUD (and of [the] plaintiff and of the
lender) to be bound by the terms of all of the parts of the
transaction.'"""
The Federal Circuit panel was seemingly sympathetic to these
arguments. It noted that:
[A]ll three documents [i.e., the regulatory agreement, the secured
note, and the mortgage] are intended to reach a single goal: to
induce developers to provide low income housing. Each of these
three documents forms a critical part of the overall transaction,
and without any one of these documents, the overall terms binding
CCA would be substantially different."
Moreover, the court noted that, "as highlighted by the dissent in
Ciénega Gardens, the Tenth Circuit in Aspenwood, and the Court of
Federal Claims in this case, it is certainly possible that the three
agreements should be interpreted together.""" Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit explained that it was bound by its prior precedent in

506. Id. at 1249 (quoting CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 598). The trial court also
noted that the circumstances of the document signing supported this conclusion, as
all three documents were on HUD's preprinted forms and were signed
contemporaneously in a single room in HUD's New Orleans office. CCA Assocs., 91
Fed. Cl. at 592.
507. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1249 (quoting CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 595).
508. Id. (quoting CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 598).
509. 355 F.3d 1256 (lOtii Cir. 2004).
510. CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Aspenwood Inv. Co., 555 F.3d at 1260).
511. Id. at 1249-50 (quoting Aspenwood Inv. Co., 355 F.3d at 1260).
512. Id. at 1249 (citing CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 592).
513. Id. at 1250.
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Ciénega Gardens and that a petition for en bane review was CCA's only
remaining avenue for relief.^'"
rv. WTNsrAR CASES
A. First Annapolis Bancorp v. United States
In the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, and
given that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) lacked the funds required to liquidate all of the affected
savings and loan associations (thrifts), the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) encouraged healthy thrifts to merge with failing
thrifts.^'" To bring about this end, the FHLBB offered incentives to
the acquiring thrifts, primarily "purchase method accounting," which
would allow the thrift to "designate the excess of the purchase price
over the fair value of all of the ailing thrift's identifiable assets
acquired as an intangible asset, called 'supervisory goodwill.'"^'" The
acquiring thrift could then count this supervisory goodwill as
regulatory capital and amortize that capital over a long period of
time."" However, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) provided that thrifts could no
longer include supervisory goodwill as part of their capital
accounts."'* As a result, some acquiring thrifts that relied on
supervisory goodwill to meet their regulatory capital requirements
could no longer do so and were liquidated by the Government.^'^ In
United States v. Winstar Corp.,'^" the Supreme Court held that FIRREA

constituted a breach of the Government's prior agreement that had
allowed acquiring thrifts to count supervisory goodwill as regulatory
capital."'
First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United State/

is the latest—and

perhaps one of the last—in the long line of Winstar cases that have
been heard by the Federal Circuit.^" After posting net losses for a
514. Id.
515. First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 64^ F.5d 1367, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 859, 844, 847 (1996) (plurality
opinion); Casde v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
516. Id. at 1368-69 (citing Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 848-49).
517. M atl569 (citing WinitorCor^., 518U.S. at851).
518. Id. (citing Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 857).
519. Id. (citing Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 858).
520. 518U.S. 859 (1996).
521. Id. at 909-10 (plurality opinion).
522. 644 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
525. See Holland v. United States, 621 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting
that this 2010 decision would he "one of the last of the Winstar cases"); Schooner,
supra note 1, at 1104 (citing Anchor Sav. Bank v. United States, 597 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
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number of years. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Annapolis (First Federal) submitted an application to the FHLBB on
November 5, 1987 to obtain outside capital through a supervisory
conversion.*" "First Federal also submitted a Holding Company
Application (HCA) and Regulatory Business Plan (Business Plan),"
which together provided for the incorporation of Bancorp.*"
Bancorp was created to acquire the stock of, and infuse capital into.
First Annapolis Savings Bank, F.S.B (First Annapolis) .*'" "On July 8,
1987, First Federal entered into a Supervisory Agreement with the
FHLBB," under which it proposed a plan to merge with First
Annapolis.*" FHLBB approved the merger on July 21, 1988,*'* and
also granted five years of regulatory forbearances to First Annapolis
(but not to Bancorp) relating to asset amortization and regulatory
capital requirements.*'" Bancorp then entered into a Regulatory
Capital Maintenance and Dividend Agreement (RCMDA) with the
FSLIC on August 12, 1988, under which Bancorp agreed to "maintain
First Annapolis's regulatory capital level as required."*'" While First
Annapolis was able to meet its first capital benchmark on June 30,
1989, FIRREA and its related regulations became effective on August
9, 1989, eliminating the prior forbearance incentives.*" Without the
regulatory goodvwll allowances provided by the forbearances. First
Annapolis failed to meet its regulatory requirements and went into
receivership.*''
At issue in the case was whether Bancorp had standing to sue the
Government for breach of contract on the ground that FIRREA
'"eliminated those forbearances after roughly one year of
performance.'""" The COFC previously held that Bancorp had
standing, finding that a contract, "including the RCMDA, HCA,
Cir. 2010) ) (characterizing Anchor Savings Bank, FSB v. United States as "another of the
vanishing breed of Winstar cases").
524. First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 644 F.3d at 1369-70 (cidng First Annapolis
Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 263, 266 (2007)).
525. Id. at 1570 (citadon omitted).
526. Id. (cidng First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 266, 267 n.6); see Holding
Company Lacks Standing in Winstar Suit, Fed. Cir. Holds, 53 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 1 284
(2011) (explaining that Bancorp would sell shares of its stock to generate capital to
be infused into First Annapolis).
527. First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 644 F.3d at 1370 (cidng First Annapolis Bancarb.,
/nc, 75Fed. Cl. at266).
528. Id. (cidng First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 269).
529. Id. at 1370-71 (ciúns First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 268, 270-71).
530. M a t 1371.
531. Id. at 1372 (cidng First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl
765, 775-76 (2009); First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 272).
532. Id. (cidng First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 272).
533. Id. (cidng First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 89 Fed. Cl. at 768).
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Business Plan, Resolutions, and Forbearance Letters," existed
between Bancorp and the Government.*'* On appeal, the Federal
Circuit conversely held that Bancorp did not have standing because it
lacked privity with the Government.^'^ Specifically, the court noted
that Bancorp was only a signatory to the RCMDA and did not receive
the forbearance letters that contained the Government's goodwill
promises.^"* Bancorp attempted to argue that it was the "acquiror" of
that goodwill promise, relying on Home Savings of America, FSB v.
United States,^'^ but the court distinguished the case on three
grounds.^" First, it was First Federal, not Bancorp, that initiated
negotiations vñth the Government and entered into the Supervisory
Agreement."'" Second, Bancorp was not incorporated until after First
Federal infused capital in March 1987; thus, it did "not exist at the
time the negotiations began."'**" Third, the court held that, in the
absence of a "larger transaction" to which Bancorp was a party,
Bancorp was not an "essential participant as a contracting party."^*'
V.

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CASES

Recent years have seen SNF cases emerge as "the new Winstar
cases," in that there has been a significant number of similar cases
brought before the Federal Circuit, which have focused primarily on
the amount of damages owed to individual plaintiffs.^*' These cases
trace their origin to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA),
through which Congress instructed the Department of Energy (DOE)
to construct and begin operating a permanent repository for U.S.

534. Id. (citing First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 273-78).
535. M. at 1376.
536. Id. at 1375.
537. 399 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
538. First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc., 644 F.3d at 1374-75.
539. Id. at 1374 (citing First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 266).
540. Id. at 1374-75 (citing First Annapolis Bancorp., Inc., 75 Fed. Cl. at 266 n.6).
541. Id. at 1375 (quoting Home Sav. ofAm., 399 F.3d at 1350).
542. Graham, supra note 5, at 1054 (arguing that SNF cases are "the new Winstar
cases"); see, e.g.. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. United States, 668 F.3cl 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Sys.
Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co.
V. United States, No. 2011-5020 (Fed. Cir. argued Nov. 7, 2011); S. Cal. Edison Co. v.
United States, 655 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011); N. States Power Co. v. United States,
No. 2008-5037 (Fed. Cir. dismissed July 15, 2011); Dominion Res., Inc. v. United
States, 641 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Energy Nw. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1300
(Fed. Cir. 2011); S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power v. United States, No. 2011-5033 (Fed. Cir. appeal
docketed Dec. 16, 2010); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States;, 536 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ind.
Mich. Power Co. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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nuclear utilities' SNF and other high-level radioactive waste (HLW)
no later than January 31, 1998.*"'
While the NWPA provided that DOE would manage the disposal of
the nuclear waste, it contemplated that the nuclear power industry
would pay for the repository through the creation of a Nuclear Waste
Fund.*"" In order to establish this fund, the NWPA made it effectively
mandatory for the nation's nuclear utilities to enter into a uniform
waste disposal contract with DOE by prohibidng the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) from issuing or renewing an
operating license to any utility that refused to enter into such a
contract.*"" This "Standard Contract" contained a schedule of fees,
and, as required by the ISTWPA, mandated that the DOE begin
accepting nuclear waste by January 31, 1998, and continue doing so
"until such time as all SNF . . . has been disposed of."*"'^
Unfortunately, the NWPA's plan to create a permanent repository
for the nation's SNF went off track almost immediately.""' Faced with
"[c]omplex environmental regulations, fierce litigation from
communities near the proposed repository sites," political pressure,
and congressional neglect, progress on the permanent repository
slowed to a crawl;""* by the mid-1990s, "DOE had given up hope of
meeting the January 31, 1998 deadline."*"' When this deadline
passed, the utilities that were parties to the Standard Contract
brought a wave of lawsuits against the federal government.*"" Indeed,
543. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, §§111,
302(a)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 2201, 2207-08, 2258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131,
10222(a)(5)(B) (2006)); see also Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at 1502 (discussing the NWPA).
544. 5ee Tom Kenny, Note, Where to Put it All? Opening the Judicial Road for a LongTerm Solution to the Nation's Nuclear Waste Problem, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1525
(2011) (citadon omitted) (discussing the history of the NWPA). As of July 2009, the
udlides had paid approximately $17 billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Budgeting
for Nuclear Waste Management: Hearing Before the H Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 5
(2009) (statement of Christopher A. Kouts, Acting Director, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep't of Energy).
545. 42U.S.C. §10222(b)(l)(A) (2006).
546. lOC.F.R. §961.11 (2011).
547. See generally Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States
and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 54 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 485-90
(2010) (providing a more detailed discussion of the difficuldes faced by DOE in
constructing a permanent nuclear waste repository and its aborted effort to establish
such a repository at Yucca Mountain); Kenny, .sti/>ranote 544, at 1323-32 (similar).
548. Daniel Thies, The Decline of the Court ofFederal Claims in Nebraska Public Power
District V. United States, 590 F 3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1203, 1205 (2010) (citing Annemarie Wall, Going Nowhere in the Nuke of Time: Breach
of the Yucca Contract, Nuclear Waste Policy Act Fallout and Shelter in Private Interim Storage,
12 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOKJ. 138,175-83 (2007)).

549. Thies, supranote 548, at 1205 (citadon omitted).
550. Budgeting for Nuclear Waste Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Budget, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Givil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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by 2009, seventy-one utilities had filed separate damage claims in the
COFC for breach of the Standard Contract."'
The prior decisions of the Eederal Circuit have established the
Government's liability for breaching the Standard Contract; thus, the
only remaining question is the amount of damages that are (and vñll
be) owed to each utility."' In 2011, the Federal Circuit issued six
SNF-related decisions, each of which focused primarily on the proper
calculation of damages.""' While many of the issues discussed in these
cases are unique to the SNF area and, therefore, will likely be of little
utility to most practitioners, other issues relating to the calculation of
damages generally may have applicability and utility beyond the SNF
context.
A. Southern Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States
In Southern Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States,""'* the plaintiffs.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Alabama Power Company,
and Georgia Power Company, filed suit in the COFC for partial
breach of the Standard Contract after the DOE was unable to begin
accepting delivery of SNF by January 31, 1998."' The COFC granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the question of liability and
held a trial to determine the amount of damages.^"'* This trial
resulted in awards of approximately $77 million in combined
damages, which the Government appealed on two grounds.""
First, the Government argued that remand was necessary to

551. Id.
552. SeeS. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en bane)). A complete discussion of the Federal Circuit's earlier decisions
establishing the Government's liability in SNF cases is beyond the scope of this
Article. A discussion of the prior case law in this area can be found in this Law
Revieiu's previous articles reviewing the government contracts decisions of the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 5, at 1054, 1069-72; Schooner, supra note 1, at
1106-11. See generally Thies, supra note 548.
553. Supra note 542. The Government's potential liability in these cases is
substantial. Indeed, in 2007, "the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
estimated that the government would owe at least seven billion dollars in damages
for delays in opening a permanent geologic repository, writh further delays increasing
damage costs by approximately half a billion dollars per year." Kenny, supra note
544, at 1331 (citing Matthew L. Wald, U.S. to Owe Billions for Delays In Nuclear Dump,
Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at C4); see also Mark Maremont, Nuclear Waste
Piles Up—in Budget Deficit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2011, at A3 (citing estimates that the
delay will cost the federal government $16.2 billion by 2020).
554. 637 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ).
555. Id. at 1298.
556. S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 77 Fed Cl. 396, 398 (2007).
557. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1300-01 (citing 5. Nuclear Operating Co.,

77Fed. Cl. at460).
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determine the amount that the plaintiffs would have spent storing
SNF if the Government had begun accepting SNF at the rates
anticipated in its 1987 annual capacity report (AGR).^^* At trial, the
pardes agreed that the plaintiffs should be awarded damages equal to
the amount of expenses they actually incurred to store SNF follovnng
the Government's breach minus the costs that the plaindffs would
have incurred storing SNF if the Government had performed on
time."^' The plaintiffs argued that, because of the breach, they were
forced to construct new storage facilides, purchase dry storage casks,
pay for SNF loading costs, and perform fuel reracking, all of which
would have been unnecessary if the Government had begun
accepting SNF as required by the Standard Gontract."'^" The
Government argued, however, that the plaintiffs would have incurred
some of these expenses even if it had begun collecting SNF on time.""'
Determining whether these costs were incurred as a result of the
Government's breach proved to be difficult, however, "because the
Standard Gontract itself did not specify a rate at which [the
Government] was obligated to pick up SNF."^'*^ "Instead, the
Standard Gontract required [DOE] to issue [AGRs] stating which
plants would be granted pick-up allocations first and projecting how
much SNF would be accepted by [DOE]," both on an industry-wide
and individual-plant basis each year.^'*'
At trial, the Government argued that the court should have
adopted a SNF acceptance rate set out in its 1991 AGR, which was
approximately 900 metric tons of SNF per year.'*'^* Unsurprisingly, the
plaintiffs argued that the Government would have accepted SNF at a
much higher rate—3000 metric tons per year—if it were not for the
Government's breach.^"^ The trial court, however, refused to
determine an actual contractual acceptance rate, and instead
concluded that if the Government had begun accepting SNF at a
"'reasonable rate'" of 2000 to 3000 metric tons per year, the plaintiffs
would not have incurred any additional expenses for reracking and
dry storage and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $77 million in
damages.^""
558. /d at 1502.
559. Id. at 1299.
560. Id.
561. M at 1500.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. (cidng S. Nuclear Operadng Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 396, 439, 460
(2007)).
t6
. . .
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Following the COFC trial, the Federal Circuit held separately in
Pacific Gas &'Electric Co..v. United States^^ that the Standard Contract

required DOE to accept SNF at die rates set fordi in the DOE's 1987
ACR, which estimated the 1998 SNF acceptance rate would be 1200
metric tons per year and that this rate would ramp up to 2650 metric
tons of SNF per year by 2004."*^ However, neither the Government
nor the plaintiffs had advocated for the use of the 1987 ACR
acceptance rates at trial and neither party had introduced evidence
regarding the proper amount of damages under these rates." Given
this fact, the Southern Nuclear Operating Co. court found it appropriate
to remand the case back to the trial court to determine whether the
parties could introduce evidence regarding damages under the 1987
SNF acceptance rates."" The court explained that this approach was
necessary to be consistent with its decision in Carolina Power & Light
Co. V. United States.^^' In Carolina Power, the plaintiff failed to

introduce evidence concerning its damages under the 1987 rates at
trial, which was held before the court's Pacific Gas decision."^ The
court "excused the failure," however, and remanded the case back to
the trial court because the plaintiff "could not 'be expected to have
forecasted the outcome of [the court's] intervening decision' in
Pacific Goi.""' The Federal Circuit explained that the ladtude that
was given to the plaintiff to reopen the record in Carolina Power must
also be provided to the Government."'
Second, the Government argued that the "Unavoidable Delays"
clause in the Standard Contract precluded expectancy damages."'
The Government attempted to raise this defense before the COFC,
but the court found it to be waived because the Government never
mentioned it in any pre-trial pleadings or at trial."" The Government
argued before the Federal Circuit that the reason it did not raise the
Unavoidable Delays clause defense earlier was because it believed this
defense was precluded by the D.C. Circuit's decision in Northern States

567. 556 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
568. Id. at 1290,1292.
569. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1300, 1302-05.
570. /a. at 1303-04.
571. 575 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
572. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1303-04 (citing Carolina Power, 573 F.3d
at 1275-77); see also Graham, supra note 5, at 1069-72 (providing a more detailed
discussion of Carolina Power).
573. Id. (quoting Carolina Power, 575 F.5d at 1275).
574. Id.
575. Id. at 1298 (citing S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 596,
452-59 (2007)).
576. Id. at 1501 (citing S. Nuclear Operating Co., 77 Fed. Cl. at 457).
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and that it would be held in

contempt by the D.C. Circuit if it had raised the defense.'"
By way of background, in May of 1995, once it became clear that
the DOE would not be able to construct a SNF storage facility on
time, the agency issued a final rulemaking concluding that it "[did]
not have an unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to
accept high level waste and spent nuclear fuel beginning January 31,
1998 in the absence of a repository or interim storage facility.""'
However, in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Department of Energy^^ the

D.C. Circuit found that the agency's interpretation was contrary to
the NWPA and that the agency had a statutory obligation to begin
accepting SNF no later than January 31, 1998, regardless of whether a
storage facility had actually been constructed.'"
The DOE's
contracting officer subsequently announced that DOE's failure to
begin accepting SNF was excused under the "Unavoidable Delay"
clause of the Standard Contract.'*^ In Northern States, the D.C. Circuit
held that DOE was improperly trying to avoid its statutory obligations
under the NWPA and issued a mandamus order "precluding DOE
from excusing its own delay on the grounds that it ha[d] not yet
prepared a permanent repository or interim storage facility."'^' Thus,
the Government argued before the Federal Circuit that it could not
have voluntarily waived the Unavoidable Delays defense because it
577. 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
578. 5. Nuckar Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1305; see also N. Stales Pmuer Co., 128 F.3d
at 760 ("[W]e preclude DOE from concluding that its delay is unavoidable on the
ground that it has not yet prepared a permanent repository or that it has no
authority to provide storage in the interim.").
579. Department of Energy Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance
Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793, 21,793-94 (May 3, 1995); see also Ind. Mich. Power Co. v.
Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (summarizing DOE's
interpretation).
580. 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
581. Id. M 1277.
582. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1305.
583. N. States Power Co., 128 F.Sd at 760-61. Nine years after the D.C. Circuit
issued the Northern States Power Co. mandamus order, the COFC held that the D.C.
Circuit did not have jurisdiction over disputes under the Standard Contract and,
therefore, its mandamus order did "not preclude [the United States] from arguing
. . . that it did not breach the Standard Contract based upon the Unavoidable Delays
clause." Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673-74 (2006), rev'd,
590 F.3d 1357, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane). On appeal, an en bane Federal
Circuit reversed this decision and held that the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to enter
the mandamus order and that its decision in Northern States Power Co. was entided to
resjudicata on the issue of liability, but that the mandamus order did not "direct the
implementation of any remedy." Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 590 F.3d
1357, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane); see also S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at
1306 (discussing Northern States); Schooner, supra note 1, at 1106-11 (providing
additional information on Northern States Power Co. and Nebraska Public Power District);
Thies, supranote 548, at 1203-15 (similar).
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"'reasonably believed that it was compelled by the Northern States
mandamus order, under threat of sanctions for contempt, from
raising the Unavoidable Delays defense in this case.'""*"
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It explained diat the
Government misunderstood the scope and purpose of the Northern
States mandamus order.*** In the court's view, the Northern States
mandamus order did not prevent the Government from making any
argument in the COFC.**" "Rather, it was directed toward a situation
in which the [DOE] itself issued a decision rejecting the premise of
the court's Indiana Michigan decision."**' The Federal Circuit
characterized the D.C. Circuit's concern as being that the DOE would
itself "'implement [an] interpretation of the Standard Contract that
excuse [d] its failure to perform,'" not that die agency might make
any particular argument in the COFC.*** Accordingly, die
Government's assertion that the Unavoidable Delays clause
precluded expectancy damages was waived.**"
B. Energy Northwest v. United States
In Ener^ Northwest v. United States,^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed in

part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a $56.9 million
award by the COFC to Energy Northwest for damages incurred when
the Government breached the Standard Contract.""'
The
Government appealed on three issues.
First, the Government challenged the trial court's award of
approximately $1 million to Energy Northwest for modifications that
the utility made to its Columbia plant in Richmond, Washington.*"'
When Energy Northwest's Columbia plant was originally constructed,
it included on-site wet storage pools that were projected to have
enough capacity to hold the plant's SNF through 2003.*"' This
capacity would have been sufficient if the Government had begun
accepting delivery of SNF by January 31, 1998 (as required by the
584. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.5d at 1505.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. M at 1505-06.
588. Id. at 1306 (alteradons in original) (quoting N. S'.ates, 128 F.3d at 760).
589. Id. Because this defense was waived, the Federal Circuit never reached the
quesdon as to whether the Unavoidable Delavs clause could provide a defense to
expectancy damages. Id. This quesdon will, however, most likely be properly
presented to the court in a future SNF case.
590. 641 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
591. Id. at 1304, 1513 (cidng Energy Nw. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 531, 560
(2010)).
592. M at 1504-05.
595. /d. at 1303.
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Standard Contract); however, when it became clear that the
Government would not begin accepting SNF in the foreseeable
future. Energy Northwest began constructing an independent dry
storage facility for its SNF.'"* In addition to the direct costs of
building the dry storage facility—^which were not challenged on
appeal—Energy Northwest sought $1 million for certain
modifications that it made to its Columbia plant.'"'
These
modifications were necessary so that Energy Northwest could safely
transfer SNF from the plant's wet storage pools to the dry storage
casks that would be used at its newly constructed storage facility.'"**
The Government challenged this expense, claiming that because
the Standard Contract made the utilities responsible for loading their
own SNF into casks for transport to the DOE, Energy Northwest
would have needed to make plant modifications even if the
Government had not breached the Standard Contract.'" The
Government noted that, under the Federal Circuit's decision in
Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States,^^^ the plaintiff "must submit a

hypothetical model establishing what its costs would have been" in
the absence of the breach, and this model must be compared to the
plaintiffs actual expenses to determine the quantum of damages.'""
Thus, the Government asserted that Energy Northwest should have
been required to prove that the modifications it made to its
Columbia plant were different than those required by the Standard
Contract.**""
Energy Northwest asserted, however, that the
Government's position was a request for a "damages offset" for
avoided future costs and, therefore, under Carolina Power, the
Government had the burden of proving that these costs were
completely avoided, and not merely deferred, before they could be
offset from the award.**"'
594. Id. at 1303-04.
595. Id. at 1304-05.
596. M. at 1304.
597. Id. at 1305 (citing DOE Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, IV.A.2(a) (1983)); see also
id. at 1302-03 (citing DOE Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, IV.A.2(a), IV.B.2 (1983))
(detailing the obligations for both the utility and the DOE in regard to SNF
transportation).
598. 536 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
599. Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at 1305 (citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., 536 F.3d at 1273Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001))
600. Id.
\
iJ601. Id. at 1305-06 (citing Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 573 F 3d
1271, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). In Carolina Power, the Government urged the Federal
Circuit to reduce an $83 million damages award by $10 million based on the
Government's estimate that, had the Government begun timely accepting SNF, the
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The court agreed with the Government. It explained that Garolina
Power addressed the limited circumstance where "a breaching party
seeks to offset an award by proving that the non-breaching party has
achieved some cost savings because the breach permitted it to
avoid—not just defer—some aspect of performance."''"^ Here,
however, the Government's position was that Energy Northwest was
attempdng to recover modification costs that were not actually
caused by the breach.'^"' Thus, Garolina Power did not apply to Energy
Northwest's plant modificadons; these expenses could only be
recovered if Energy Northwest could prove, to a reasonable certainty,
that but for the Government's breach, the modification expenses
would not have been incurred.'* *
Second, the Government sought to vacate $2 million in
compensadon for certain indirect overhead expenses that Energy
Northwest claimed were related to its efforts to mitigate the
Government's breach.'"" The Government argued that, under Yankee
Atomic, Energy Northwest was required to prove what its indirect
overhead costs would have been in a hypothetical non-breach world,
and use that as a baseline to demonstrate how much its indirect
overhead expenses increased.
The Federal Gircuit rejected this argument. It explained that the
udlity would have been required to spend $10 million processing and loading its SNF
into casks for transportadon to the Government. 575 F.3d at 1274, 1277. The court
rejected the Government's request for an offset, explaining that the expenses for
loading and processing were only "deferred" and had not been "avoided." Id. at
1277. The underlying logic was that, in order to award the Government the full
amount of its requested offset, the court would first need to conclude that "the
udlides' future loading costs would be zero." Energy Nrv., 341 F.3d at 1306 (discussing
Carolina Power). The court refused to speculate in that manner, explaining that
"'|j]ust as the udlides cannot now collect damages not yet incurred under the
ongoing contract, the government cannot prematurely claim a payment that has not
become due.'" Carolina Power, 573 F.3d at 1277 (quodng Yankee Atomic, 536 F.5d at
1281).
602. Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at 1306.
605. Id. at 1505.
604. Id. at 1307. Energy Northwest raised a number of other arguments in
support of its posidon, including (1) that the construcdon of the dry storage facility
was "a reasonable and foreseeable response to the government's breach;" (2) that
there was tesdmony in the record that there was a " 90% likelihood'" that it would
need to re-modify its Columbia plant when the DOE eventually begins to accept
delivery of SNF; (3) that the Government was responâble for causing uncertainty
regarding what the non-breach modificadon costs would be; and (4) that the
Standard Contract actually did not require it to make any modificadons because
DOE was responsible for selecdng the type of cask that would be used. Id. at 1307-08
(citadon omitted). The court held, however, that notwithstanding these arguments,
Yankee Atomic placed the burden of proving the quantum of expenses in the nonbreach world with the udlity. /d. at 1508.
605. /d. at 1308-09.
606. Id.
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plaindff was entided to prove "the amount of costs by whatever means
available, so long as the cumuladve result is a reasonable certainty
that the awarded costs were actually caused by the breach."^"' It noted
that Energy Northwest "presented testimony estimating the pordon
of its overhead costs fairly allocated" to support of its midgation
efforts using generally accepted accounting practices; as a result, the
court could find no error in the trial court's acceptance of that
Finally, the Government sought reversal of | 6 million in damages
for interest Energy Norüiwest paid to obtain financing for the
projects that Energy Northwest implemented in order to mitigate the
Government's breach of the Standard Contract.^"' The Government
argued that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a), it was immune from interest
on funds borrowed to midgate its breach, and nothing in any other
statute or the Standard Contract waived that immunity."" Energy
Northwest claimed, however, diat § 2516 (a) granted sovereign
immunity only for "interest 'ori a claim (e.g., awards of prejudgment
interest), and not interest 'as' a claim (e.g.. Energy Northwest's
financing costs incurred as part of midgadon).""' In support of this
posidon. Energy Northwest noted that the Federal Circuit had found
that the Government could be liable for interest expenses incurred
by a contractor.^'^
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the
court only awarded interest as an equitable adjustment pursuant to
changes requested by the Government under a "Changes" clause, and
these Changes clauses "amounted to a waiver of the [G]overnment's
immunity against recovery of interest.""' Because the Standard
Contract did not contain a Changes clause, or any other express
waiver of immunity against recovering interest, there was no waiver of

607. Id. at 1309 (citing Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. United States, 422 F.5d 1369 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
608. Id.
609. Id. at 1510 (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 510, 514 (1986)).
610. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (2006) (stating that "[i]nterest on a claim against
the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the United States Court of
Federal Claims only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for
payment thereof); iee also England v. Contel Advanced Sys., Inc., 584 F.5d 1372,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (barring recovery of interest paid on funds "borrowed as a
result of the government's breach" (citations omitted)).
611. Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at 1510 (emphasis added).
612. Id. at 1510 (citing Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1968)). For
example, in Bell v. United States, the trial court allowed a contractor to recover interest
costs that were accrued in order to comply with a unilateral change order issued by
the Government. 404 F.2d at 984.
615. Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at

lSU-12.
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immunity; consequently, the court held that the trial court erred in
awarding Energy Northwest its interest expenses.*"
C Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States
In Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States,^^' the Federal Circuit

affirmed a |42.7 million award by the COFC to Dominion for
damages incurred when the Government breached the Standard
Contract."^ The Government appealed on two issues.
First, the Government argued that the COFC should not have
allowed Dominion to recover $10.9 million for costs incurred by
Dominion's predecessor. Northeast Utilities."' In 2001, Northeast
Utilities sold its Millstone Power Station (near New London,
Connecticut) to Dominion."^ Approximately $10.9 million of the
$42.7 million the trial court awarded to Dominion was for interim
storage expenses incurred prior to Dominion's purchase of the
Millstone facility.*'' The Government argued that Northeast Utilities
was barred from transferring its claim against the Government under
the Assignment of Claims Act."
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that both
the NWPA and the Standard Contract contained language allowing
the parties to transfer all of their "'rights and duties'" under the
Standard Contract, and that "[o]ne of the rights of a party to a
contract is the right to bring a claim for damages resulting from
breach.""^' Accordingly, the court observed that the Assignment of
Claims Act did not prohibit assignment of Northeast Utilities' claim
to Dominion."^^
Second, the Government appealed the trial court's denial of
discovery regarding the economic benefits that Dominion may have
received by deferring payment of a "one-time fee" that was required
under the Standard Contract."" This one-time fee was to compensate
the Government for disposal of SNF generated by the utility before
614. M at 1311-13.
615. 641 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
616. Id. at 1360-61 (citing Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 259,
263 (2008)).
617. M a t 1361.
618. Id. (citing Dominion Res., Inc., 84 Fed. Cl. at 261).
619. Id. (citing Dominion Res., Inc., 84 Fed. Cl. at 263).
620. Id. at 1361-62; je« Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2006).
621. Dominion Res., Inc., 641 F.3d at 1362-63 (quoting Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. § 10222(b) (3) (2006)); see also Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. XIV
(1983) (permitting the assignment of "rights and duties").
622. Dominion Res., Inc., 641 F.3d at 1363-64.
623. M a t 1364.
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April 7, 1983."'" Under its contract with DOE, Dominion was
required to pay a one-time fee of |82.1 miUion, but it was allowed to
make this payment "anytime prior to. the first delivery" of SNF,
subject to a specified rate of interest."'*
On appeal, the Government acknowledged that Dominion's onetime fee was not yet due because the Government had not begun
accepting delivery of SNF."'" The Government argued, however, that
it should have been allowed discovery to investigate whether
Dominion received any economic benefit from having "use of that
money in the meantime by investing, financing other projects, or
avoiding the need to obtain loans."""
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It explained that this
type of discovery was foreclosed by its decision in Yankee Atomic, which
stated that a utility had no obligation to pay the one-time fee where it
was not yet due under the contract."'* Moreover, because Dominion
was sdll obligated to pay the one-time fee with interest "when it comes
due," the Government could not claim an offset to the damages
award."'" Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's
award."'"
D. Dairyland Power Cooperative v. United States
In Dairyland Power Gooperative v. United States,'^^' the Federal Circuit

affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a $37.6 million
award in favor of Dairyland Power."" As with the other SNF cases
decided in 2011, liability in this matter was not at issue; the
Government only contested the calculadon of damages."" The
Government's appeal raised three issues.
First, the Government contended that the COFC erred in finding
that, absent the Government's breach, Dairyland would have been
able to negotiate with other utilities to have all of Dairyland's SNF
removed in 1998—the first year that the Government was obligated to

624. Id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. VIII.B.2).
625. Id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. Vin.B.2).
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id. at 1565 (citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F 5d 1268
1280 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
629. Id. (citing Yankee Atomic, 556 F.3d at 1280)
630. Id.
631. 645 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
632. Id. at 1366, 1368 (citing Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 90 Fed Cl
615,618(2009)).
f
/
f
,
.
633. Id. at 1366 (citations omitted).
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begin accepting SNF—rather than in 2006 as anticipated by the
Standard Contract.**'*
By way of background, Dairyland operated a nuclear power plant
in Genoa, Wisconsin until 1987.**'" Although the reactor was no
longer active, Dairyland still had thirty-eight metric tons of SNF
remaining at the plant in a wet storage pool; the fact "that there was
SNF stored on-site prevent [ed] Dairyland from permanently
decommissioning" the plant."*'"* Both the Government and Dairyland
agreed that, under the terms of the Standard Contract, the
Government would have removed the last of Dairyland's SNF in
2006.**" However, Dairyland argued before the trial court that if the
Government had begun collecting SNE on time, Dairyland could
have negotiated vsdth other utilities to purchase their year-one (1998)
SNE removal allocations, thereby eliminating all of its SNE in 1998
rather than 2006.*" In support of this argument, Dairyland presented
expert testimony which modeled the "'exchanges market'" for yearone removal allocations and opined that Dairyland would have
eliminated all of its SNF in the first year of performance."*'" The trial
court agreed and computed Dairyland's damages as the cost of
storing SNF from 1998 to 2006.***"
On appeal, the Government argued that there were a number of
deficiencies in the trial court's findings. For example, the
Government argued that Dairyland did not identify the specific
utilities from whom it would have obtained the year-one delivery
commitments; moreover, local communities might have pressured
634. Id. at 1366-67 (citing Dairyland Poxver Coop., 90 Fed. Cl. at 618).
635. Id.
636. M. at 1367.
637. Id. (citing Dairyland Power Coop., 90 Fed. Cl. at 627). Although the Standard
Contract did not contain a detailed schedule for when the Government would
remove SNF from each utility, the Standard Contract did give priority to removing
older fuel before newer fuel. Id. (citing Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, art. II,
VI.B.l(a) (1983)). The parties agreed that under this "oldest fuel first" rule, the
Government would not have removed the last of Dairylamd's SNF until 2006. Id. at
1369.
638. Id. at 1369. The Standard Contract specifically permitted this type of
negotiation between utilities to move to the front of the queue for transferring SNF
to the Government. Section V.E of the Standard Contract, entitled "Exchanges,"
provided that the utilities
shall have the right to exchange approved delivery commitment schedules
with parties to other contracts with DOE for disposal of SNF and/or HLW;
provided, however, that DOE shall, in advance, have the right to approve or
disapprove, in its sole discretion, any such exchanges.
Standard Contract, 10 C.F.R. § 9611.11, sec. V.E (1983).
639. Dairyland Power Coop., 645 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Dairyland Power Coop., 90 Fed.
Cl. at633).
640. Id.
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utilities to use their year-one removal slots to remove SNF from the
community instead of selling the slots.***' The Government also
argued that the selling utilities might have tried to extract high prices
for their year-one allocations, and that Dairyland did not produce
pre-litigation evidence illustrating any intent to seek early removal of
SNF from its Wisconsin plant.***^ The Federal Gircuit rejected these
arguments, explaining that it could review the factual findings of the
GOFG only for clear error; based on this standard of review, the trial
court's acceptance of Dairyland's exchange market argument
appeared to be "grounded in proper weighing of the evidence.""'
Dairyland filed a related cross-appeal on the "exchanges market"
issue, which was similarly unsuccessful."** At trial, Dairyland argued
that it was entided to approximately $33.28 million in storage costs
for the period 1998 through 2006."*' The court held, however, that
Dairyland's model was fiawed because it did not account for the
substantial amount that Dairyland would have been required to pay
to purchase year-one delivery commitments from the other utilities."***
The trial court explained that the other utilides would be
"'sophisticated and well-advised negodators'" who would have
demanded that Dairyland split the benefit of the transacdon with
them evenly; thus, the cost of the year-one commitments would have
been $16.64 million, and the court reduced Dairyland's award by this
amount."*'
On appeal, Dairyland asserted that the trial court's reducdon of its
damages by half was in error because the cost of the first-year delivery
commitments was only deferred by the Government's breach and,
when the Government ultimately performs, Dairyland will still need
to negotiate for the year-one commitments."** The Federal Gircuit
disagreed, explaining that purchasing the year-one commitments was
an "elective future cost that Dairyland might or might not take up,
depending on its situation," if and when the Government begins
accepting SNF."*' Dairyland also asserted that the trial court's
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 1570.
644. M at 1571-72.
645. M at 1368, 1371.
646. Id. at 1571-72 (cidng Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl.
615,655-56(2009)).
647. Id. at 1572 (quodng Dairyland Power Coop., 90 Fed. Cl. at 635-36).
648. Id. (cidng Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 573 F.5d 1271, 1277
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
In Carolina Power, the Federal Circuit held that it was
inappropriate to offset for costs that are not avoided but only deferred. 575 F.5d at
1277.
649. Dairyland Power Coop., 645 F.5d at 1572.
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reducdon of its damages by half was excessive, that the true cost of
purchasing year-one commitments would have been only around the
marginal bid price ($2 million), and that the presence of muldple
sellers would have driven down the price.**"" The Federal Circuit,
however, refused to disturb the trial court's award, noting that the
appellate court typically "'affords the Court of Federal Claims wide
discredon in assessing an appropriate quantum of damages.'"""
Second, the Government argued that the trial court erred in
awarding Dairyland indirect overhead and general and administrative
costs because Dairyland failed to show that the Government's breach
actually caused Dairyland to incur these costs, and that Dairyland
would have incurred at least a portion of the costs absent the
breach."'^ The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the trial
court rejected this very argument, and, absent clear error, the court
was bound to defer to the trial court on the matter.'*"'
Finally, the Government asserted that the trial court erred in
awarding Dairyland the endre cost of its investment in a private SNF
repository; this repository was known as Private Fuel Storage, LLC
(PFS), which was formed by a consortium of eleven nuclear utilides,
including Dairyland, to locate, license, build, and operate an off-site
SNF repository."" The Government contended that "Dairyland's
investment in PFS was more profit speculation than mitigation" and
thus should not be recoverable.""" Specifically, the Government
noted that PFS was a for-profit venture and that the size of
Dairyland's investment in PFS far exceeded Dairyland's actual need
for off-site interim storage of its SNF.""* The Federal Circuit agreed
that "expectation damages are available to con~ pensate a plaintiff for
the cost of acdons taken in mitigation, and not for speculadve
ventures."'*"' The court explained that Dairyland had the burden of
proving how much of its investment in PFS was midgation-related, as

650. Id. at 1572-75.
651. Id. at 1373 (quoting Carolina Power, 573 F.3d at 1276).
652. Id.
655. Id. at 1574 (citing Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 615,
658 (2009)).
654. / ¿ a t 1568, 1374.
655. Id. at 1375.
656. Id. Trial testimony indicated that using standard storage casks, Dairyland
would need six casks to store the thirty-eight metric tons of SNF remaining at its
plant. Id. at 1375-76. Dairyland, however, owned a 13.5% share in PFS, which given
the facility's projected 4000 cask capacity, was the equivalent of 540 cask^ at PF&—far
in excess of Diaryland's own needs. Id. at 1376.
657. Id.
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opposed to a speculative investment, and remanded the matter to the
trial court.""'
E. Southern California Edison Co. v. United States
In Southern California Edison Co. v. United States,^"^ the Federal

Circuit affirmed a $142,394,294 award to Southern California Edison
(SCE) for damages caused by the Government's breach of the
Standard Contract.""" Of this amount, the trial court attributed
$23,657,791 to indirect overhead costs associated with SCE's
construction of on-site SNF dry storage facilities following DOE's
breach of the Standard Contract.""' The sole issue on appeal wais
whether these indirect overhead costs could be included in the
damages calculation.*'^^
The Government raised two arguments against awarding the
indirect overhead costs for construction of the dry storage facilities.
First, the Government argued that the indirect overhead costs for
construction of the dry storage facilities should have been excluded
from the damages award because SCE failed to meet its burden of
separating out the overhead costs caused by the breach from those
unrelated to the breach.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It noted that the trial
court, relying on the Federal Circuit's earlier decision in Carolina
Power, had found that "it was proper for SCE to allocate" the indirect
costs for the dry storage project on a percentage basis "because if it
had not, 'other projects and SCE operations [would] support an
658. Id. at 1376-77.
659. 655 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
660. Id. at 1319-20 (citing S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 337, 340
(2010)).
661. Id. at 1320 (citing 5. Cal. Edison Co., 93 Fed. Cl. at 371). SCE began
construction of on-site dry storage facilities after DOE failed to begin accepting
delivery of SNF in January 1998. Id. (citing S. Cal. Edison Co., 93 Fed. Cl. at 345-46).
Following completion of the first such facility, SCE filed a complaint in the COFC
seeking damages from the United States including: (1) costs of constructing and
operating the dry storage facilities; (2) overhead allocated to the dry storage project;
(3) "off-site storage of SNF;" and (4) "costs associated with SCE's participation in a
limited liabilities corporation with other nuclear utilities known as the Private Fuel
Storage project." Id. (citing S. Cal. Edison Co., 93 Fed. Cl. at 346).
662. /¿.at 1319.
663. Id. at 1321-22 (citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d
1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Energy Nw. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1300,
1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that overhead costs could be awarded "[s]o long
as the plaintiff can present a sufficient basis for making the trial court reasonably
certain that the claimed damages were caused by the breach"). "The Government
[did] not contest the existence of the claimed overhead expenses nor [did] it contest
that SCE's general overhead expenses increased because of the Government's
breach." 5. Cal. Edison Co., 655 F.3d at 1321.
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unequal share of the overhead costs.'"""" Moreover, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the COFC that the costs were causally linked to
the breach because if the Government had not breached its contract
and created the need for the dry storage, SCE could have allocated
these resources to other projects.""" The Federal Circuit stated that it
found no error in the trial court's analysis and deferred to its findings
as required by precedent."'^"
Second, the Government argued that most of the overhead costs
were unrecoverable because they were '"of the type that had been
incurred prior to the breach'" and would have been incurred "'as a
result of [SCE's] normal operations . . . irrespective of the breach."'""'
In making this argument, the Government cited Precision Pine àf
Timber, Inc. v. United States,^ in which the Federal Circuit held that
the operator of a sawmill was not entitled to the full amount of
overhead damages that it requested after the Government suspended
a forestry contract because several of the costs associated with the
operation of the sawTnills were fixed costs that were not dependent
on the Government's contract.""" The Federal Circuit rejected the
Government's argument and its reliance on Precision Pine. The court
explained that because SCE constructed the dry storage facilities after
the Government's breach and the facilities were necessary as a result
of the breach, this was "not a case where the underlying costs were
incurred by operations independent of and unrelated to the
breach.""'" Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's
award.""
F. Boston Edison Co. v. United States
In Boston Edison Go. v. United States,^^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed

in part, reversed in part, and remanded a decision awarding damages
to Boston Edison Co. and Entergy Nuclear Generation Co."" The
Government appealed the trial court's award on three grounds, while

664. 5. Cal. Edison Co., 655 F.5d at 1522 (alteration in original) (quoting S. Cal.
Edison Co., 93 Fed. Cl. at 559).
665. Id. (quoting S. Cal. Edüon Co., 95 Fed. Cl. at 559).
666. Id.; see also Energy Nw., 641 F.3d at 1310 (acknowledging that the court would
defer to the trial court's determination of damages "in the absence of clear error").
667. S. Cal. Edison Co., 655 F.5d at 1522 (quoting 5. Gal. Edison Co., 95 Fed. Cl. at
356).
668. 596 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
669. 5. Gal. Edison Go., 655 F.3d at 1322 (citing Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 834).
670. Id.
671. /A at 1319.
672. 658 F.5d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
673. /d. at 1363-65.

1098

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1013

674

Entergy appealed on one. Of these issues, the most noteworthy was
the question of whether Boston Edison could recover damages under
a "diminution-of-value theory" in a partial breach setting.**'"
In order to understand this issue, some background is necessary.
In 1997, Massachusetts enacted legislation that required regulated
utilities such as Boston Edison to either "sell their electricity
generation assets and operations or to functionally separate their
generation operations JErom their transmission and distribution
operations."**'** As a result of this legislation, Boston Edison began
seeking potential buyers for its Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in
Plymouth, Massachusetts.**" "In addition to Pilgrim's physical
facilities, Boston Edison offered to transfer a 'fully-funded
decommissioning fund' to cover the costs of decommissioning
Pilgrim" and the costs of post-decommissioning fuel storage "until
such time as the Department of Energy takes title to the fuel."**" This
offer indicated that Boston Edison would "make an advance payment
to a prospective purchaser to cover the cost of DOE's anticipated
future delays in performance of the Standard Contract.""*'"
Ultimately, Entergy agreed to purchase the Pilgrim plant for $80
million and to "accept decommissioning and storage responsibilities
in return for a decommissioning fund of $428 million."**'" "In setting
the price for the decommissioning fund," Entergy considered the risk
of "DOE's continued delay in performance under the Standard
Contract.""*" Under this arrangement, Boston Edison specifically
retained the right to any claims "'related or pertaining to the
Department of Energy's defaults under the DOE Standard Contract
accrued as of the Closing Date, whether relating to periods prior to
or following the Closing Date.'""*" "Entergy received rights to all
other claims arising from the Standard Contract."**"
On the day before the sale closed in July 1999, Boston Edison sued
the United States for damages caused by its breach of the Standard
Contract.**'* Entergy also filed suit against the United States for
674. Id. at 1365-66.
675. See id. at 1366-67 (determining that "Boston Edison cannot recover damages
under a diminution-of-value theory in a partial breach setting").
676. Id. at 1364 (citation omitted).
677. Id.
678. M. (citation omitted).
679. Id.
680. M. (citation omitted).
681. M. at 1364-65.
682. Id. at 1365 (quoting the purchase agreement between Boston Edison and
Entergy).
683. Id.
684. Id.
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breach of the Standard Gontract in 2003; the cases were eventually
consolidated.***" Following trial on the issue of damages, the GOFG
awarded Boston Edison $40 million, which included compensadon
for the portion of the decommissioning fund that was "attributable to
DOE's breach of the Standard Gontract."***** The trial court found
that it should have been "reasonably foreseeable to the Government
that Boston Edison would transfer the decommissioning fund to a
third party" and that the DOE's breach forced Boston Edison to pay a
larger amount into the decommissioning fund than otherwise would
have been necessary."*' The trial court also awarded Entergy $4
million for damages caused by the Government's breach.
On appeal, the Government and Entergy argued that the trial
court should not have awarded Boston Edison damages for its
increased payments into the decommissioning fund because partial
breach damages are limited to expenses actually incurred by the time
of trial and cannot include damages that are expected to arise from
future delays in DOE's performance.***' The Federal Gircuit agreed.
The court noted that the Government's ongoing breach of the
Standard Gontract was only a "partial breach" and not a "total
breach."**'" The court went on to explain that under Indiana
Michigan, in the case of a partial breach of contract, damages are
limited to those incurred as of the time of suit; the plaintiff must
bring subsequent suits if it wishes to obtain further damages as they
are incurred.**"
In doing so, the court rejected Boston Edison's argument that
Indiana Michigan did not bar it from recovering damages under a
diminution-of-value theory because Boston Edison suffered an actual
pre-trial loss when it was required to include additional money in the
decommissioning fund when it sold the Plymouth facility."'^ The
court explained that allováng Boston Edison to recover damages in
this manner "would undermine the prohibition on recovery of future
damages" and that "the estimated value of future damages agreed
upon by two private pardes should not set the amount of the
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. at 1366.
690. Id. (cidng Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1280
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
691. Id. (cidng Ind. Mich. Power Co., 422 F.3d at 1376-78); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFjUDGMENTS § 26, cmt. g (1982)).
692. Id. at 1365, 1367.
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government's liability for partial breach."""' The court observed that
"[t]he purpose of allowing 'a series of recoveries' for pardal breach,
as opposed to a single recovery for total breach, is to avoid
speculadon about the quantum of future damages," and that the
actual value of the future damages was "no less speculadve simply
because Boston Edison and Entergy attached a price to it."""
The Government also appealed the trial court's award of damages
to Entergy for certain addidonal amounts that Entergy was required
to pay to the NRC in fees that the NRC imposes on the industry to
cover its budgetary expenses.""' The trial court found that the NRC
changed its fee structure in 1999 "as a consequence of DOE's breach
of the Standard Contract" and that "Entergy was forced to pay more
in aggregate fees" as a result of the change.'*"'* In its appeal, the
Government contended that the trial court's calculation of damages
wasfiawedbecause it did not include an offset for the fact that, under
the changed fee structure, Entergy actually paid less in fees for its wet
storage fees and decommissioning.""'
The Federal Circuit agreed with this contention. Citing its recent
decision in Southern Nuclear, the court stated that the non-breaching
party "bears the burden of persuasion to establish both the costs that
it incurred and the costs that it avoided" as a result of the breach.""*
When the breaching party points out costs that were avoided because
of its breach, "the plaintiff must incorporate them into a plausible
model" of damages.'*"" The Federal Circuit remanded the issue to the
trial court "to determine whether adjustments should be made to
Entergy's damages award to account for the decreased share of
generic wet storage and decommissioning fees paid by Entergy" as a
result of NRC's rule change.'""
The Government also asserted that the trial court's award was
incorrect because, in order to recover damages for indirect overhead
costs, Entergy should have been required to prove that these
additional costs were incurred as a result of the Government's
breach."" The Federal Circuit summarily rejected this argument,
explaining that the right of udlides to recover overhead costs had
693. /d. at 1367.
694. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243, cmt. e (1981)).
695. Id. at 1367-68.
696. Id. at 1368.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 1369 (citing S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, 637 F.3d 1297,
1504(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
699. Id. (citing S. Nuclear Operating Co., 637 F.3d at 1304).
700. M at 1370.
701. Id.
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already been established in Energy Northwest and the Government
could not show that the trial court's award of overhead costs
constituted clear error.™^
Finally, Entergy argued that it should have been awarded "the cost
of securing capital for mitigation projects undertaken as a result of
the DOE's breach."'"' Entergy originally argued that it was entitled to
recover this cost, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. §2516(a),""' because it
was seeking the interest "as" a claim rather tihan "on" a claim.'"'
However, after the court rejected this argument in Energy Northwest,
Entergy argued instead that it was "entitled to recover the cost of
securing capital because DOE 'assumed the status of a private
commercial enterprise'" when it "enter[ed] into the business" of
collecting and disposing of SNF.'""
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. It explained that the
"commercial enterprise exception" to the no-interest rule did not
apply because the government's purpose in entering into the
Standard Contract was not to turn a profit but to achieve public
objectives.""" The court noted that the NWPA's purpose was "to solve
the national problem of permanent disposal of spent nuclear
materials."'"' Because Entergy could not point to any provision of the
Standard Contract or the NWPA that specifically waived immunity for
Entergy's interest claim, the court found, in light of Energy Northwest,
that it was not recoverable.'"**
* * *
In 2010, the Secretary of Energy, at the direction of the President,
established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future, with a goal to conduct a comprehensive review of the
country's policy for managing SNF."" In 2011, the Commission
released its report, concluding that "[t]he overall record of the U.S.
nuclear waste program has been one of broken promises and unmet
702. Id. (citing Energy Nw. v. United States, 641 E.3d 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
703. M at 1370-71.
704.' 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (2006) (providing that "[i]nterest on a claim against the
United States shall be allowed . . . only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly
providing for the payment thereof).
705. Bos. Edison Co., 658 F.3d at 1370 (citing Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer,
12 F.3d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
706. Id. at 1371 (quoting Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317 n.5 (1986)).
707. Id. (citing Sandia Oil Co. v. Beckton, 889 F.2d 258, 263 (lOtii Cir. 1989) (per
curiam)).
708. Id. (citing Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States;, 590 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)).
709. M a t 1372.
710. Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, 75 Fed. Reg. 5485
(Feb. 3, 2010).
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commitments.""' The Commission further concluded that the recent
"decision to suspend work on the [Yucca Mountain] repository has
left. . . [the public and the nuclear industry] wondering, not for the
first time, if the federal government will ever deliver on its
promises."'"
Indeed, today, almost three decades after the passage of the
NWPA, "the federal government appears to have no viable alternative
solution on the horizon for this significant problem.""' In the
meantime, the nation's nuclear utilities continue to store over 60,000
metric tons of SNF in on-site facilities, with that amount growing by
2000 metric tons per year."" Nuclear power companies whose
contracts were breached will continue to file complaints for breach of
contract against the Government until such time that the
Government fulfills its contractual duties, setdes these cases once and
for all, or undertakes some alternative means of performance that
cures the financial harm to the plaintiffs. Unfortunately, the oudook
for any such solution in the near-term does not appear to be positive.
CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit's 2011 government contracts opinions were
few in number. The decisions that were issued seem unlikely to cause
any sea changes in the field of government contracts law; however,
there were a notable collection of cases resolving long standing
jurisdictional questions. Those decisions focused primarily on
resolving jurisdictional questions regarding the authority of the
Federal Circuit, the COFC, and the Boards to hear government
contracts cases. Chief among these decisions are Slattery, which gives
the COFC jurisdiction over claims against NAFIs, and Todd
Gonstruction, which gives the COFC the authority to hear challenges
711. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, DRAFT REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF ENERGY xiv (2011), available at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/brc_draft_report_29iul2011 O.pdf.
712. /¿.at25.
~
713. Schooner, supranote 1, at 1106-07 (footnote omitted).
714. See de Saillan, supra note 547, at 474 (citation omitted). Obviously, it is
beyond the scope of this Article to recommend any solutions to this vexing problem.
However, many other articles are devoted to diis topic. See generally Marta Adams,
Yucca Mountain—Nevada's Perspective, 46 IDAHO L . REV. 423 (2010); Thomas B.
Cochran & Geoffrey H. Fettus, NRDG's Perspective on the Nuclear Waste Dilemma 40
ENVTL. L. REP.

10,791, 10,792 (2010); de Saillan, supra note 547; David R. HillThe

NWPA and the Realities of Our Gurrent Situation, 40 ENVTL. L . REP. 10,795 (2010);
Richard B. Stewart, Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,783
(2010); Daniel T. Swanson, NWPA is Still a Viable Option for Solving the Nuclear Waste
Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,800 (2010); Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: The Future of
Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP.J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L . 231 (2010).
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to performance reviews under the FAR. Those contractors and their
counsel who wish to challenge a performance evaluation should take
note of the court's requirement that the complaint in such cases
meet the heightened pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.
Following the trend of the past two years, the Federal Circuit issued
a diminishing number of decisions in bid protest cases. In 2011, the
Federal Circuit issued only two such decisions^ both of which were
decided in favor of the Government. These decisions, taken together
with the decisions from the prior two years, illustrate the court's
emphasis on judicial restraint and deference to procuring officials.""
A substantial number of the Eederal Circuit's 2011 government
contracts decisions also were dedicated to resolving damages issues
related to the SNE saga. While many of these decisions focus on
issues that are specific to SNF litigants, the decisions contain broader
lessons regarding the calculation of damages following the
Government's breach of contract, and practitioners may draw lessons
from these cases regarding the proper treatment of damages.
Finally, 2011 is, in some ways, noteworthy for the cases that the
Federal Circuit did not hear. Over the past year, the court issued
only one Winstar decision. First Annapolis Bancorp. These Winstar

cases, which represented a substantial portion of the court's
government contracts docket in years past, are becoming fewer in
number and are unlikely to be common going forward."^

715. See Graham et al., supra note 5, at 993 (noting that the seven precedential
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2009 were all decided in favor of the
Government and "emphasized the need for judicial restraint and deference to
procuring officials").
716. See Holland v. United States, 621 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(characterizing the Court's 2010 decision in Holland as "one of the last Winstar
cases"); see also Schooner, supra note 1, at 1104 (referring to Winstar claims as a
"vanishing breed of... cases").
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